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1
Introduction
Wei-Chiao Huang 
Western Michigan University
American labor unions have experienced a precipitous decline in 
membership and strength and are apparently at a crossroads today. Fac 
ing the changing structure of the economy, management's increasing 
resistance to union organizing and demand for concessions, and the grow 
ing penetration of imports into domestic markets, it is urgent for organiz 
ed labor to reassess its past practices and strategies and to seek new 
methods and solutions.
Why are unions declining? Is the decline in the labor movement a 
typical global pattern or is it unique to the U.S.? How are unions respond 
ing to the changing world? What position is organized labor taking on 
the various policy issues? What are some of the innovative ideas and 
experiments currently undertaken to improve labor-management rela 
tions? And are they here to stay or short-lived? Ultimately, what is the 
future of American labor unions? Some of these questions were addressed 
by six scholars in their lectures delivered at Western Michigan Univer 
sity during the academic year 1987-1988. Those lectures form the basis 
of this volume, while this introductory chapter will provide a general 
flavor and summary of the six papers.
Sharon Smith starts with a case study of collective bargaining be 
tween the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and 
the representing unions, primarily the Communications Workers of 
America (CWA), from 1984 to 1986. The divestiture of AT&T, effec 
tive in 1984, has essentially changed the world in which AT&T and 
its unions bargained for the past forty years. In chapter 2, Smith gives 
an interesting account of how AT&T and its unions responded to this 
new world as manifested in their bargaining processes.
1
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With divestiture and the consequent loss of government-sanctioned 
monopoly, the "new" AT&T found itself subjected to intense domestic 
and foreign competition in the long-distance telephone service and in 
formation systems markets. It was not in position to meet such com 
petition because of high labor costs, inflexible job designs, and out 
moded work practices inherited from its days as a regulated monopo 
ly. Recognition of this problem led to talks with the CWA early in 1984 
in an attempt to communicate to them the need to reduce costs by amend 
ing the 1983 contract. These talks were unsuccessful. AT&T came back 
in 1985 with a serious overture to labor leaders, seeking to terminate 
the 1983 contract early and to bargain new three-year agreements. The 
sensitive information AT&T shared with their unions essentially gave 
the union insider status, while the company's proposal, including pro 
fit sharing and a job bank offer differed drastically from previous bargain 
ing positions. Nevertheless, partly due to internal division in the CWA, 
this attempt yielded few results except that all parties agreed to move 
up the contract termination date to May 31, 1986. During the crucial 
1986 bargaining, AT&T continued to stress the need to strengthen its 
competitive position by limiting wage and benefit increases, restruc 
turing the workforce, consolidating contracts, etc. While the unions were 
strongly committed to keeping the wage increases they had bargained 
in previous contracts, they also pressed hard on issues of employment 
security, retraining and pension increases. The negotiations proceeded 
on schedule until they hit a snag over the size of the wage package, 
along with some minor issues. A 26-day strike ensued and ended with 
CWA accepting essentially the same offer made by AT&T before the 
strike.
Smith points out that the wage difference between the two parties was 
small, and would not previously have resulted in a strike. AT&T's new 
hard-nosed policy on the small wage difference, a significant depar 
ture from its predivestiture bargaining conduct, reflects its sense of urgen 
cy in response to the new business environment. CWA, while not 
unaware of the changing environment (evidenced by their insider status) 
underestimated AT&T's resolve on the wage issue and fought to main 
tain the status quo. They ultimately learned the hard way that now "they 
were working for a different company in a different industry." Smith's
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paper demonstrates vividly that adjusting a given labor-management rela 
tionship to a changing world can be a slow and painful process of learn 
ing and compromise for both parties. Hopefully that process can be 
smoother for other industries "when all parties recognize that even when 
interests are in conflict, problems can best be solved to the mutual 
satisfaction of all through a participative and collaborative approach, 
and when parties share in the responsibility of the decision and the 
rewards that result."
The telecommunication industry's adjustments in labor relations to 
changes in the economic environment is not a unique case. In fact, 
numerous experiments and innovations in labor-management relations 
have occurred in so many industries that scholars have begun to ask 
if those innovations will permanently transform traditional American 
industrial relations. Valuable insights into this question are given by 
Thomas Kochan and Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld in chapter 3. Based on 
case studies of nine companies and associated unions, they examine four 
major innovations under way in American industrial relations: employee 
participation, flexible forms of work organization, participation in new 
technology decisions, and participation in strategic management deci 
sions. Regarding employee participation, they note that a plateau seems 
to exist in the growth of the quality of worklife (QWL) initiative, and 
that a narrowly focused QWL process itself cannot sustain widespread 
support. Thus the QWL process can best serve as a useful starting point 
for building mutual trust and learning participative problemsolving 
methods. Subsequently, it requires commitment of the top level manage 
ment and union leaders to expand the scope of participation into a wide 
variety of issues involving work organization, technology and strategic 
planning.
Regarding work organization reforms, it is found to be easier to in 
troduce flexible work organization concepts in new worksites than to 
retrofit an existing facility with new systems. To cope with the inherent 
difficulty of retrofitting existing plants, Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 
suggest doing it incrementally whenever natural "opportunities" (threat 
of plant closing, potential of new investments, etc.) arise to stimulate 
the change. As for setting up flexible work systems in new sites or in 
completely refurbished unionized plants, they advise that, in light of
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the GM Fiero versus Lake Orion experiences, it should be done by 
involving workers and union leaders in early stages of the design and 
planning processes. Turning to the introduction of new technology, the 
aforementioned principles are equally applicable. In addition, the 
NUMMI experiment (GM-Toyota joint venture) underscores the need 
for broadening the concept of technology to encompass many aspects 
of organization design and human resource management practices. 
Without integrating technology and human resource considerations, 
management "faces longer learning periods for making the technology 
work and greater resistance by employees to the full utilization of the 
technology." To integrate technology and industrial relations, in turn, 
requires "fundamental and lasting changes in the roles of union leaders, 
workers and managers, and in their relationships."
The last innovation union participation in strategic management 
decisions stands in sharp contrast to traditional U.S. labor relations, 
in which management was to manage and labor was to labor and never 
the twain to meet. Only when both parties are ready to break away from 
that old mode and accept a broader role for labor can this innovation 
be initiated and sustained. Such conditions, evidence again suggests, 
will be met more likely and naturally through "bottom-up" incremen 
tal expansions of participation rather than through direct formal board 
representation by the union. Hence Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 
emphasize that while the four union participations being discussed repre 
sent discreet starting points for industrial relations innovations, none 
of them can survive over time independent of others. Instead, when 
those innovations are introduced at all levels of industrial relations and 
reinforce and help sustain each other, they can be institutionalized and 
result in permanent transformation of traditional industrial relations in 
an organization.
Such transformation, however, cannot easily permeate industries, 
given the deep-rooted stand against unions taken by the majority of 
American managers. Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld discuss various 
strategies and choices facing American management, union, and govern 
ment leaders for the wider diffusion of these innovations. They end their 
chapter calling for "comprehensive review and updating of both the 
specific labor laws and the array of economic, trade, regulatory, and
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employment and training policies" in order that the innovative prac 
tices being experimented with in selected settings can be diffused to 
broader settings.
This task of policy review is partially undertaken by George Johnson 
in chapter 4, in which he examines organized labor's political agenda 
with respect to four groups of policy issues: (1) domestic labor market 
issues, (2) international trade policy, (3) monetary and fiscal policy, 
and (4) policy related to women in the labor market. For each issue, 
he reviews the AFL-CIO's position, explains the rationale behind it, 
and evaluates its overall impact in terms of standard economic analysis. 
It should be noted, however, that organized labor does not function as 
a single entity, despite the seemingly high degree of political coopera 
tion among unions. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO does not speak for all 
unions, which have various and sometimes conflicting political priorities.
Particularly noteworthy among Johnson's discussions is labor's posi 
tion on international trade and macroeconomic policies. It is interesting 
to note that the same AFL-CIO, now so vehemently opposing free trade, 
used to denounce opponents of lower tariffs in the 1950s as "protec 
tionists." The radical change in labor's stand on trade over the past 
30 years is understandable given that disproportionately more industries 
and associated unions have suffered in recent years from the mounting 
trade deficit than have benefited from trade. Does it follow then, as 
the AFL-CIO clearly states, that the U.S. should adopt a more protec 
tionist set of policies? Like most economists, Johnson does not think 
so. Instead, he thinks those restrictive trade policies attack only the symp 
tom, not the root cause of the trade crisis. The cause remains the same: 
huge government deficits driving up the dollar, resulting in worsening 
terms of trade. Thus, a more sensible solution, in his view, lies in ad 
dressing the cause of the trade deficit, while improving trade adjust 
ment assistance programs to alleviate the symptoms. How should the 
government deficit be reduced? The AFL-CIO prefers raising taxes to 
cutting federal spending, a rather long-sighted and seemingly reasonable 
approach. In its own words, "skimping on infrastructure to cut the deficit 
is a short-run expediency that will constrain growth in the future. The 
far wiser course is to raise the necessary revenue and develop appropriate 
spending priorities. ..."
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Equally noteworthy is the specific method of tax increase favored 
by labor: leaving the 15 percent rate (up to about $40,000 income in 
the current system) intact, but increasing both the higher rate (now 33 
percent) on personal income and the profits rate from 34 percent to 38.5 
percent. Johnson notes that the typical union member is above the mid 
dle of the income distribution and would therefore be adversely affected 
by the progressive tax hike. Thus it is not entirely self-interest that 
motivates labor with respect to tax policy. Johnson concludes that while 
many of the AFL-CIO's positions are motivated by the self-interest of 
blocks of their member unions, political altruism cannot be ruled out 
in some of their positions, and that there is a growing preference by 
labor for government intervention in the economy at the micro level.
No innovative idea to cope with an economy's macroeconomic and 
labor problems has attracted so much attention and controversy recent 
ly as the idea of profit sharing (or more broadly, gain-sharing ar 
rangements). In chapter 5, Martin Weitzman, the leading theorist and 
proponent of profit sharing, gives a very complete nontechnical argu 
ment about the overall advantage of tying some part of workers' pay 
to the performance of the firm. Weitzman points out that the central 
economic dilemma of our time is how to simultaneously reconcile 
reasonably full employment with reasonable price stability. In his view, 
the prevailing wage system of paying labor cannot help solve that dilem 
ma and in fact is responsible for it, because the rigid money wage system 
throws the entire burden of economic adjustment onto employment and 
the price level. By contrast, a profit-sharing system (PSS), because of 
its built-in flexibility puts in place exactly the right incentives to resist 
unemployment and inflation, viz., the profit-sharing component of a 
worker's wage acts like an automatic shock-absorbing cushion that helps 
maintain full employment even when the economy is unbalanced by 
some shock to the system. Thus, the major case for widespread adop 
tion of PSS is its ability to help improve macroeconomic performance, 
especially in a short-run disequilibrium situation. Furthermore, it can 
also reduce the noninflationary rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Weitz 
man enumerates several NAIRU theories and emphasizes that in no case 
would a PSS cause a higher natural rate of unemployment, and in most 
of the more reasonable scenarios it promises to generate lower long-
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run unemployment than the current wage system. He further suggests 
that a PSS not only possesses favorable macroeconomic properties but 
that it may also improve microeconomic performance in that the motiva 
tional effects of such a system may increase productivity, and that a 
share system might provide better employment stabilization to the firm.
Having extolled the virtues of PSS, Weitzman responds to the objec 
tions commonly raised against profit sharing. Most of the objections 
are dismissed as involving a fallacy of composition. The most noteworthy 
example of fallacious reasoning is that profit sharing exposes workers 
to unnecessary risk. Weitzman argues that this is true only for the in 
dividual tenured worker (the insider) and is false for the aggregate of 
all would-be workers, and that it is better for the risk to be shared by 
everyone than a portion of them (the outsiders). However, he does ad 
mit that the following question is legitimate: if profit sharing is so 
desirable, why doesn't it spread spontaneously? Weitzman responds with 
the externality or market-failure explanation: contract forms are chosen 
by employed workers and firms involved, with no consideration of their 
aggregate effect; hence, few individuals or firms would find it beneficial 
to switch to a profit-sharing contract since the most obvious benefits 
do not accrue to the inside parties. This market-failure argument 
underscores the inherent difficulty of implementing Weitzman's idea 
in an economy in that it requires society wide reform and government 
intervention such as tax incentives for profit-sharing income. Thus, while 
his theoretical arguments are well taken, there are still legitimate ques 
tions regarding the workability of his model. But that is, of course, 
beyond the scope of his paper.
In the next chapter, Richard Freeman takes us beyond the U.S. scene 
to review the changing patterns of unionism in developed Western coun 
tries, and to speculate about changes in union status in Communist 
economies. His major point is that the deunionization experience in the 
U.S. is not a "necessary" feature of advanced postindustrialized 
capitalism. This is evidenced by the diverging trends of unionization 
among developed OECD economies, with union density falling sharp 
ly in countries like the U.S. and Japan, while reaching unprecedented 
peaks in others like Denmark and Sweden. What causes this divergence? 
Freeman claims that' 'the divergence results in large part from the degree
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to which country differences in the legal and institutional features of 
industrial relations give employers the incentive and opportunity to op 
pose unionization of their workers, not to 'inexorable' economic 
changes." He refutes several nonconflictual explanations showing that 
they are inconsistent with cross-country comparisons and detailed within- 
country evidence. A case in point is the often given reasoning that shifts 
in the composition of employment toward traditionally nonunion jobs 
and types of workers lead to union decline in the U.S., which contradicts 
the fact that other countries such as Canada have experienced similar 
compositional changes but with thriving unionism. He then articulates 
his thesis that the major cause of private sector union demise in the 
U.S. is aggressive management opposition to union organizing, and that 
the rising management offensive is not only due to the growing cost 
of union presence to firms and to management's antiunion reflex, but 
is particularly due to the accommodating legal structure that allows 
virulent campaigns against union organizing drives and imposes lenient 
penalties for illegal union-busting activities. By contrast, it is no coin 
cidence that in those economies where unions are strong, either the labor 
laws restrict management's ability to influence organizing, or manage 
ment opposition is significantly muted, for example, by centralized wage 
negotiations as found in neo-corporate systems. His thesis is further 
substantiated by a pooled cross-country time series regression analysis 
which firmly establishes the statistical significance of the impact of legal 
and institutional factors on union density.
This in no way frees American unions from the blame for their own 
trouble, however, given the substantial unexplained residuals left in the 
regression results. For one thing, compared to unions in other coun 
tries, American unions are often slow to realize the problems besetting 
them and consequently respond to them too late. This may be due to 
the low turnover and aging union leadership, and, Freeman suggests, 
may also be due to the decentralized structure of American labor in 
that "such a structure concentrates union efforts on local or sectoral 
rather than national issues, guaranteeing slow reaction to problems that 
affect unionism in its entirety." Finally, Freeman moves on to assess 
the future of unions in the Communist world in the era of "glasnost" 
and "perestroika." He speculates that because only autonomous unions
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can provide the needed counterforce to old-line managers and party func 
tionaries who stand in the way of reform, and because only free unionism 
offers the greatest promise to spark work effort that is necessary for 
Communist economies to advance, growing independent union activi 
ty will go hand in hand with the reform.
The final chapter by Orley Ashenfelter deals with another aspect of 
labor relations, i.e., dispute resolution. His paper focuses on arbitra 
tion as a dispute resolution system, specifically the "interest arbitra 
tion" system for settling wage disputes, operating in the U.S. public 
sector. Ashenfelter begins by describing how interest arbitration arose 
to become a feature of public sector wage determination against the 
background wherein labor in the public sector is permitted to unionize 
and to bargain but not to strike. He then describes two common forms 
of interest arbitration in use in the U.S.: conventional arbitration, in 
which the arbitrator is selected to review cases presented by both sides 
and to fashion any awards deemed suitable; and final-offer arbitration, 
where the arbitrator must select one or the other party's offer without 
compromise. One interesting twist of the second form is tri-offer ar 
bitration used in Iowa, where a third offer determined by a neutral fact- 
finder is also put on the table. The common view on these systems is 
that conventional arbitration tends to produce a "chilling" effect on 
bargaining because the disputing parties, presuming that the arbitrator 
will simply split the difference, may present extreme demands in order 
to gain from the compromise; whereas in final-offer arbitration, such 
a standoff won't occur because the parties dare not go to extremes for 
fear that the arbitrator might select a more reasonable offer made by 
the other party. This view is seriously questioned by Ashenfelter as it 
involves conflicting assumptions about arbitrators' behavior: they are 
assumed to split the difference in conventional arbitration but not in 
final-offer arbitration. Actually, if they also try to split the difference 
in the latter, which amounts to flipping a fair coin to choose a final 
offer, the chilling effect will resurge since the expected gain from present 
ing the more extreme demand is greater!
Instead, Ashenfelter hypothesizes that the arbitrators behave consistent 
ly, regardless of the type of system under which they are asked to 
operate. Specifically, the arbitrator would use some unspecified exter-
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nal criteria to arrive independently at some notion of a "reasonable" 
award in a given factual situation. Under conventional arbitration, he 
would fashion an award taking into account both the positions of the 
parties and his own notion of a reasonable award; under final-offer ar 
bitration, he would choose whichever final offer was closer to his own 
preferred award. Ashenfelter further hypothesizes that the arbitrators' 
independently-formed, preferred awards can vary from place to place 
and from arbitrator to arbitrator, rendering their final decisions truly 
unpredictable by the parties and outside observers. Are these hypotheses 
consistent with observed behavior? He proceeds to review quantitative 
studies of arbitrator selection and decisionmaking in simulation ex 
periments and in practice in Iowa and New Jersey. The statistical 
evidence in these studies displays a remarkable stability in the operating 
characteristics of the arbitration systems and strongly supports his 
hypotheses. Thus, it appears that arbitral reference to external criteria 
and arbitral uncertainty are the two central aspects of U.S. arbitration 
systems. This also implies that neither system exhibits chilling effects 
because the uncertainty associated with an arbitral award would motivate 
the parties to negotiate their own settlement in order to avoid the gam 
ble an arbitrator's decision entails. Although a great deal can be learn 
ed from Ashenfelter's paper, some questions remain unanswered. For 
instance, if arbitrators' decisions are uncertain, and if the parties are 
risk averse, why does arbitration exist? Also, precisely why may ar 
bitrator decisions be characterized in this way? Ashenfelter's conjec 
ture that the answers may be related to the cooperative nature of the 
arbitrator selection process awaits exploration in further research.
In closing, organized labor is said to be at a crossroads. Perhaps it 
would be more appropriate to say that the entire labor-management rela 
tionship is at a crossroads. Before driving through the intersection, we 
must look both ways very carefully, because at stake are not only the 
future of labor unions, and the way that labor and management will 
interact with each other, but also the international competitiveness and 
vitality of the U.S. economy. It is hoped that this volume will provide 
some insights into the problems, the choices, and the future path fac 
ing American industrial relations. Although the diversity of the six papers 
allows no simple conclusions, one observation is in order. It seems to
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be a common view held by the authors, at least by Kochan, Johnson, 
Freeman and Ashenfelter, that there is a need to study extensively the 
propriety and efficacy of current labor laws and also of labor-related 
public policies. Such an endeavor, however, will be the topic of a future 
symposium. After all, as Freeman elegantly states, "there is no rest 
in the practice or study of industrial relations."

2 
Bargaining Realities
Responding to a Changing World
Sharon P. Smith 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company
As unions in the United States begin their second century, it has 
become increasingly obvious that they are in a stage of continuing and 
sharp decline in numbers and in overall influence. The decline, though 
not limited to the private sector, has been concentrated there. Union 
penetration of the private labor market (as measured by percent 
represented) reached a peak in 1953 and has now declined to the levels 
of nearly 50 years ago. l At the same time, the industries in which unions 
remain concentrated have been under pressure from a combination of 
forces: technology has changed the nature of work; deregulation has 
changed the ways many of these firms do business; and competition 
from abroad and from nonunion domestic firms has increased pressure 
on prices.
In response, collective bargaining has sometimes been observed to 
have moved in new directions as "unions and companies were groping 
to find ways to accommodate traditional union roles to very new 
economic patterns. . . . Could the parties convert their skill at dividing 
up the goodies to equally effective methods for combating the losses?" 2 
The bargaining that occurs in these circumstances has often been term 
ed "concession bargaining." To use such a label, however, ignores 
the fact that unions, management, and stockholders all share in the out 
come as firms respond to outside forces. Given this shared fate, it 
becomes clear that unions and management must choose between work 
ing jointly to meet the challenges of outside forces or fighting to main 
tain the status quo and in doing so accelerate their own decline. 3
Nowhere have these changes been more dramatic and concentrated 
than in the telecommunications industry. This industry was long at the 
forefront of technological change in the workplace: where technology
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changes the nature of work but "technological blur" often makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the functions performed by the worker 
and those performed by the machine. For example, with the introduc 
tion of LMOS/MLT (loop maintenance operations system/mechanized 
loop testing), a high-skill technical job has been transformed into a largely 
clerical job because the technical tasks that had been performed by the 
worker are now performed by the machine with which the worker in 
teracts. Moreover, in the 1980s, deregulation has changed the way firms 
do business in this industry and has subjected them to competitive 
pressures they have never experienced before. 4 Thus, a detailed ex 
amination of the recent bargaining in one part of the telecommunica 
tions industry AT&T can provide insight into how both sides of the 
bargaining table in any industry should respond to change.
The basic reality of 1986 bargaining was that the world had changed 
for both AT&T and its unions. A series of judicial and regulatory deci 
sions since the beginning of the decade had transformed the company 
into a very different employer from that which bargained its last con 
tract in August 1983. As a result of these institutional changes, the 1986 
contract was the first between parties with 40 years of bargaining history. 
The issues that were resolved wages, benefits, employment security, 
working practices had been addressed in previous bargainings, but the 
answers were different because of the institutional changes and because 
of company and union activities that took place between 1984 and 1986. 5
Institutional Background
AT&T began operations on January 1, 1984 as a divested company 
with approximately 260,000 occupational (nonmanagement) employees, 
of whom 90 percent were represented by unions. The principal unions 
were the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and the Inter 
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). There were also 
a number of smaller unions representing, in total, about 5 percent of 
the employees. Since 1974, bargaining between the Bell System and 
these unions had traditionally been carried on through a two-tier struc 
ture: national bargaining covered issues of universal application such
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as wage and benefit improvements, and local bargaining covered issues 
of regional or unit application generally referred to as working prac 
tices. The relationship between the company and these unions was 
generally excellent, as it had been characterized over recent years by 
an openness and a growing commitment to participation among the dif 
ferent parties.
The principal structural developments that influenced bargaining both 
individually and interactively were: the Amended New Entities 
Agreements (AMOA, effective in 1980, amended in 1982, and ter 
minated in 1987); Computer Inquiry II; and the Consent Decree. 6 The 
Amended New Entities Agreements applied to reassignments of 
represented employees made in connection with any corporate 
reorganization. They assured that no employee would lose representa 
tion status or the provisions of the then-existing collective bargaining 
agreements. In addition, the Agreements extended a number of 
assurances concerning employees' wages, benefits, credited service, 
and location.
Computer Inquiry n, issued in April 1980 as the Federal Communica 
tions Commission's (FCC's) final decision in its second Computer In 
quiry, represented the FCC's acknowledgment that the advance of 
technology had muted the distinction between data processing (com 
puters) and data transmission (telephones). Instead, the FCC drew a 
new distinction between "basic services," which would remain sub 
ject to regulation under the Communications Act of 1934, and "enhanced 
services," which would be open to all competitors. Accordingly, in 
keeping with this new distinction, AT&T was permitted to sell customer 
premises equipment and enhanced telecommunications services under 
the terms of this decision only through a subsidiary that was fully 
separated from the regulated businesses providing "basic services." 
The FCC made a ruling lifting this requirement in September 1985.
Prior to 1984, AT&T was the largest nonfmancial corporation in the 
world and the dominant firm in three separate, though interrelated, in 
dustries: the manufacture of telephone equipment, local telephone ser 
vice, and long distance telephone service. In 1974, the U.S. Justice 
Department filed a criminal antitrust suit against AT&T, charging it 
with monopolization and conspiracy. After six years in discovery, the
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suit went to trial in 1981. On January 8, 1982, AT&T and the Justice 
Department announced a Consent Decree to settle the suit out of court. 
Under the Consent Decree, the former Bell System was split into AT&T 
and seven Regional Holding Companies, which, in turn, encompassed 
22 Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). In exchange for AT&T's 
divesting itself of the operating companies, the antitrust suit was nullified 
and major markets were deregulated. The fundamental principle guiding 
the assignment of personnel in divestiture was that people would follow 
their work. Represented employees were afforded the protections of 
the AMOA. Therefore, when assigned, they carried with them their 
representation status and contracts.
Early Bargaining Efforts
Early in 1984, shortly after divestiture and while still in the first con 
tract year of the 1983 agreement, it became apparent that both AT&T 
and the BOCs had too many employees and too high costs for their new 
operating environments. At the same time, it was clear that AT&T's 
"business" had changed far more than the BOC's. In essence, the BOCs 
had kept the business they had before divestiture and that business was 
not cyclically sensitive. AT&T, in contrast, was a new company which 
faced an enormous integration problem. It had changed from a small, 
staff-oriented entity to a large company, heavily concentrated in manufac 
turing, but rapidly entering large, new ventures as well. Moreover, most 
of AT&T's business was highly sensitive to cyclical economic 
developments. In particular, AT&T was now facing domestic and foreign 
competition in its traditional business while simultaneously attempting 
to enter new businesses that were also highly competitive and in which 
market conditions were changing rapidly.
Accordingly, late in the spring, AT&T began discussions with its two 
principal unions intended to reduce costs by recasting their 1983 col 
lective bargaining agreements. There followed the first educational 
meetings with selected leaders of both unions to bring them to an 
understanding of the changes divestiture had brought to the business in 
terms of both the financial requirements and the standards of business 
performance that would be necessary for this new business to succeed.
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The company sought to transform the second and third contract an 
niversary increases, due in August of each year and consisting ofcost- 
of-living adjustments (COLA) and bargained-for increases, into one- 
time issuances of stock. The "one-time" aspect of the payment would 
reduce the subsequent cost impact of the increases and the stockowner 
aspect was thought to provide a special incentive to improve operating 
performance. However, this early bargaining effort went nowhere. The 
principal reason was one of timing: the proposed change was introduc 
ed too close to the August 1984 payment date for the unions to build 
consensus for the ratification needed to rewrite the collective bargain 
ing agreements.
Consequently, early hi 1985 and well before the August 1985 pay 
ment date, the company began discussions with the unions under the 
auspices of the Common Interest Forum (GIF) aimed not at amending 
the 1983 agreements but actually terminating them early and bargain 
ing new three-year agreements. The intention was to negotiate 
agreements that would slow the growth in labor costs and change the 
contract date from that held in common with the divested companies. 
(The GIF had been established in the 1983 agreements as a vehicle with 
a threefold mission: to communicate and discuss business developments 
of mutual interest; to discuss and review jointly "innovative approaches 
to enhance the competitiveness of the Company and improve employ 
ment security;" and to avoid unnecessary disputes by cooperatively ad 
dressing changes in the environment.)
The problem here was twofold. The Company had recognized that 
divestiture had totally changed the business environment from one in 
which many markets were guaranteed and costs were covered and returns 
assured as long as the commissions agreed to set rates appropriately 
to one in which there were many competitors, prices of products and 
services were market driven and not set to cover both costs and a 
specified rate of return. Therefore, in order to change its behavior ac 
cordingly, the Company was attempting to slow the long-term rise in 
costs. The second problem was to separate AT&T from the BOCs in 
all future bargaining; bargaining had been common since 1974 but, with 
business environments now dramatically different, an overt separation 
of bargaining process and timing appeared appropriate.
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The GIF discussions began with a full-scale educational program for 
the leaders of both unions to bring them to a better understanding of 
the emerging nature of the business. This was clearly in the spirit of 
the GIF contract language: that information would be shared and solu 
tions sought in a fully participative fashion. Indeed, the information 
presented to the unions was sufficiently sensitive and detailed to give 
the union leaders insider status under the provisions of the Securities 
and Exchange Act.
The theme of these discussions was the need to extend the participative 
relationship between company and unions by putting into place a more 
competitive cost structure that would promote profitability for the com 
pany, generate jobs, and generally insure employment security. 
Specifically, the company sought to abandon its past practice of bargain 
ing for regular annual improvements in basic compensation and remove 
wages from the bargaining arena. Instead, consistent with the par 
ticipative approach, the company proposed to replace regular bargain 
ed wage increases with profit sharing, thus making compensation con 
tingent on firm performance. The lump sum nature of profit sharing 
would also reduce the subsequent cost impact of the compensation in 
crease. At the same time, the company directly addressed the union's 
concerns over employment security with the offer of a job bank that 
would guarantee a job offer to any union-represented worker with at 
least five years of service who would otherwise be without a job.
Ultimately, this attempt at early bargaining, like the 1984 attempt, 
was to no avail. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that 
internal division in the CWA precluded the termination of the existing 
agreement. (The company practice in this special bargaining was, as 
in past ordinary bargaining, to seek agreement first with its major union, 
the CWA, and to make no agreements otherwise with the IBEW or any 
other smaller unions.) It became evident that the changes embodied in 
this contract were too dramatic and potentially controversial to be en 
dorsed publicly by the membership of the union.
Bargaining Realities 19 
Changing the Contract Date
By fall 1985, there were no more savings to be made by moving 
bargaining up, as the second anniversary and final contractual increase 
had already been granted. Nevertheless, an earlier contract date than 
August 1986 continued to have merit from the company's perspective 
for two principal reasons: (1) it would put AT&T's bargaining before 
the BOC's and thereby remove pressure to conform with their pattern; 
and (2) it would ease the ratification process in union locals containing 
both AT&T and BOC employees if there were no side-by-side com 
parisons of different contracts.(This would be the first time that such 
employees, who, in some instances, were still co-located, would not 
receive the same wage treatment.)
Meanwhile, logistical problems began to emerge for the IBEW: the 
simultaneous bargaining of AT&T and BOC contracts would require 
key bargainers to be in multiple locations at the same time. Discus 
sions begun late in 1985 suggested that the idea of moving the contract 
date up was attractive to all concerned. Thus, all parties agreed to ter 
minate the contract on May 31, 1986 rather than August 9, 1986, as 
originally specified.
Issues in the 1986 Bargaining
Company Perspective
The basic company concern in 1986 bargaining remained the same 
as it had been in the abortive attempts to bargain early: the need to 
strengthen the company's competitive position. With divestiture, AT&T 
had entered fast-paced, competitive, and largely nonrepresented markets, 
saddled with a high cost structure, inflexible job designs, and outmod 
ed work practices inherited from its days as a regulated monopoly. The 
company had specific objectives in several areas.
The number one objective was to obtain a minimum economic set 
tlement. At the outset, the company had clearly indicated to both unions 
that it would not seek to cut wages or obtain similar concessions in benefit 
areas but, rather, would attempt to slow the rate of increase in 
compensation.
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In preparation for bargaining, the company had made a comprehen 
sive analysis of its employees' relative wage position. This study con 
firmed that AT&T's wages were consistently and substantially above 
the market for comparable jobs (both in local labor markets and among 
product/service market competitors). This advantageous wage position 
had not happened overnight, but rather had developed gradually over 
the previous dozen years due in large part to a rich COLA clause. In 
deed, COLA accounted for over two-thirds of the total wage increase 
during the period.
A specific objective, then, was to start to move AT&T's wages closer 
to the market by bargaining a pattern of wage increases substantially 
below the market norm. The company commissioned detailed forecasts 
of expected increases in wage rates to estimate the parameters for 
bargained increases that would still allow the market to outpace it. These 
forecasts clearly suggested that progress could be made only if COLA 
were either paid lump sum or eliminated from the contract. The com 
pany recognized, however, that it had taken years to create the wage 
advantage for AT&T workers and that it would also take years to move 
them back closer to the market.
Minimizing the size of the contractual wage increases was only one 
of several company bargaining objectives designed to put into place a 
more competitive cost structure. It was equally important that key 
workforces, namely, technical maintenance and installation, be restruc 
tured to align their skills and wage rates with those of AT&T's com 
petitors in this service market. In particular, the company proposed to 
stratify this top technical force into three skill levels, job titles, and cor 
responding wage schedules to align more closely with the practice of 
competitors than did AT&T's traditional single-title organization. 
Analogous changes for AT&T's factories included the consolidation of 
manufacturing job grades to reduce costly movement of personnel and 
the elimination of the wage incentive payment system as an expensive 
and inappropriate wage adder in high-technology manufacturing.
Detailed analysis had confirmed that the employees' advantageous 
wage position was compounded by a rich benefit package. Therefore, 
the company's aim in bargaining was to make minimal improvements  
small pension increases and the introduction of a 401 (k) plan only if
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the wage settlement was satisfactory. At the same time, the company 
wished to continue to extend health care cost containment measures and, 
in addition, make some major moves similar to those already im 
plemented for management which were primarily designed to control 
utilization.
The company recognized that in order to reach agreement with the 
unions it would have to address satisfactorily the question of employ 
ment security. At the same time, it was essential that this be done without 
guarantees of employment or any commitments to make firm job of 
fers when employment is terminated by layoff. Although such an offer 
had been made during the 1985 GIF discussions, it was no longer a 
point for discussion.
The AMOA had assured that employees brought their contracts with 
them to new organizations. This meant that an individual entity could 
have 22 separate contracts and, in fact, could have employees working 
side-by-side with different contracts. Accordingly, a key company ob 
jective in 1986 bargaining was to consolidate the provisions of multi 
ple operating company contracts into one comprehensive contract for 
each bargaining unit.
An equally important company objective was the replacement of 
restrictive contracting-out language in the 1983 Contract with language 
better suited to a competitive environment.
Union Perspective
Meanwile, developments within the company during the previous three 
years, particularly the announcement in August 1985 of a major downsiz 
ing amounting to 16,500 represented employees, as well as events in 
other collective bargaining situations, had intensified union concerns 
for their members' prospective compensation and employment securi 
ty. The unions had specific objectives in several areas.
The unions were strongly committed to maintaining the form and size 
of wage increases they had bargained in previous contracts. Indeed, 
both unions indicated that they would seek to enhance the COLA por 
tion of the increase by improving the payout ratio, a move that would 
help support the same percent rise in wages in the face of the recent 
quiescence in inflation. More importantly, the CWA took a strong public
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stand against concessions, two-tier arrangements, and lump sum ap 
plications, arguing that this contract would mark a turning point not 
only for their own union but also for the American labor movement 
by reversing the recent trend toward settlements containing such 
provisions.
The whole issue of employment security was of paramount concern 
to the unions. The union objective in bargaining was to enhance ex 
isting programs, such as the existing income protection programs for 
surplus employees who terminate voluntarily, as well as to break new 
ground in this area. The CWA, in particular, indicated that it would 
seek to expand the job bank concept that had been offered in the abor 
tive GIF discussions into a lifetime employment guarantee for employees 
with at least two years of service. In addition, a key CWA goal was 
the establishment of a company-funded, jointly administered, train 
ing/retraining fund, in clear recognition that the only form of employ 
ment security that can be sustained over the long term is one which 
combines a series of different jobs with the training needed to perform 
them.
Another union objective was to obtain some improvement, principally 
in pension benefits and in the introduction of a 401 (k) plan, and to resist 
any shifting of health care costs from the company to employees. The 
thrust in the pension area appeared to reflect a union conviction that 
their members had lost ground in pension benefits due to the plan's be 
ing changed in 1980 from a final dollar to a dollar per month basis.
Progress of Bargaining
Early in 1986, the company's set of issues and the unions' set of issues 
were exchanged and became the subjects of private discussions at various 
levels. The normal give-and-take of public meetings and private discus 
sions proceeded on schedule. The company was following past bargain 
ing practice of making no agreement until it had settled with the CWA. 
As the final day approached, however, thought was given to the possibili 
ty that settlement could be reached with the IBEW and not the CWA.
As the midnight deadline drew closer, private discussions focused 
on the size of the wage package, contracting, and minor issues that did
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not appear to stand in the way of a settlement. 7 The wage difference 
between company and union positions was small an amount, in fact, 
that would not have produced a strike in previous bargainings between 
the two parties. Nevertheless, agreement on wages was not reached with 
the CWA and a 26-day strike resulted. 8 Agreement was reached on time 
with the DBEW and on the same terms that had been offered to the CWA.
Strike
Beginning with the decision to settle with the IBEW, through the time 
that the CWA strike was settled, the company's behavior was very dif 
ferent from its predivestiture bargaining conduct. All of the company's 
actions had their origin in its determination to behave as a company 
in the competitive arena rather than in a regulated environment, shielded 
from market forces. This was manifested in three key decisions: (1) the 
decision to make a final offer and to settle on this even if full agree 
ment with all parties was not possible; (2) the decision to engage in 
an aggressive public relations campaign to present this package direct 
ly to the striking workers; and (3) the decision to hire people off the 
street to replace striking operators, not to break the union but rather 
to maintain customer service.
Once the company had acted on the first decision, it was imperative 
to adhere to this as the only possible offer to emphasize its will to 
stand on its position and to avoid embarrassing the parties already in 
agreement. Meanwhile, the company's decision to wage an aggressive 
public relations campaign became an essential tactic in the effort to bring 
about agreement among all parties. The company adopted the philosophy 
of going public on its final offer, based in large part on its concern that 
the terms of that offer were clouded with the misinformation circulating 
during the weekend the strike began.
The IBEW resolve to stand by its acceptance of the company's offer 
also provided support to the points in this final offer. On June 10, the 
leaders of the Telephone Coordinating Council (representing a mixture 
of clerical and technical workers) recommended ratification to their
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members (whose ballot vote would be completed by July 5). Then, on 
June 15, the members of the EM-3 (which is the manufacturing unit 
of the IBEW and meets in convention to vote on an agreement) ratified 
the contract.
When agreement was finally reached between the company and the 
CWA, it was on essentially the same terms as the final offer. The dif 
ferences, which were incorporated in the IBEW agreement, were essen 
tially of an informational nature and reflected the clarification discus 
sions that had been conducted since the strike began. There were three 
principal changes: (1) the inclusion of the COLA language into the agree 
ment, though the provisions were still inapplicable; (2) some additional 
protections to employees affected by job-structure changes; and (3) some 
changes in the language on contracting.
Reasons for the CWA Strike
To some extent, the failure to settle was a risk that was heightened 
when each party agreed to negotiate early. With the AT&T contract 
as front-runner to all the BOC negotiations, the settlement reached, which 
many analysts had thought would be a floor for all the negotiations in 
the former Bell System, became a ceiling for all the BOC settlements 
to follow.9
At the most basic level, it appears that the strike reflected a union 
miscalculation of company resolve on the wage issue. It is true that com 
pany bargaining behavior predivestiture would, in fact, cast some doubt 
on its willingness to take such a position and stand by it. Nevertheless, 
there had been efforts for more than two years to bring the union to 
an understanding of the changes in the company's operating environ 
ment and the fact that cutting costs would help enhance overall business 
performance of the company, which would help preserve jobs. Despite 
the lengthy discussions and briefings, despite bringing the union into 
insider status, each side ultimately failed to understand the other's posi 
tion. The strike, then, became the ultimate means for each side to reach 
such an understanding. 10
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The bargaining that took place from divestiture through the 1986 con 
tract negotiations, viewed in its entirety, demonstrates that adjusting 
to a changing environment can be a slow and painful process of learn 
ing and compromise. Fischer has suggested that success in this area 
is best achieved through the full cooperation and participation of manage 
ment and labor.
Unions should review their 50-year history. The pre-1980 
labor relations patterns represent a labor concession to the 
most basic of management demands the unbridled right to 
manage. Unions did not succeed in seriously eroding the right 
of management to decide and to direct. . . . Now, when many 
management forces seek to concede some of what they 
previously rejected, unions are usually found protesting. . . . 
Managers are not embracing worker involvement as a result 
of an ideological conversion, but are merely responding to 
new urgencies, new economic pressures, the broader and 
more potent options of consumers. 11
Although this process has not always been smooth for AT&T and 
the CWA and IBEW, progress has been achieved. Together they have 
moved to reshape the company to fit its new competitive environment 
while simultaneously addressing the employment needs of the workers 
in this more uncertain world. Further progress will best be achieved 
when all parties recognize that even when interests are in intrinsic con 
flict, problems can best be solved to the mutual satisfaction of all through 
a participative and collaborative approach, and when all parties share 
in the responsibility of the decision and the rewards that result.
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Alternative Directions for American Industrial Relations
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The first half of the 1980s witnessed joint experimentation and ex 
tensive innovation with new forms of labor-management relations. In 
our earlier work (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) we interpret both 
tendencies as signals that many of the principles of what we term the 
New Deal industrial relations system are no longer well-suited to the 
contemporary environment or to the interests of workers, employers, 
or the broader society. In that work we used a three-tier model to describe 
both the key principles in the New Deal industrial relations system and 
the efforts of labor-management to move to a new system. The focal 
point of the New Deal system was the middle tier, i.e., the level at 
which unions and employers negotiated collective bargaining agreements 
over wages, hours, and working conditions. The key to the success of 
this model was that collective bargaining "took wages out of competi 
tion." At the top tier of the system, the governing principle was that 
it was management's sole job or prerogative to manage the enterprise; 
unions and workers were to negotiate over the impacts of strategic 
management decisions if these decisions affected wages, hours, or work 
ing conditions. At the bottom tier, the workplace, the collective bargain 
ing agreement specified in detail worker rights and obligations and pro 
vided workers a voice in day-to-day administration through the grievance 
procedure. As we will see, the innovations under way in the 1980s 
challenge each of these New Deal principles and practices.
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At the workplace, for example, efforts are under way in many set 
tings to introduce more employee participation and greater flexibility 
in the organization of work and utilization of people. At the level of 
collective bargaining, negotiations continue to play an important role. 
The inability of unions to take wages out of competition by standardiz 
ing wages and benefits across the product market, however, has forced 
the parties to give greater attention to employment issues and in some 
cases to experiment with new wage criteria and formulas that link wage 
increases to more firm-specific performance. Innovations under way 
at the level of strategic decisionmaking stand in direct contrast with the 
New Deal principles regarding managerial prerogatives. In a limited 
number of settings, management and union leaders are experimenting 
with different ways to involve union leaders earlier and more deeply 
in decisions that heretofore would have been the sole province of 
management.
Some innovative developments in industrial relations have proven 
fragile. In part, this is because the early 1980s have also been a period 
of increasing crisis and bitter conflict between labor and management 
in American society. While strikes were less frequent in the 1980s than 
in previous years since World War n, those that did occur were fre 
quently hard-fought struggles for survival, rather than tactical exten 
sions of the collective bargaining process. More than 40 percent of union 
members covered under major collective bargaining agreements ex 
perienced wage cuts or one or more years of no wage increase between 
1980 and 1984. Many others experienced significant losses in real wages 
and decreases in coverage or benefit levels in medical insurance or other 
fringe benefit areas. Moreover, the long-term decline in the rate of union 
membership accelerated during the early 1980s. This was partly a reflec 
tion of overall employment declines in the sectors of the economy where 
union membership is highest, but it was also the result of greater and 
more open employer opposition to union representation in newly open 
ed facilities (Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985). The early 1980s 
were also characterized by an increasing polarization in the relation 
ships between the labor movement and government policy makers. Union 
representatives' frustrations in organizing and representing workers in
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the context of existing collective bargaining policies and procedures were 
heightened by a sense of powerlessness to modify these policies.
The central question underlying the research summarized in this paper 
is whether the innovations and experiments in labor-management rela 
tions will diffuse to a broader array of bargaining relationships and 
become institutionalized as regular aspects of labor-management rela 
tions. Or alternatively, will they be aborted by the broader conflicts 
between labor and management or between labor and government 
policymakers over union representation and organization rights, or over 
the very role of unions in society?
To address this issue, we will draw on a study of innovations in a 
panel of nine companies and more than a dozen associated local and 
international unions. These parties participated in a two-year study con 
ducted by members of our research team with the support of the U.S. 
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and 
Cooperative Programs. These cases were selected because in each the 
parties had initiated one or more of the types of innovations that we 
believed challenged prevailing principles of the New Deal system. As 
such, these are neither representative nor random samples from the 
universe of contemporary collective bargaining relationships. Instead, 
they are illustrative examples of the different avenues through which 
labor and management can change their bargaining relationships in ways 
that substantially depart from the traditional New Deal model.
Our sites and the nature of changes occurring in each are outlined 
below and classified in Exhibit 1 within the three-tiered framework we 
use for analyzing contemporary employment relationships.
The United Automobile Workers Union (UAW) 
and General Motors (GM)
Our focus in this case was on the new Fiero and Lake Orion 
assembly plants, both of which feature a fundamental reoganiza- 
tion of work design. The roles of labor and management have been 
significantly modified to afford employees greater autonomy, less 
supervision, and, in the case of Fiero, union representation in all 
plant-level strategic and administrative decisions. During our 
research, the joint design and creation of the Saturn Corporation
30 Innovation or Confrontation
was also solidified and the GM plant in Fremont, California, was 
reopened (after a two-year shutdown) as a joint venture with 
Toyota. We followed some aspects of both of these developments 
as well.
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) 
and Xerox
The seven plants in Xerox's home manufacturing complex (near 
Rochester, New York) show how narrowly focused quality circles 
can evolve to encompass multiple forms of employee participa 
tion and innovation in the organization of work, all of which is 
reinforced via contractual language including a no-layoff guarantee, 
joint decisionmaking regarding outsourcing, and gain-sharing. Fur 
ther, the parties have built on a history of informal consultation 
about strategic issues with the establishment of joint "horizon" 
planning committees on human resource management and other 
issues, the joint design of a new manufacturing facility, and union 
involvement in new product development.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the International Brother 
hood of Teamsters (IBT), the Association of Flight Attendants 
(ATA), and the Air Transport Employees (ATE) Western Airlines
A financial crisis brought on by industry deregulation led Western 
to pose concession demands to all four unions. Though each of 
the negotiations was different, all four unions ultimately emerged 
with significant minority stock ownership for the members, a seat 
on the board of directors, and, in one case, an agreement to pur 
sue greater employee participation in daily decisions. Of particular 
interest is the great variation in the strategies selected by the four 
unions.
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the 
Boeing Corporation
Rapid advances in manufacturing technology led the union to push 
for joint roles in the exploration, selection, and implementation 
of new technology. The operation of the joint structure that evolved
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over the course of two contract cycles in Boeing's Seattle, 
Washington facility and a parallel quality circle effort were the 
focus of this research.
The Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (ABGWU) and 
Alcoa
A rolling mill, in a highly competitive portion of the aluminum 
industry, was the setting in which these parties attempted to guide 
employee involvement activities and work reorganization through 
a period of major wage and benefit concessions. The concessions 
also reflect decentralization of bargaining in the industry. We ex 
plore the consequences within the local union and in a range of 
joint activities.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the Budd Company
These parties have sought to sustain employee involvement in 
itiatives, limited just-in-time delivery, and quality control im 
provements. These changes have been prompted by customer 
pressure in the context of the highly competitive auto supply in 
dustry. During our research, efforts were initiated to link plant- 
level participative activities to cooperation at the corporate/inter 
national union level. Also, one local negotiated an agreement to 
accept significant work rule changes and the use of a team con 
cept approach to work organization in return for reinvestment in 
its facilities.
The Diesel Workers Union (DWU) and the Office and Clerical 
Unit (OCU) and Cummins Engine
After nearly a decade of experimentation with the design of non 
union facilities based on socio-technical principles, the parties are 
now trying to integrate these innovations into the company's 
unionized home manufacturing complex. We have followed the 
diffusion of new systems for the organization of work, as well 
as related changes in collective bargaining as they have evolved 
during a period of layoffs and management turnover at the cor 
porate level.
32 Innovation or Confrontation
The Paperworkers Union and Boise Cascade Corporation
Two decades of low performance in the company's newest and 
largest facility, partly connected with an increasingly complex set 
of work rules, led to company bargaining demands for a sweep 
ing revision of the contract and hundreds of attached memoran 
dums of agreement. After a lengthy strike, the company prevail 
ed, and imposed a contract with only four job classifications, a 
team-based, flexible work organization, a no-lay off pledge covering 
current employees and substantial wage increases for those affected 
by the job classification changes. Critical questions in this case 
concern the implementation and evolution of such changes when 
they are imposed by hard bargaining.
The United Rubber Workers Union (URW) and Goodyear 
Corporation
Gradually, over about 10 years, the parties have made a series 
of incremental changes in the organization of work and the struc 
ture of union-management relations in their Lincoln, Nebraska 
facility. We were interested in the process and results of these 
changes.
Longitudinal case studies were conducted for each site by one or more 
members of our research team. Interviews ranging in number from 15 
to over 100 were conducted in each case. In some of the cases, we were 
also able to draw on previous case studies or related research emerging 
from our earlier work. Employee surveys were conducted in three cases 
(Western, Boeing, and Xerox). In one case (Boise Cascade), we were 
able to conduct a formal economic analysis of the effects of the changes 
introduced.
The Processes of Institutionalization and Diffusion
The concept of institutionalization has a long history within the 
behavioral sciences. It rests, in part, on Kurt Lewin's (1948) seminal 
studies of social change, which positioned institutionalization as the end 
point of a multistaged change process. The first stage of the process
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is often referred to as the process of "unfreezing" current organiza 
tional practices. Stimulating or motivating change is usually some crisis 
or set of severe external pressures. The second phase of the change 
process normally involves implementing a set of experimental or 
demonstration projects. The focus at this stage is on the factors that 
lead to and then maintain the parties' commitments to the proposed 
changes, and also on the evaluation of initial results. The third phase 
is the institutionalization phase, viz., the process by which changes are 
integrated into ongoing practices within the organization. This can be 
thought of as a refreezing process, though one of our conclusions is 
that this final institutionalizing stage is best thought of as dynamic, rather 
than static in nature.
We will focus on the second and third stages of this model and ex 
amine the management and union strategies and actions that affect the 
institutionalization process. While we recognize that developments in 
the external environment also have important effects on the course of 
these innovations, we have discussed the importance of these external 
factors elsewhere (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). Our goal here 
is to elaborate more fully on the internal dynamics of these processes.
We define institutionalization as the dynamic process by which daily 
practices and decisionmaking at the workplace, collective bargaining, 
and strategic levels of industrial relations are linked so as to respond 
to the environment confronting the parties and their independent needs. 
We believe that achieving this type of effective linkage in today's en 
vironment requires fundamental transformations in practices across all 
these levels of industrial relations activity. In this paper, we focus on 
the following specific practices: employee participation, flexible forms 
of work organization, participation in new technology decisions, and 
participation in strategic management decisions. We see these as cen 
tral features of what might be thought of as a new industrial relations 
system more responsive to the demands of the environment and the needs 
of the parties. At the same time, however, we don't claim that these 
exhaust the range of innovations under way in American industrial rela 
tions or that they constitute the sole characteristics of any new system.
Finally, we are interested not only in the conditions under which these 
changes permanently transform a given labor-management relationship,
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but also in how widely these innovations will be diffused throughout 
a given organization and across North American industry. A final sec 
tion of this paper will therefore discuss the prospects for the wider dif 
fusion of these changes.
Employee Participation Processes
By far the most frequent innovation initiated in industrial relations 
hi the early 1980s was some form of employee participation. Some type 
of QWL or similar participation effort was initiated in eight of the nine 
cases in our panel. Many of these efforts came to be tied to work 
organization changes and technological change, which are discussed 
in greater detail in the following sections of this paper. The focus here 
is just on participation.
An examination of the evolution of these various processes indicates 
that in no case has it diffused smoothly over time to a point where a 
large majority of employees are now actively participating in QWL prob- 
lemsolving teams. On the other hand, it has been completely abandon 
ed only in one case. Typically, the parties experienced an initial period 
of growth and enthusiasm, followed by what appears retrospectively 
as a predictable crisis. This crisis was usually characterized by a decline 
in further employee volunteers to participate in the process, resistance 
by middle and lower managers, and opposition by some union leaders, 
all of which is often prompted by developments in other aspects of the 
management organization, the union organization, and the collective 
bargaining relationship. Thus, the resulting plateau in the growth of 
the QWL initiative raised fundamental questions about the extent to which 
it could or should affect the economic interests of the firm, the 
employees, and the union. The parties were then forced to choose 
whether to reinforce or abandon the effort.
Because of the relatively modest costs of initiating QWL processes, 
we have concluded they can serve as useful starting points for building 
trust and exposing employees, supervisors, managers, and union leaders 
to participative methods of interaction and joint decisionmaking. 
However, it is increasingly clear that they cannot remain in this narrowly-
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focused, adjunct mode. Where the parties have recognized this, what 
started out as a narrowly-focused QWL process became a catalyst for 
participative problemsolving methods in a wide variety of areas involving 
work organization, the introduction of new technology, strategic plan 
ning, and planning for new facilities.
This transition is politically difficult, however, since the broader the 
scope of issues addressed in a participative mode, the more likely the 
process is to touch on issues covered in the collective bargaining con 
tract or other areas of management decisionmaking usually designated 
as off-limits to the QWL process. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
many QWL processes never make this transition. Yet, standing alone, 
the narrow forms of QWL are not likely to make a sufficient contribu 
tion to the competitive strategies and objectives of the firm, or to the 
economic and social interests of workers and the union, to sustain 
widespread support.
The key determinant of whether or not the transition to larger aspects 
of the relationship is made successfully appears to be the willingness 
of top-level management and union leaders to assert their commitment 
to the principles of problemsolving and participation in the face of new, 
potentially contentious situations. By doing so, they can transform what 
was an incremental program for diffusing QWL teams into a set of prin 
ciples to be applied to a range of crises or opportunities that might benefit 
by problemsolving processes.
Work Organization Reforms
During the first half of this decade many employers pressed hard to 
increase flexibility in work rules and in the organization of work. In 
a broader survey, Cappelli and McKersie (1987) note that in the majori 
ty of cases, management pressed for work rule changes primarily so 
as to reduce costs by shedding labor. In some cases, however, the goal 
was also to introduce new concepts of work organization. This was 
especially true where (1) the economic and technological environments 
facing the parties have changed in significant ways; (2) an alternative 
model of work organization was available to the parties to draw on (often
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from elsewhere within the firm); and (3) new employment security pro 
visions were used to gain acceptance of the changes.
Employer interest in new forms of work organization arose out of 
a desire to tap the motivational advantages usually associated with broad 
task designs (Hackman and Oldham 1980) and the need to overcome 
the rigidities and high costs associated with traditional work structures 
and rules. In addition, new technology that promises increased flex 
ibility in production requires, for its optimal performance, equally flex 
ible human resource management systems and work organization ar 
rangements (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987). Thus a concept that first 
gained favor among behavioral scientists as a means for increasing 
motivation and job satisfaction through broader job designs (Hulin and 
Blood 1968; Turner and Lawrence 1965; Walton 1980) has now gain 
ed the support of many line managers because of its strategic impor 
tance in lowering costs, increasing quality, enhancing adaptability, and 
achieving full utilization of new technology.
In our panel, we observed all nine firms either implementing changes 
in work rules and new work organization design principles, or plan 
ning or attempting to implement these concepts for selected operations. 
Two firms (GM and Xerox) used these concepts in designing new 
facilities; four firms (Xerox, Boeing, Western, and Boise Cascade) 
negotiated work rule changes in collective bargaining; four firms (Alcoa, 
Cummins, GM, and Xerox) used problemsolving principles and pro 
cesses to introduce these concepts into selected work units within ex 
isting facilities; and two firms (Boeing and Budd) were in the process 
of discussing the introduction of flexible work systems on a selected 
basis at the time our case studies ended.
New Facilities
By far, the most successful introduction of flexible work organiza 
tion concepts has been in new or "greenfield" worksites. This is hard 
ly surprising, since at a new site a new workforce can often be selected 
based on the ability and desire to work within flexible or teamwork 
systems. In the 1970s, most of the plants that opened on this basis were 
(and still are) nonunion. More recently we have seen a number of new 
or completely refurbished unionized plants using flexible work systems.
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Several examples from our panel sites illustrate the use of these con 
cepts in the unionized worksites.
GM. Consider the way self-selection, even in a unionized setting, 
contributed to the different experiences of GM's Pontiac Fiero and 
Lake Orion plants. Both were new or completely remodeled and 
retooled facilities, and the human resource management strategy 
for each was based on the team concept, or, as GM calls it, the 
"operating team" concept. Workers from both plants came largely 
from a Fisher Body GM plant that had been closed and was later 
refurbished (retooled) to form the Fiero assembly plant. The 
workers were told prior to choosing to stay at the Fiero site that 
the plant was designed around a teamwork concept and that anyone 
who requested to stay at the plant should be prepared to work under 
this type of system. This undoubtedly created a self-selection pro 
cess among those who requested to stay at the Fiero plant, rather 
than work at the nearby Lake Orion plant. The union leaders who 
chose to go to Orion initially sought to fully replace what they 
saw as a pre-set socio-technical plant design, while the managers 
and union leaders at Fiero were engaged in a deeper, joint-design 
process from the outset.
The greenfleld sites opened on a nonunion basis in the 1970s relied 
on human resource management professionals to provide the input into 
the design of the new work systems. In contrast, the cases hi our panel 
that were most successful in introducing these new concepts involved 
workers and union leaders in early stages of the design and planning 
processes.
Xerox, in 1983, the company decided it needed to build a new 
toner supply plant. Rumors leaked to the union that the company 
planned to build the plant in the South because of lower utility, 
tax, and labor costs. The union leaders questioned management 
about its plans and proposed to work with management to see if 
the plant could be built and operated competitively in the Webster 
manufacturing complex. The company agreed, and a set of workers 
and union representatives were designated to work with manage-
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ment representatives to examine and test new work and machine 
design concepts while union and company representatives began 
negotiations with the local public utility and local government to 
lower energy and tax costs for the new facility. The plant design 
and equipment selected together promised significant productivi 
ty gains and the negotiations with the local government and utili 
ty representatives were successful. The result was that the plant 
was built in the Webster complex at costs and projected produc 
tivity levels equal to or better than the levels forecast for the plant 
if it was relocated in the South.
GM.The most widely publicized joint union-management plant 
design in the GM system involves the new Saturn Division. After 
the company's engineering and financial planners decided in the 
early 1980s that it was unprofitable to try to build a small car in 
the U.S., GM signed import agreements with two Japanese firms. 
In 1983 GM addressed the issue again, but this time invited the 
UAW to participate in the planning process. The result was an 
agreement to build small cars under a new division of GM (Saturn). 
The design principles included in the new agreement provide for: 
(1) operating teams of workers on the shop floor in a single job 
classification; (2) consensus decisionmaking principles throughout 
all levels of the organization; (3) UAW representatives facilitating 
the operating teams and being represented in the management struc 
ture at all levels of the organization from the shop floor to the 
plant management administrative staff, to the "Strategic Advisory 
Committee" which provides the link between the Saturn Division 
and the executives of GM.
While Saturn is the most visible example of new flexible work systems 
in General Motors, the corporation has sought to introduce these con 
cepts in most of its new or newly refurbished plants. To date, over a 
half dozen such facilities are operating effectively. Still, GM's new plants 
have not all been equally successful, or at least have not followed the 
same paths in introducing the new team concepts.
Again, the comparison of the Fiero and Orion plants is instructive. 
General Motors management designed the technology and manufacturing
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plans for the Orion plant around the use of flexible work systems. For 
a variety of reasons, the union was not actively involved in this pro 
cess. Under the national contract, however, management had the right 
to design the plant and start it up with the new work system. After one 
year, management was then responsible for negotiating an initial con 
tract with the local union, in which the job classifications and related 
work system arrangements were negotiable. After a protracted period 
of negotiations and considerable conflict between local union leaders 
and plant managers, a distinctive local agreement was negotiated that 
allowed workers to choose between working under the pay-for- 
knowledge compensation plan and flexible work systems, or under a 
traditional pay system (though still with the requirement of knowing 
a minimum of two jobs in a given area). Thus, instead of a jointly 
developed system, the parties in effect split the difference.
In contrast, local union representatives worked with management to 
design the work system for the Fiero plant. This experience also 
facilitated the development of a broader role for the union in the manage 
ment of the plant. This was all agreed to at Fiero prior to the start-up 
of production, and no deep conflicts between the parties occurred in 
subsequent negotiations or in the administration of the initial agreement.
The differences between the Fiero and Lake Orion cases suggest that 
failure to develop a joint commitment to the design principles prior to 
their implementation will increase the likelihood of conflict and resistance 
to these new forms of work organization and compensation. This is 
especially the case with workers and/or union representatives whose 
prior experiences are limited to the traditional system. Once the new 
system is implemented, however, it represents enough of a structural 
change and it often begins to attract enough supporters that the burden 
of change then falls on those seeking to return to the traditional system.
Retrofitting Existing Facilities
Our cases suggest it is much more difficult to retrofit existing facilities 
with new work systems. Indeed, throughout the U.S. and Canada, there 
are very few cases where the work organization or work rules cover 
ing a complete facility and the complete workforce have been changed 
by way of a cooperative union-management problemsolving process.
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The only case in our panel where a complete shift from a traditional 
work system to a more flexible system occurred was a case where 
management took a long strike and imposed the new system as part of 
the strike settlement.
Boise Cascade. In 1984, after management had made several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach informal agreements with union 
leaders to eliminate what management viewed as an overly rigid 
set of job classifications and work rules, a nine-week strike over 
a new contract occurred in the company's DeRidder mill. This 
was a relatively new mill (opened in 1967) and represented a 
massive billion dollar investment; but it had a poor productivity 
and profitability record. The major issue in the strike was manage 
ment's demand to eliminate the large number of past practices that 
had built up over the years, and to collapse the work organization 
structure down into a small number of job classifications. After 
nine weeks the union accepted management's terms largely in 
response to threats from this high-wage employer that it would 
hire a replacement workforce. The settlement provided for a no- 
layoff guarantee, and a guarantee that no worker would face a pay 
reduction. In fact, a majority of workers received large pay in 
creases as they were transferred to the new pay structure. A year 
and one-half after the end of the strike, the workers voted to con 
tinue the new system. Still, the leadership of the union is in flux 
and plant performance has not shown dramatic improvements. 
Thus, it remains to be seen whether this avenue for innovation 
will be effective and whether it can be sustained. 
This case illustrates that it is very difficult to use a problemsolving 
approach to achieve an immediate and complete change within an ex 
isting facility. The changes that management wanted were just too vast 
for the union to discuss until it had no other choice. It may be that only 
a hard bargaining strategy by management, with a high probability of 
a strike, can achieve wholesale change all at once. Even then, as part 
of the new arrangements, the employment and income security interests 
of the incumbent workforce need to be addressed and the ultimate out 
come remains uncertain.
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Because it is difficult to change the work organization of an entire 
plant all at once, the more typical strategy observed in the panel was 
an incremental process in which natural "opportunities" (threat of job 
loss, prospect of obtaining new investments, etc.) provided the stimulus 
to change. What, then, has been the experience with the incremental 
retrofitting of existing facilities? Here our cases provide much evidence.
Xerox. In 1982, after management announced its intent to con 
tract out wiring harness production, the union persuaded manage 
ment to place the decision on hold and to establish a special study 
team to explore changes in the organization and management of 
the wiring harness unit that would make it cost competitive. The 
team's recommendation cut the costs of production by an estimated 
28 percent, and thereby saved the work. However, these recom 
mendations required changes in the managerial formulas for 
calculating overhead, revising supervisory ratios, and other deci 
sions that had to be made by top management. The changes also 
involved a number of modifications to seniority, job classifica 
tion, transfers, and temporary work. Thus, the task force's recom 
mendations had to be referred to the union and company bargain 
ing committees for approval. Approval was granted as part of the 
1983 contract. In fact the negotiators went an important step fur 
ther by agreeing to use the wiring harness study team concept as 
a model for dealing with uncompetitive operations in the future. 
As noted earlier, employment and income security guarantees for 
incumbent workers were included as part of the agreement. Since 
this agreement, five other study teams have been formed, four 
of which have kept work in-house leading to a range of modifica 
tions in work organization in different areas.
Cummins. Innovation occurred here in response to a management 
announcement that a line responsible for a particular engine was to 
be shut down and moved from the unionized Columbus, Indiana 
plant to the company's newer nonunion plant (one of the most 
highly publicized nonunion team-concept plants opened in the 
1970s) in Jamestown, New York. The Diesel Workers Union asked
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to have an opportunity to save the work. Both parties ultimately 
agreed to a reorganization of the work into fewer job classifica 
tions and other flexible arrangements. This line now operates with 
these new arrangements inside a plant governed by traditional con 
cepts and work rules.
A similar development occurred at the Indianapolis parts center, 
a distribution operation that was scheduled to close. The company 
agreed to keep this work under the jurisdiction of the DWU if 
costs could be brought down to a level competitive with non 
union options. The union agreed to eliminate the multiple job 
classification system and replace it with a single pay grade and 
flexible movement of workers across tasks. These workers earn 
more than do comparable workers in another unionized parts center 
that is organized in a traditional fashion. However, the Indianapolis 
employees also have more duties assigned to them than the 
employees working under the traditional system.
It should be noted that this pay and progression plan had been in 
troduced by management at Cummins in several successive rounds 
of negotiations dating back to 1979. However, each time rank- 
and file opposition kept the union from agreeing to it. Thus this 
case illustrates again how the threat of job loss has been used by 
employers to achieve changes in work rules and work organiza 
tion for specific groups especially in the face of predictable 
general opposition by the workforce.
Just as the threat of job loss has been used to induce changes in work 
organization, so too has the potential for gaining new work or new in 
vestments been used as a lever to introduce changes. In the Xerox toner 
plant example it was the union that took the initiative in getting manage 
ment to consider locating the new plant in Rochester. At Fiero, workers 
knew that if they were not able to assemble the new Fiero sports car 
at low costs, the plant was likely to be permanently closed, as the site 
was too small for other operations. In other cases in our panel, manage 
ment initiated discussions with the union over the possibility of locating 
work in an existing site, or allocating new investments to bargaining 
unit personnel, in return for adopting flexible work organization con 
cepts. We expect this to happen with increasing frequency in the future.
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Introduction of New Technology
The introduction of new technology represents one of the oldest 
avenues for changing industrial relations, since nearly all changes in 
technology have effects on the number, mix, and content of jobs. The 
advances in micro electronics that fuel the current wave of technological 
innovation have these traditional effects. There is a growing consensus 
among technology and work specialists, however, that the specific ef 
fects of these new technologies vary depending on the objectives driv 
ing their use, the means by which new technology is implemented, and 
the links forged between the technology and the human resource/in 
dustrial relations practices of the parties (Walton 1983; Pava 1985; 
Shimada 1986).
The introduction of new technology clearly serves as a major oppor 
tunity for unfreezing existing industrial relations practices and tradi 
tions. We also see it as an extremely powerful avenue for stimulating 
and institutionalizing innovations. At the same time, technological change 
can serve as a major source of conflict, resistance, and struggle for power 
between the parties, since it strikes so deeply and directly at the vital 
interests of the firm, the workforce, and the union.
All of the propositions or principles we suggested involving chang 
ing work organization arrangements apply equally to the introduction 
of new technology. However, two additional propositions are suggested 
by our work in progress with panel members involved in major 
technological innovations. First, when management makes massive in 
vestments in new technologies without consciously and successfully using 
the new investments in order to introduce innovations in industrial rela 
tions practices, it faces a longer learning period for making the 
technology work, greater resistance by employees to the fullest utiliza 
tion of the technology, and less capacity for continuous learning and 
improvement in the performance of the new technology and work system. 
Second, technology strategies that fully integrate human resource con 
siderations require fundamental and lasting changes in the roles of union 
leaders, workers, and managers, in their relationships, and in the design 
of the organization. Major technological change will inevitably have 
implications for the social side of the organization. If these are not
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addressed directly there will inevitably surface important questions about 
organizational structure and the orientation of employment relations. 
We will draw on work under way at two panel firms to illustrate these 
points: GM and Boeing.
The joint venture between GM and Toyota at New United Motors 
Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI) in Fremont, California provides 
a good deal of evidence regarding how effective integration of technology 
and human resource management and organization design principles 
can improve industrial relations and organization performance. The 
NUMMI experiment also illustrates how the concept of technology must 
itself be broadened to encompass the total array of organization design 
and human resource management principles and practices. The NUM 
MI plant relies on principles of high worker motivation, organizational 
learning, flexible job and work organization, advanced inventory and 
quality control, and employment security, many of which were first 
introduced in Europe by socio-technical design theorists (Trist 1982) 
and now are being adopted in varying degrees by an increasing number 
of American firms and unions (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987).
NUMMI. The central feature of the production system used at 
NUMMI is its deep dependence on achieving effective performance 
via the human resource management system. It cannot work unless 
workers have the proper skills, training, and motivation. Thus, 
Shimada and MacDuffie argue that achieving and sustaining these 
human resource outcomes is a necessary condition in order for 
the just-in-time inventory system, the introduction of quality con 
trol into production jobs, the flexible system of work organiza 
tion, and the related organization design and hardware features of 
this production system to produce high quality goods at low costs.
While there has been no comprehensive quantitative comparison 
of the performance of this plant with other auto plants in the U.S., 
there are enough preliminary quantitative and qualitative data to 
suggest that it is performing well on quality and cost criteria. It 
has continued to be evaluated favorably by the workers, union 
leaders, and managers involved. One study shows, for example, 
that the plant's productivity and quality performance exceeds the
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performance levels of a traditionally structured plant with a tradi 
tional union-management relationship, and is generally comparable 
to the quality and productivity levels found in Toyota's major pro 
duction facility in Japan (Krafcik 1986). Moreover, UAW and GM 
management both continue to stress the importance of learning 
from the NUMMI experiment when introducing new technology 
and changing work organization practices in other facilities.
Boeing. In 1983 Boeing and the IAM included a New Technology 
clause in their collective bargaining agreement, which provided 
for periodic management briefings about plans for new technology 
and established a Joint Training Advisory Committee (JTAC) to 
oversee training and retraining of employees affected by new 
technology. In the 1986 contract negotiations, the parties took 
another step toward a joint approach to planning for and manag 
ing the introduction of technological change by establishing a Pilot 
Project on New Technology Committee (PPC). This joint com 
mittee is charged with the responsibility of designing, implement 
ing and evaluating experimental projects involving new technology 
and new work organization arrangements. It represents another 
example of the use of collective bargaining process to endorse and 
sanction problemsolving and joint planning principles on a project- 
by-project basis where opportunities for new approaches arise. 
While it is too early to evaluate this new agreement, it does pro 
vide the protective language and the joint commitment needed not 
only for the initial experiments to be conducted but for the parties 
to learn from these experiments and to diffuse the experience and 
knowledge gained from them to other parts of the organization. 
The NUMMI experience is made especially significant when com 
pared to the approach to introducing new technology typically follow 
ed by American firms. Technology is usually seen as a deterministic 
factor to be purchased or developed and implemented by management 
and technical engineering experts. Even companies that emphasize par 
ticipative principles on a wide range of other issues often fall back into 
the traditional stance of viewing technology as fixed and relegate 
organizational and human resource issues to a secondary status
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(Goodman et al. 1986). At Boeing, even though considerable progress 
has been made in giving the union access to information on technology 
at the strategic level, to date the implementation process at the workplace 
has followed a fairly traditional form. Labor-management deliberations 
have focused primarily on the consequences of new technology and not 
on issues of design. The new technology language introduced in the 
1986 labor agreements at Boeing represent the parties' determination 
to break out of this traditional pattern.
Union Participation in Strategic Management Decisions
In the examples discussed so far in this report we have focused on 
changes initiated at either the workplace or the collective bargaining 
levels of the labor-management relationship. We have followed the ex 
tent to which the changes have broadened and deepened the union's 
role in areas of decisionmaking that have traditionally been reserved 
to management. We have also seen how the union's role can be even 
further circumscribed by unilateral management decisions. One of our 
central propositions is that broader and deeper union roles at the strategic 
level of management decisionmaking are necessary if the innovations 
in employee participation, work reorganization, and introduction of new 
technologies and work systems are to be sustained over time.
At the same time, we have found that participation at the strategic 
level must not only help produce tangible economic benefits for the 
employees and the firm, but must be accompanied by active communica 
tions, education, and participation efforts at the workplace level. This 
is because workers will not support representation or participation in 
managerial decisionmaking as a right or a matter of principle. Instead, 
the majority of workers show little interest in representation at this level 
of decisionmaking unless and until they see the links between decisions 
made at this level and their own long-term economic welfare and securi 
ty, as well as with their everyday work experiences. When these links 
are made, however, worker interest may well increase, and the prob 
ability that support for this type of representation and involvement
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will be sustained over time may also increase. Our case study at Western 
Airlines (Wever 1987) illustrates these points.
Western. In collective bargaining in 1983 and again in 1984, the 
four major unions representing employees at Western Airlines made 
wage and work rule concessions, and in return were granted 
(1) four seats on the company's board of directors, (2) a profit- 
sharing plan, and (3) an employee stock ownership plan. These 
concessions and the quid pro quos were in effect when Western 
reached an agreement to merge with Delta Airlines in September, 
1986. As a result of the merger, Western employees were to be 
absorbed into the Delta workforce. Since only the pilots at Delta 
are unionized (and are part of the Airline Pilots Association, as 
are the Western pilots), all other employees would lose their union 
representation unless their unions won a representation election 
involving all of the Delta and Western employees in their respec 
tive bargaining units.
Survey data collected from Western employees about one year prior 
to the merger demonstrated quite clearly that these employees 
evaluated board representation (and other quid pro quos) primarily 
on the basis of their economic effects. Employees were asked to 
indicate which of the quid pro quos they valued most: (1) board 
membership, (2) stock ownership, (3) profit sharing, or 
(4) employee involvement at the workplace. The clearest survey 
result was that employees valued board membership the least of 
all these options. Employee involvement at the workplace was given 
a higher priority than board membership. Profit sharing and stock 
ownership were valued even higher than employee involvement, 
suggesting that employees were most interested in using these new 
compensation arrangements to recover the wage concessions.
The merger with Delta does appear to enhance the security of the 
jobs of Western employees. In addition, our calculations of the 
effects of the profit sharing and the stock ownership provisions 
suggests that the average Western employee would recoup bet 
ween 75 percent and 90 percent of the wage concessions made 
in 1983 and 1984. At the same time, our case study evidence
48 Innovtion or Confrontation
suggests that the union representatives on the board had little signif 
icant influence over the merger negotiations or the terms of the 
merger agreement, or over other basic strategic business decisions 
of Western. Thus, this case produced mixed results. The existence 
of profit sharing and stock ownership did help employees recoup 
a substantial portion of their economic concessions, while the 
merger bolstered their employment security. However, all but one 
of the unions would lose their representational status in the merger 
and that all employees would lose representation in strategic 
management decisionmaking. Thus, in this case involvement in 
strategic decisionmaking was only a short-run quid pro quo that 
was not sustained through the change in ownership. 
Board representation is only the most visible and formal type of par 
ticipation in strategic decisionmaking found in our panel. More frequent 
forms of such participation are ones that evolve incrementally as 
workplace participation processes expand and top union-management 
steering committees are established, or as part of work organization 
reforms, or when decisions to make major new investments or 
technological changes require agreements between top-level union and 
management leaders. These opportunities for innovations make it 
necessary for union and management decisionmakers to choose between 
expanding the scope of participation and joint decisionmaking, and 
thereby sustaining the innovation process, or limiting its scope and often 
its momentum. Several examples from the panel illustrate this point. 
Examples of involvement in strategic decisionmaking that evolve in 
crementally, as expansions of innovations begun at lower levels of the 
bargaining relationship, include the participation of UAW representatives 
on the plant manager's steering committee at GM's Fiero plant, and 
the participation of ACTWU representatives on Xerox's human resource 
strategic planning teams and in the design of the work system and cost 
analysis of the new toner plant. These and other examples noted earlier 
suggest that the "bottom-up" incremental expansions of participation 
are more likely than formal provisions for board representation to achieve 
the types of linkages among workplace, collective bargaining, and 
strategic interactions that we believe are essential in sustaining strategic 
level participation.
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Strategic participation represents a fundamental departure from tradi 
tional U.S. industrial relations policy and practice, however. It requires 
that management accept the union in the organization, and that both 
parties (and ultimately policy makers) agree on the broader roles of the 
union. Unless management is prepared to strengthen the role and status 
of the union, and unless union leaders are prepared to break from their 
traditional stance of leaving the task of managing to management, 
strategic participation is unlikely to be initiated or sustained. Because 
of the important conditions necessary for management and union leaders 
to accept this innovation, we do not see this type of innovation diffus 
ing to a broad range of settings unless major changes in public policy 
reinforce changes in the values and strategies of both management and 
labor. We also believe a broader and deeper role for worker represen 
tation at this level is absolutely needed to sustain, diffuse, and even 
tually institutionalize the other innovations discussed in this paper.
Institutionalization of Innovations Within the Panel Sites
The diversity of situations faced by the parties in the sites studied 
in this research preclude simple comparisons. Yet we can use the com 
parative experiences of the cases to summarize a number of the key 
lessons they offer about the conditions that facilitate institutionaliza- 
tion of changes within bargaining relationships that have initiated in 
novations. We must also be careful, however, to avoid over-generalizing 
from the select and limited sample upon which we have drawn these 
observations. Therefore, the following summary statements might bet 
ter be interpeted as hypotheses worth testing in future research or against 
the personal experiences of labor and management leaders engaged in 
similar activities.
While we have discussed participation, work reorganization, 
technological change, and union participation in strategic management 
decisionmaking as discreet starting points for industrial relations innova 
tions, it is clear that none of these can survive over time independent 
of others. Instead, when combined in ways suited to particular settings, 
they offer a higher probability of being institutionalized in on-
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going practices. Indeed,when the full range of innovations discussed 
here are integrated in a single bargaining relationship, they produce 
a system of industrial relations that is fundamentally different from the 
traditional New Deal model.
For example, a more complete transformation of practice has occur 
red at Xerox and Fiero than at the other sites in the panel because the 
parties in th£se two cases have introduced innovations at all levels of 
industrial relations that reinforce and help sustain each other. At Xerox, 
participation and problemsolving are used not only at the workplace 
as part of an ongoing QWL process, but to adapt work organization 
practices, to plan for how to use new technology, to explore oppor 
tunities for enhancing employment security, to design a gain-sharing 
system, and for union-management consultation over longer-term plans 
and business prospects. At Fiero, the principles of participation and 
flexibility have been integral parts of the overall design and day-to-day 
management of the facility from the start. Thus, because of the in 
terdependence among these innovations, we believe these parties have 
gone farther toward a transformation of the overall system of industrial 
relations governing their relationships and have a higher probability of 
institutionalizing these innovations as ongoing industrial relations 
practices.
We only see a continuous commitment to grappling with these issues 
in a handful of cases. Instead, we mostly observe significant changes 
in a limited subset of activities. In some cases, such as Boeing, Budd, 
Goodyear, and Alcoa, the parties appear to be searching for strategies 
to continue the momentum established to date. They are broadening 
the scope of their innovations in ways needed to reinforce and sustain 
those already initiated. At Boise Cascade, the changes were introduc 
ed as a one-time event, incorporated into the labor contract, and have 
remained in place. At Cummins there has been a reversal of some of 
the initial changes as a result of conflict that occurred between manage 
ment and the unions over recent layoffs, recent shifts in business strategy, 
and changes in top management personnel. Thus, a wide spectrum ex 
ists within our panel sites with respect to the degree to which these in 
novations have been institutionalized and their prospects for further 
transformation of traditional practices.
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Strategies for Diffusion
A key conclusion that can be drawn from the cases reviewed above 
is that the institutionalization process involves incrementally overcom 
ing or coping with the various internal contradictions that block innova 
tion at all three levels of the labor-management relationship. Only a 
subset of the population of current bargaining relationships across the 
United States fits this description, however. Innovation is still concen 
trated in relationships where the parties have experienced sufficient 
economic pressures to adapt, and where management lacks viable alter 
natives to improving its competitive position without working with the 
union. Thus, we face a major constraint on the diffusion of these in 
novations to broader settings, viz., the fact that in the majority of employ 
ment relationships in the U.S., management attempts to avoid unioniza 
tion or to limit the scope and influence of their unions.
We now turn to a discussion of the strategies of American manage 
ment, union, and government leaders, to identify the factors that will 
help decide whether these innovations will diffuse, or whether they will 
remain limited to a relatively small subset of bargaining relationships.
Management Strategies and Choices
The diffusion of innovations in industrial relations will be vitally af 
fected by the values that govern management policies and by the business 
and technology strategies management chooses to remain competitive.
Management Values. In unionized settings, innovation depends on 
management's acceptance of a role for unions at the workplace and in 
managerial decisionmaking. This is essential if management is to at 
tain a shared commitment to improving the organization's com 
petitiveness. Yet the opposition to unions and expanded union influence 
lies so deep within the value system of the majority of American 
managers that it has become a major barrier to the diffusion of industrial 
relations innovations.
Efforts to unionize new groups of employees will be highly contested 
adversarial processes. If the present trends continue, unions will lose 
a majority of these elections and probably become more frustrated wim 
the current procedures. This will reinforce the insecurity and hostility
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that has come to characterize the national labor-management climate 
in recent years. It will make it more difficult for those union leaders 
who promote innovations and cooperation at the workplace to win in 
ternal political battles over these innovations. In those cases where unions 
do win representation elections, adversarial recognition processes will 
become adversarial bargaining relationships that will not be conducive 
to the trust, flexibility, and participative union-management relations 
required for the institutionalization of innovations.
Thus, American management faces a clear strategic choice. It can 
continue to take advantage of its current power and influence, thereby 
maintaining its traditional opposition to union representation of its 
workforce. This will make innovation problematic with existing unions. 
In effect, those managers facing strong, stable unions suffer at the hands 
of their associates. Alternately, management can join union represen 
tatives so as to negotiate various forms of worker representation that 
suit the needs of firms, as well as the needs of unions and the 
employees/members.
We do not expect a significant shift in managerial values to take place. 
What we do wish to emphasize here is that collectively, American 
management has a stake in diffusing innovations. At a macro level, 
management has an interest in ensuring that actions by any individual 
management representatives at the level of a firm or a single plant do 
not chill the environment for innovation in other organizations.
National networks of executives, who have seen the benefits of sus 
tained innovation and who have a significant economic stake in the con 
tinuity of these innovations, need to be encouraged along these lines. 
These executives need to play a visible and active leadership role in 
promoting discussions over the role of unions in society and the types 
of union-management relationships that are essential to the long-run com 
petitiveness of American industry. They need to work to educate their 
peers on the costs of union avoidance to the overall national labor- 
management climate.
Business Strategies. Not all business strategies are equally compati 
ble with creating and sustaining innovations in industrial relations. The 
stability provided by collective bargaining under the New Deal industrial 
relations model rested on the ability of unions to limit management's
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incentives (or ability) to use labor costs as a major source of competitive? 
advantage. Since collective bargaining is no longer able to "take wages 
out of competition" in many industries, managers must now compete 
in settings where labor costs vary. Yet, we believe that attempting to 
compete through low labor costs is, in the end, not a viable option foir 
much of American industry. This path certainly limits the trust, flex 
ibility, and adaptability of workers that are all needed to sustain the 
innovations discussed in this paper.
American management must recognize that in order to sustain and 
diffuse innovations over the long run, it will need to follow competitive 
strategies that meet the income and employment security expectations 
of the American workforce. Business and investment strategies that seek 
to move work in response to short-run variations in labor costs or 
employment standards are only the most visible of a variety of strategies 
that are incompatible with sustaining innovation. There will always be 
environments within or outside the U.S. that offer lower wages and 
employment standards. This business strategy will forever leave the 
American workers insecure, and therefore inflexible. Such a short-run 
strategy will also direct management's attention away from the need 
to develop the comparative advantage American firms can sustain in 
the world market, viz., an advantage built on high technology, skilled 
labor, and flexible production.
Other business strategies that limit trust and flexibility also need to 
be challenged if innovations are to be diffused. The short-run buying 
and selling of productive assets as mere financial instruments applied 
irrespective of employment consequences, has the same chilling effect 
on trust and flexibility. Thus, corporate take-overs or other investment 
strategies that have short or limited time horizons have profound dysfunc 
tional human resource and industrial relations consequences.
Technology Strategies. One of the central lessons American manage 
ment is learning from NUMMI and other Japanese-managed firms in 
the U.S. concerns the technology strategies these companies are using. 
Our discussion of NUMMI relied heavily on Shimada's and MacDuf- 
fie's model of the production system in use in that plant and in many 
other Japanese manufacturing firms. The lesson, however, is 
generalizable to applications of new technology outside of manufactur-
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ing as well. That is, technology strategies that rely on effective use of 
employee motivation, skill, and flexibility are more compatible with 
innovations in industrial relations than are those that try to embody all 
the controls and labor saving features within the hardware itself. These 
technologies also help to institutionalize the associated industrial rela 
tions innovations discussed here.
Strategies and Choices for Union Leaders
A companion paper from our research (McKersie, Cutcher- 
Gershenfeld, and Wever 1987) provides a detailed analysis of how the 
strategies and roles of union leaders at the local and national levels change 
in bargaining relationships that institutionalize these innovations. We 
therefore need only summarize the key roles of top-level union leaders 
in diffusing these innovations.
There are deep divisions of opinion within the leadership ranks of 
the labor movement over whether to support, oppose or remain neutral 
about many of the innovations discussed here. The American labor move 
ment will very likely experience a prolonged period of internal political 
debate and conflict over these issues. Unless leaders of national unions 
and other top-level leaders in the labor movement adopt innovations 
of this kind as part of their basic strategies for organizing and represent 
ing workers, union leaders at lower levels who support these innova 
tions will lose political battles within their unions. Consequently, the 
diffusion and institutionalization of these innovations will be blocked.
A leadership posture of neutrality or passive acceptance is not enough. 
This approach would only sustain uncertainty and prolong internal con 
flict. Moreover, it would leave employers wondering about how sup 
portive future union leaders would be of such changes. Finally, simple 
passive acceptance would limit labor leaders' ability to shape and in 
fluence the course of innovations and would limit the ability of unions 
to use their support for these ideas in recruiting new union members.
Strategies for Government Officials
We believe that the broad diffusion of these innovations will require 
strong and sustained leadership on the part of national political leaders: 
first, to encourage a positive dialogue between labor and management,
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and then, to adopt the principles embodied in these innovations as a 
conscious and explicit national policy. Such a national policy would 
require comprehensive review and updating of both the specific labor 
laws that govern union-management relations and the array of economic, 
trade, regulatory, and employment and training policies that influence 
employment relationship.
Some positive steps in this direction are already being taken at the 
national and state levels of government and within a variety of public 
and private groups that are studying ways to enhance the competitiveness 
of the American economy. For example, the Labor Department recently 
issued a discussion paper asking for further analysis of the fit between 
current labor law and the objective of promoting greater cooperation 
(Schlossberg and Fetter 1986). This coincides with a growing consen 
sus within the academic community that serious flaws exist inthe con 
tent and administration of the National Labor Relations Act that im 
pede workers from exercising their rights in union organizing drives 
and discourage labor and management from adopting many of the in 
novations discussed in this report (Getman, Goldberg, and Herman 1976; 
Dickens 1983; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Weiler 1984; Cooke 1985; 
Koch an, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Morris 1987). This dialogue must 
continue and be translated into concrete proposals for updating labor 
law to fit the contemporary environment.
The efforts of the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Management 
Relations and Cooperative Programs to promote research and disseminate 
information on innovations in industrial relations have also helped to 
bring the changes hi industrial relations practices to a broad range of 
practitioners. The network established through the Labor Department's 
support of this research has served a diffusing role as the parties in 
teracted and learned from each other's experiences. The development 
of more and larger networks such as these should continue to pay 
dividends for the Labor Department and the economy.
Updating labor policy will also require greater integration of labor- 
management relations with other dimensions of our national human 
resource and economic policies. In this paper, we have emphasized the 
importance of cooperation, flexibility in human resource management, 
compensation and employment security, and long-run business strategies
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within individual firms. The same need exists for coordination and in 
tegration of public policies affecting these activities and outcomes, the 
1987 report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Ad 
justment and Worker Dislocation is a good example of a tripartite ef 
fort to reach a consensus on a national policy for helping workers and 
firms adjust to economic and technological changes. The involvement 
of labor, business, and government representatives in the development 
of this policy not only helped to build a stronger link between public 
policy and private practice but it also served as a model for making 
progress on a controversial labor policy issue by involving the parties 
hi intensive negotiations and consensus building.
There is also an opportunity to take advantage of the growing con 
sensus among public officials, business and labor leaders, and academic 
experts on the need to develop a long-run strategy for improving the 
competitiveness of American firms in world markets and reducing our 
trade deficits. We believe that diffusing and institutionalizing the in 
dustrial relations innovations discussed here will be critical to the suc 
cess of these efforts and should, therefore, be integrated into these 
strategy discussions.
We can make this final point by way of a historical analogy. Collec 
tive bargaining only diffused and became institutionalized as a stable 
institution in American society after the private experiments of unions 
and employers in the clothing, skilled trades, railroad, and other in 
dustries were adopted as the basic public policy of this country in the 
Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act. The diffusion of collective 
bargaining was then bolstered with the support of the National Labor 
Relations Board and the War Labor Board. Macroeconomic policies 
that linked economic expansion and improved standards of living fur 
ther assured the centrality of collective bargaining. Public policy will 
need to play a similar institutionalizing role if the innovative practices 
that management and labor have experimented with in selected private 
settings during the first half of the 1980s are to be sustained and diffus 
ed to broader settings in the years ahead.
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Exhibit 1 
Overview of Research Sites
GM-UAW (Fiero & 
Lake Orion plants  
both MI)
Xerox-ACTWU 
(Rochester, NY 
manufacturing 
complex)
Workplace 
level
Elements of the team 
system, less supervision, 
heightened emphasis on 
quality control, fewer 
inventories
Highly evolved employee 
involvement groups, some 
autonomous work groups, 
less supervision, statistical 
process control, areas of 
complete work redesign, 
just-in-time delivery, 
reduced inventories
Collective bargaining 
level
Departures from past 
practice to allow greater 
flexibility in work design & 
wages, Lake Orion agree 
ment allowing for employees 
to choose single or multiple 
classification pay and work 
organization
No-layoff guarantee, 
language guaranteeing joint 
decisions on outsourcing, 
experimental gain-sharing 
program, problemsolving 
approach to bargaining, 
shift in pay to take some 
increases out of base wage, 
shelter agreements to allow 
for flexible work 
organization
Strategic 
level
Joint discussion of new 
technology, human resource 
planning, and some 
aspects of investment at 
Fiero, formal top-level joint 
roles in Fiero
Joint decisionmaking on 
subcontracting, horizon 
teams for long-term joint 
human resource planning, 
regular union access to 
CEO, joint plant design, 
joint new product develop 
ment, new relations with 
subcontractors
Western-ALPA, 
ffiT, ATE, AFA (Los 
Angeles main hub)
Boeing-IBT (Seattle, 
WA manufacturing 
complex)
Budd-UAW (Detroit, 
MI and Kitchener, 
Ontario manufactur 
ing plants)
Cummins-DWU, OCU 
(Columbus, OH)
Limited employee 
involvement
Quality circle program
Employee involvement 
groups, statistical process 
control, just-in-time delivery 
being established, Joint 
Die Transfer Committee
Work redesign, extensive 
employee involvement 
program, statistical process 
control
Deep concessions in wages 
and work rules
New technology language 
covering training, informa 
tion sharing, and pilot 
programs and experiments
Substantial wage and benefit 
concessions, history of 
wild-cat strikes and other 
concerted activity
Some wage concessions, 
limited job security
Union seats on the board of 
directors, minority employee 
stock ownership
Joint union-management 
pilot technology programs 
and experiments
Establishment of joint, top- 
level steering committee
Unanticipated corporate- 
wide layoff
Exhibit 1 (continued)
Alcoa-ABGWU 
(Lebanon, PA 
rolling mill)
Boise Cascade-PWU 
(DeRidder, LA 
paper mill)
Goodyear-URW 
(Lincoln, NE manu 
facturing plant)
Workplace 
level
Employee involvement and 
communications programs, 
selected areas with work 
redesign and autonomous 
work group, statistical 
process control
Sudden shift to highly 
flexible work organiza 
tion with only four job 
classifications
Employee involvement and 
communications programs, 
statistical process control
Collective bargaining 
level
Substantial wage and benefit 
concessions, inability to 
depart from national agree 
ment on gain sharing
Complete replacement of 
traditional contract with 
team-based system of work 
organization, lengthy strike 
prior to the change
Problemsolving negotiations 
process
Strategic 
level
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Organized Labor's Political Agenda
An Economist's Evaluation
George E. Johnson 
The University of Michigan
This paper is a critical analysis of organized labor's political agenda 
in the United States. What do they want, why do they want it, and, 
from the point of view of economic analysis, what would happen if they 
got it?
There are three reasons why I consider this an interesting and relatively 
important topic to consider at the present time (late 1987).
(1) A great deal of organized labor's ability to wield influence in col 
lective bargaining is derived from public policy, especially the legal 
environment. At times in U.S. history, unionism has been discourag 
ed; for a brief period (1935 to 1948), it was encouraged as a positive 
force for both economic recovery and social justice. For the past 40 
years, it has been more or less tolerated (more during some years and 
less in others, for example now). If organized labor is to reverse its 
historic slide (from representation of about 33 percent of nonagricultural 
employment in 1955 to approximately 17 percent in 1986), public policy 
will have to switch back to the encouragement mode of the Depres- 
sion/WW n years. Indeed, it would have to shift much more even than 
organized labor advocates in its public positions, discussed below.
(2) Organized labor still represents the largest special single-interest 
bloc in the Democratic Party. If the Democrats regain the White House 
in the 1988 election which, unforeseeable scandals aside, depends to 
a very large extent on whether or not an economic recession breaks 
out by the end of the summer of 1988 a large part of labor's political 
agenda will be enacted in one form or another. Even if the Republicans 
hold on to the presidency, it is likely that the new president will be
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more moderate (a Bush or a Dole rather than a Kemp or a Robertson) 
than the Reagan group and value some amount of accommodation with 
labor. It is thus likely that "16th Street" (the D.C. euphemism for the 
AFL-CIO, referring to the site of their headquarters) will fare much 
better in the post-Reagan era than it has thur far in the 1980s.
(3) Organized labor has, despite its diminished political influence, 
been taking very clear positions on a number of important economic 
and social problems. Its positions are, indeed, rather refreshing in their 
forthrightness compared to the tendency of most presidential candidates 
(from both parties) to obscure and waffle in order to be as inoffensive 
as possible. Labor's positions on what we should do about trade, taxes 
and government spending, minimum wages, child care, and a host of 
other issues are extremely clear. If nothing else, a discussion of their 
agenda is a good excuse to deal with many important problems.
These issues are relatively controversial, and one might well ask about 
my underlying biases. (For example, when one picks up a newspaper 
in a strange city, it is best to read the editorial page first so that one 
is aware of the possible slant of the news stories.) For what it is worth, 
I am a political independent who supports Republican, Democratic, and 
Independent candidates with about equal frequency; the distinguishing 
characteristic of my choices is that they usually lose. I have worked 
in Washington on two occasions (once under each party) as a technical 
economist dealing with labor market policies. As a rather conventional 
economist, I have a built-in conservatism in favor of market outcomes 
and a skepticism (reinforced from observation of the government in ac 
tion) of political intervention in the economy. On the other hand, I have 
an inherent sympathy for the underdog (how could, for example, anyone 
not root for the Cubs over the Mets?), and I perceive that there are 
many serious problems in the country that simply will not be solved 
without intelligent government intervention. Thus, I approach this cri 
tique of organized labor's political agenda from the point of view of 
an economist from the middle of the U.S. political spectrum. There 
are biases, but not the usual kind.
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Background: The Current Economic Situation
Before considering labor's political agenda, it is useful to clarify some 
background issues. What is going on with the U.S. economy, and what 
are the potential economic effects of unions?
First, the most startling fact about the recent behavior of the U.S. 
economy is the fact that we have become almost a stagnant economy. 
A consistent feature of the U.S. economy (and all other modern 
economies) is that there was consistent per capita economic growth from 
the time we started industrialization into the early 1970s. This per capita 
growth was reflected in a real wage rate (dollars per hour divided by 
an index of the price level) that grew at an average annual rate of be 
tween 1.5 and 2.0 percent. This means that a worker in any time period 
has between 55 to 80 percent more purchasing power than an equivalent 
worker 30 years previously; he/she had to spend only half to two-thirds 
as much time at work to buy a pair of shoes or a pound of cheese. ' 'Pro 
gress" was inexorable.
During the first 25 years after World War n this pace of improve 
ment in the general standard of living continued. Real compensation 
per hour (including fringe benefits and employer contributions to social 
insurance) grew at an abnormally high rate of 2.64 percent. The average 
real nonagricultural wage of nonsupervisory workers (not including 
fringes and payroll taxes) grew at a lower but still rather substantial 
rate. All this ended after 1973 when both indices of real compensation 
declined through the rest of the decade, and they have recovered only 
slightly since 1980. What this means is that the average compensation 
of the typical employee in 1986 was only 3.0 percent higher than hi 
1973. A simple extrapolation of the performance of that variable from 
1947 to 1973 would imply that the typical worker would have been 40.3 
percent better off in 1986 than in 1973. Similarly, the average real 
nonagricultural wage has fallen 10 percent rather than increasing 27 
percent as would have been expected on the basis of the 1947-73 
experience.
The reasons for this decline in the real wage rate are, I am somewhat 
embarrassed to admit, not fully understood by economists. According 
ly, it is difficult to tell if we will continue in a condition of stagnation
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or will revert to old style per capita growth in the future. (Without go 
ing into the gory details, the fact that the decline coincided with the 
first energy crisis provides a hint about what is going on, but the ex 
planations are not sufficiently comprehensive.) What is relevant for this 
paper is the implication of the stagnation for social policy. In the pre-1973 
period, if group A received an increase in living standards, there was 
always a "growth dividend" so that group A's gain was not ostensibly 
at the expense of groups B, C, and D. If, however, the pie per capita 
(or per worker) is essentially fixed, A can gain only at the expense of 
some combination of the other groups.
A second important development in the postwar period has been the 
increasing interdependence of the world economy. In 1965 the ratio 
of exports to GNP was .061 and the ratio of imports to GNP was .047. 
By 1986, these figures rose to .089 and .114; in other words, imports 
became about two-and-a-half times as important during this period. Of 
greater relevance for the present topic, the ratio of nonagricultural mer 
chandise exports (primarily manufactured goods) to GNP rose from .038 
in 1965 to .045 in 1985, but the ratio of nonpetroleum merchandise 
imports (again primarily manufacturing) to GNP rose from .028 in 1965 
to .072 in 1985. These developments, as will be pointed out below and 
as has been noted in detail by the AFL-CIO, have had a profound ef 
fect on the composition of employment in the U.S.
In addition, the markets for both physical and financial capital have 
become extremely interdependent among the developed, non-communist 
economies. This means that factories tend to be built where costs are 
lowest, and, with the enormous improvement of methods of communica 
tion and transportation, the principal variable cost is the price of labor. 
To anticipate, one of the major functions of unionism is to drive up 
the price of labor, and the AFL-CIO has not been very happy about, 
the "opening up" of the U.S. economy. Another implication of this 
interdependence among nations is that an individual country (even the 
biggest one) does not have very much control over the level of its in 
terest rates; the prices of U.S. securities are determined in London, 
Tokyo, Milan, etc., as well as New York. This renders the use of fiscal 
policy to stimulate the economy, a tool in which the majority of U.S. 
economists had much confidence as late as 1968, at best problematical.
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What is the function of unions? I think there is fairly broad agree 
ment that the goal of most unions in the U.S. is to improve the wages and 
working conditions of the workers they represent. Unions in some coun 
tries (and some unions in the U.S. a century ago) view their organizations 
as vehicles for the mobilization of the working class into revolutionary 
cadres, but U.S. unions are conservative in the sense that they accept 
the distinction between ownership and employment and work within 
the capitalist system. Granted, a few unions (there are some current 
U.S. examples) have a subsidiary goal of the enrichment of the leader 
ship, but the typical union is run more or less representatively (in about 
the same degree as, say, Congress) in the interests of its membership.
One important aspect of what unions do some, including me, would 
argue that this is their most important function is to provide a voice 
to individual members. If a worker feels that she has been treated un 
fairly in terms of work assignment, discipline, dismissal, or whatever, 
she can appeal to her shop steward who will see that the matter is handled 
equitably. Unionism in the worlds of Sumner Slichter, provides a system 
of "industrial jurisprudence" as an alternative to unilateral decisions 
by representatives of management. Most reasonable observers would 
agree, I think, that this is a good thing; workers have as much right 
to equitable treatment by their supervisors as, say, professors do from 
their dean (for which purpose, in large part, academic tenure was 
invented).
A second function of unions is to raise the wages (I take the word 
"wages" to include nonwage compensation) of their members above 
what they would be in the absence of unionism. What are the efficien 
cy and distributional effects of union success in this regard? It is useful 
to start from the fact that the sum of payments to all factors of produc 
tion must equal real GNP (Y). A useful disaggregation of "factors of 
production" includes unionized employment (the value of which is Nu), 
nonunion nonsupervisory employment (Nn), other "nonunionizable" 
labor (No, including most managers and many professional, technical, 
and lower level supervisory workers), and inputs of capital and other 
nonlabor factors (K). It then follows that
Y=Wu*Nu+Wn*Nn+Wo*No+R*K,
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where Wu is the average union real wage rate, Wn the wage of non 
union nonsupervisory wage, Wo the wage of relatively skilled labor, 
and R the real return on the ownership of a nonlabor input.
In the absence of unionism, the wage for the Nu jobs would be (more 
or less) equal to those for the Nn jobs through the force of labor market 
competition, or Wu=Wn. Under unionism, however, Wu is raised 
through collective bargaining to some level above Wn. The traditional 
story of the economic effects of this is as follows, (i) The higher wage 
level faced by employers of union labor causes them to cut back employ 
ment, and the displaced workers are forced to accept nonunion wages 
at the lower wage Wn. This causes an aggregate "inefficiency" that 
is reflected in a slight decline in Y. (ii) The loss in wages of those Nu 
workers who are forced to accept the lower wage Wn is equal to the 
decline in Y. (iii) The higher value of Wu means that those unionized 
workers who are sufficiently fortunate to retain their union jobs will 
gain, (iv) The increased supply of workers for nonunion jobs caused 
by the reduction in Nu following the increase in Wu means that Wn 
will decline below its initial level, and consequently, nonunionized 
relatively low skilled workers will lose due to the introduction of 
unionism, (v) Relatively skilled workers will incur a slight reduction 
in income due to the inefficiency caused by the introduction of unionism, 
and its value is roughly proportional to the reduction in Y under (i) 
above. This loss, however, will be small compared to the loss incurred 
by the incumbent Nu's, for the displaced union workers cannot generally 
compete for relatively high skilled jobs, (vi) The owners of nonlabor 
inputs will incur a loss through the reduction in R that is comparable 
in proportionate terms to that of the No's.
The preceding suggests that whatever union members gain in terms 
of increased compensation, item (iii) in the preceding paragraph, is equal 
to the losses of workers who are similar but nonunionized, (iv), plus 
the losses of both relatively skilled workers and the owners of nonlabor 
inputs, (v) and (vi). Investigation of this question in formal economic 
models (e.g., Johnson and Mieszkowski) suggests that most of the gains 
come from losses incurred by nonunion nonsupervisory labor, i.e., the 
value of (iii) is only slightly greater than the negative of (iv). By this 
view of the economic effects of unionism, therefore, the gains by union 
members arise primarily at the expense of similar but nonunionized
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labor. Estimation of the size of this transfer is a fairly complicated matter, 
but I would conjecture that as of 1987 it is between 30 and 60 billion 
dollars.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint an extremely important aspect of 
the ability of individual unions to obtain economic gains for their 
members is the mitigation of competition from lower-wage, nonunion 
competition. If, for example, a union organizes a few firms in an in 
dustry characterized by the free entry of other firms, the unionized firms 
will face a severe cost disadvantage relative to firms that have been 
able to resist unions, and, in the long run, the unionized firms may be 
so unprofitable that their owners decide not to replace depreciated plants 
and leave the industry. Consequently, unionism generally has been suc 
cessful in the U.S. in industries in which (a) they are able to organize 
a large majority of the workers in particular occupations, and (b) there 
are only a few large firms and entry by new firms is very difficult. In 
the absence of these conditions, a union faces the prospect that at least 
a very large proportion of its membership will lose their jobs if the wages 
of its members are negotiated at a level above the industry norm.
The point will be made and stressed below that much of organized 
labor's political agenda can be understood in terms of their obvious and 
understandable desire to mitigate competition from nonunion labor.
Labor's Political Agenda
I now turn to a consideration of labor's specific political agenda with 
respect to economic policy issues. The discussion will be organized in 
to four groups of issues: (a) policy toward the labor market and the 
environment of collective bargaining; (b) international trade policy; 
(c) monetary and fiscal policy; and (d) women in the labor market. I 
put major emphasis on the current attitudes of labor toward various ques 
tions, but where it is especially relevant I consider the historical develop 
ment of labor's attitude.
The sources of my impression of labor's attitudes consist principally 
of the following: (i) various issues of the AFL-CIO News, a weekly 
publication that reports and interprets political and economic
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developments from the point of view of that organization; (ii) a series 
of position papers entitled AFL-CIO Reviews the Issues, which go into 
some detail on a wide range of policy issues of the mid-1980s; and 
(iii) the annual reports of the AFL-CIO to the Congress, in which the 
AFL-CIO Department of Legislation sets out what the Executive Council 
of the organization feels the U.S. government ought to be doing.
Domestic Labor Market Issues
There are, of course, literally hundreds of political issues that con 
cern the day-to-day operation of unions: worker safety, pension manage 
ment, union reporting requirements, the management of the National 
Labor Relations Board, and so on. I will focus on a few such issues 
that seem to me to illuminate labor's position with respect to the domestic 
labor market.
Davis-Bacon Act (DB). The purpose of this law, which was pass 
ed in 1931, was to keep wage rates in construction from falling 
precipitously during the first phase of the Great Depression. It requires 
any construction project that is financed by federal funds to pay the 
"prevailing wage" for construction workers in the area. This level is 
usually interpreted as the negotiated union rate, so DB means essen 
tially that nonunionized construction firms cannot employ their cost ad 
vantage (due to a 10-25 percent lower wage level) in bidding on 
federally-financed projects. It was pointed out above that unions have 
a difficult time operating in industries that are characterized by a high 
degree of product competition and the relatively free entry of (non 
union) firms. It is clear that a law like DB is very popular to unions 
in the construction industry, for it assures them access to a large share 
of the market.
DB is anathema to conservatives who see it as an unwarranted, inef 
ficient governmental intervention in the market. It has also not been 
popular in the postwar period with liberals who have seen DB as a 
mechanism for denying black construction workers access to lucrative 
jobs in construction. It is, in fact, very difficult to defend a law of this 
sort, unless one puts inordinate weight on the well-being of unionized 
construction craftsmen. It is an example of a few benefiting at the ex 
pense of the many with, as seen in the above analysis of the distribu-
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tional effects of union wage gains, the largest cost being incurred by 
individuals at a lower economic stratum than the beneficiaries.
The retention of DB, however, has been a consistent component of 
labor's political agenda for decades, and they spend a lot of energy in 
defeating proposals to weaken it. For example, in 1982 there was an 
amendment to a bill to provide federal funds to help rebuild infrastruc 
ture that would have limited the application of DB to initial highway 
construction and excluded repair work. This was defeated by a vote 
of 191-194, no doubt with a bit of lobbying by the relevant unions.
Minimum Wages. A second "workers' rights" law that gets a lot of 
attention from the AFL-CIO is the minimum wage provision of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938. The minimum wage has been the subject 
of periodic battles between conservatives and liberals over the 50 years 
of its existence. Its value has usually been reset at about 50 percent 
of the average wage in manufacturing, and over the following few years 
its value falls relative to other wages and to the price level.
The last increase in the value of the federal minimum wage was in 
1981 to $3.35, its current value. The average manufacturing wage at 
the time of the last increase was about $7.63, so the minimum/manufac 
turing ratio was .44. Since then, however, the average manufacturing 
wage has risen to about $10.20 (as of November 1987), so the ratio 
has fallen to .33. From another perspective, prices have risen about 
18 percent since the beginning of 1981, so the real value of the minimum 
wage has fallen by about 15 percent. Indeed, in large parts of the coun 
try the going wage for the relevant lowest skilled jobs (teenagers working 
as fast food hands and such) is well above $3.35, so that the federal 
minimum wage is as irrelevant as if it were set at its 1938 level (25 cents).
The AFL-CIO strongly supports the current Kennedy-Hawkins bill 
that would raise the minimum to $3.85 in 1988 and by steps to half 
the manufacturing wage in 1991. If the minimum were currently equal 
to half the manufacturing wage, it would be $5.50 rather than $3.35 
and would be a decidedly not irrelevant level in most labor markets 
in the country. It should be pointed out that the Reagan administration 
continues in its opposition to an increase in the minimum, calling in 
stead for a youth sub-minimum differential. I understand that there is 
general resignation by Republicans to an eventual increase, but its value
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will probably be smaller than the Kennedy-Hawkins proposal. (A similar 
proposal for indexing the minimum to the manufacturing wage, strongly 
supported by labor, was opposed by the Carter administration and 
defeated in 1977.)
Most unionists in the U.S. earn a great deal more than $5.50 per hour, 
so why is the raising of the minimum wage so important to the AFL- 
CIO? Part of the reason is their concept of how low-wage labor markets 
operate. To quote from AFL-CIO Reviews the Issues. Report No. 13, 
July 1987:
Many wages are not set in free and perfectly competitive labor 
markets. The lowest paid workers in society often suffer from 
their lack of bargaining power. They are easy targets for ex 
ploitation by business, especially when there is a large pool 
of unemployed seeking work, . . . Some non-market institu 
tion or arrangement is often needed, therefore, to prevent 
such exploitation. Indeed, the notion that the structure of 
wages should adhere to some underlying standard of fairness 
is one reason for having a minimum wage in the first place, 
and for keeping it in line with the general structure of wages. 
This is, of course, a very difficult line of argument for a conven 
tional economist to follow. What kind of exploitation? What is a "stan 
dard of fairness?" The standard economic analysis of the labor market 
effects of minimum wages is similar to that of the distributional effects 
of unionism. If the minimum were raised to $5.50, some low wage 
workers would gain (by keeping their higher wage fast food jobs) but 
others would lose (by having to babysit or cut grass or not work at all). 
What right does the government have, more conservative economists 
would go on to argue, to deny employment opportunities to people who 
are willing to work for $4.00?
One problem with the standard economic argument is that the em 
pirical evidence about the employment effects of minimum wages is 
that they are rather small (see Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). The 
reason for this may be due to the likelihood that, in periods in which 
the minimum wage is significant (i.e., nontrivially in excess of the 
market-clearing wage), there is large noncompliance with the law. A 
firm that is found in violation of the law for the first time is liable to
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pay back wages to its employees, if these employees can be found. That 
is like establishing a fine for owners of automobiles in parking places 
with expired meters equal to the price for one hour of parking; people 
wouldn't bother putting quarters in the meters because the expected value 
of doing so would be negative. It is interesting to note tht the AFL- 
CIO has backed legislation that would establish penalties on firms for 
noncompliance.
A second, probably more important, reason that the AFL-CIO sup 
ports a minimum wage legislation is that some of its member unions, 
e.g., the International Ladies Garment Workers and the Restaurant 
Workers, are in low-wage industries and are very affected by low-wage 
competition. A high, well-enforced minimum wage would serve the pur 
pose for these unions as does the Davis-Bacon Act for the construction 
trades. It would establish a wage floor so that these unions could bargain 
for higher wages and better working conditions without the fear of be 
ing undercut by nonunionized firms in relatively competitive product 
markets. From the viewpoint of equity, it is difficult to fault this motiva 
tion; for example, the wages of textile workers currently average only 
about $7 per hour. However, the competitive labor they are trying to 
price out of their market earns hourly wages of $4 to $6 per hour, so 
the equity case is not clear cut.
Occupational Disease Notification. A current example of organiz 
ed labor's political activity is its strong support of a bill that would re 
quire the identification, notification, and medical counseling of workers 
exposed to a high risk of cancer or other diseases on a current or previous 
job. Pending legislation would provide federal monitoring of the pro 
gram at a cost of about $25 million. The bill is supported by some trade 
associations and firms (e.g., the Chemical Manufacturers Association 
and General Electric) but is opposed by other representatives of industry 
(e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers) and by the Reagan 
administration.
The position of the Reagan administration on this proposal is in 
teresting. On the one hand, they maintain, the bill is duplicative of ex 
isting OSHA regulations and therefore unnecessary; on the other hand, 
it would create a great deal of unproductive litigation by being a boon 
doggle for liability attorneys. Further, says the administration, policies
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of this sort should be decided in the course of normal collective bargain 
ing. The AFL-CIO says that because of careless and ignorant past prac 
tices by many industries there is going to be a lot of future occupa 
tional disease and that this legislation would prevent or minimize the 
disease.
This is an interesting and subtle problem. Why should the govern 
ment become involved in a program that could in principle, be negotiated 
between unions and firms? The answer is that many firms are not unioniz 
ed and their workers, especially former employees, have no way to com 
pel the firms to provide the relevant, costly information. Assuming that 
the notification procedures are cost-effective from a social point of view 
(which may or may not be true, I don't have enough information to 
tell), it is correct for the government to require participation by all rele 
vant firms and not simply depend on unions and managements to work 
it out. Nonunion firms would generally not engage in the notification 
process, and unionized firms that did would be subject to a competitive 
disadvantage.
Other legislation of this sort that is recent passed or currently under 
consideration in Congress includes provision of (unpaid) leave time for 
new parents, mandatory provision by firms of catastrophic health in 
surance, the prohibition of polygraph tests by employers, and required 
advance notice by firms of plant closures or significant employment 
reductions. The Reagan administration has said of all of them "leave 
it to the collective bargaining process." The reason that labor wants 
these sorts of provisions codified is that they will apply to all firms, 
union and nonunion alike and thus will eliminate a competitive disad 
vantage of unionized firms who agree to them in collective bargaining. 
An economist would predict that a nonunion firm mandated to pay some 
benefit that costs x cents per hour will lower its wage offer (sooner 
or later) by that x cents. Thus, the competitive disadvantage of a unioniz 
ed firm that has negotiated the benefit at a cost of x cents will not in 
fact change. The support of these proposals by the AFL-CIO, however, 
indicates that they are not believers in the economist's conclusion (or 
maybe they value the sooner more than the later).
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International Trade Policy
In the past few years, the issue about which labor has been the most 
strident is the flow of imports into the U.S. The headlines of the front 
page stories in the AFL-CIO News document the horror of lost jobs and 
wages caused by the increasingly larger importation of shoes, vehicles, 
steel, military equipment, and all manner of goods.
It was not always like that. In 1958, for example, the AFL-CIO sup 
ported the Eisenhower administration's request for an extension of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement and scolded the "protectionists" who did 
not want lower tariffs. They lauded the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
that gave the President authority to cut tariffs in return for equivalent 
treatment in other countries. (This was the period in which the Euro 
pean Economic Community was being formed.) They also provided a 
hint of things to come, however: "The AFL-CIO gave strong support 
to the Kennedy trade program but warned that support could turn to 
opposition unless strong measures were taken to help workers who might 
lose their jobs and to help industries that might be injured by increased 
imports."
By 1970, the support had indeed turned to opposition, and the op 
position has become much stronger since 1984 when the merchandise 
trade deficit began its sharp increase to present levels. Their present 
position can be summarized as follows: (a) the free movement of goods 
across countries was beneficial to the U.S. when we produced most 
of what we consumed at home; (b) now, however, many U.S. manufac 
turing companies are multinational concerns that export American 
technology and capital to wherever they can yield the highest profit, 
thus resulting in a severe loss of U.S. jobs; (c) the irresponsible, 
unregulated behavior of multinationals, along with the irresponsible fiscal 
policy of the Reagan administration (to be discussed below), has also 
been a major cause of the disappearance of real wage growth and of 
the reduction of the "middle class" in the U.S.; and (d) extremely 
strong, European-style policies are needed in the U.S. to preserve our 
industrial base.
During 1987, the AFL-CIO has strongly supported the Trade and In 
ternational Economic Policy Reform Act. The major provision of this 
bill is that any country whose (nonpetroleum) merchandise trade surplus
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with the U.S. exceeds 1.75 times its imports from the U.S. must reduce 
that surplus by 10 percent per year until either the ratio falls to or below 
1.75 or until the U.S. trade deficit falls below 1.5 percent of GNP (it 
was 4.1 percent of GNP in 1986). The bill also provides for severe 
penalties to be placed on the importation of goods from countries whose 
price advantage is derived from, in the AFL-CIO's words, "the denial 
of the right to freedom of association (in other words, bust unions), 
the refusal to insure a safe working environment, the exploitation of 
child labor and other reprehensible practices." The bill (usually refer 
red to as "Gephardt," after its leading sponsor in the House) would 
also provide specific relief to certain industries such as steel and telecom 
munications. Another bill, the Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987, 
would increase restrictions on the importation of clothing and shoes. 
In addition, labor has been a proponent of similar proposals such as 
domestic content legislation for the auto industry and an opponent of 
measures such as the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative 
that was an effort to spur economic development in that region by en 
couraging imports from these nations into the U.S.
Why has organized labor shifted its position on trade so radically over 
the past 25 years, from putting down opponents of lower tariffs in the 
U.S. as "protectionists" in the 1950s to denouncing proponents of low 
tariffs as "slaves to outmoded economic theories" in the 1980s? To 
understand this question, one has to understand that each worker, whether 
a union member or not, has the role of a consumer of goods as well 
as a supplier of services. As a consumer, each worker is clearly better 
off by being able to purchase foreign goods at lower prices. Any policies 
like those mentioned above that would raise the price of shoes, autos, 
VCRs and the like, simply lower the purchasing power of a given value 
of each person's income. To give a commonly cited example, if some 
country decides that it wants to sell steel to the U.S. at a price below 
its domestic cost and make up the losses by taxing its citizens, American 
consumers gain by roughly the amount of the subsidy provided its steel 
industry by the foreign government. If, as was the case before the re 
cent nationwide labor strife, wage rates in Korea are 10 to 15 percent 
of those in the U.S., the American consumer clearly gains from the 
importation of labor-intensive, low technology goods (like shoes) from
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Korea. If the vintners in the Bordeaux region of France are more skill 
ed than their counterparts in the Napa Valley region of California, Yup 
pies are clearly hurt by an increase in the tariff on Chateau Lafitte 
Rothschild.
On the other hand, each worker is also a supplier of labor services. 
Some workers produce goods that are import-sensitive (e.g., autos and 
shoes). A reduction in the price of imported goods (for whatever reason: 
increase in the efficiency of foreign suppliers, the granting of govern 
ment subsidies to export industries in foreign countries, or an increase 
in the real value of the dollar) lowers the return to the owners of capital 
(both physical and human) in import-sensitive industries. Thus, although 
they pay lower prices than they would otherwise for the goods they 
buy, they receive lower incomes, and, for this subset of Americans, 
the negative effect of lower incomes outweighs the beneficial effect of 
lower prices. These people, both the workers in and the owners of shoe 
factories, would clearly gain by the imposition of tariffs or other trade 
restrictions on the importation of goods.
A second group of workers is employed in industries whose output 
is both consumed domestically and exported (e.g., airplanes and wheat). 
A fall in the price of imports, everything else equal, makes them better 
off as consumers, but it also increases their incomes by weakening the 
dollar and increasing the demand for exports. The interest of these 
workers and that of the owners of firms in export industries is in keep 
ing both U.S. trade restrictions and those in foreign countries as low 
as possible. For example, if, in response to a domestic content law that 
said that a certain fraction of each imported automobile had to be pro 
duced in the U.S., Japan did the same for the 747s it purchases for Japan 
Air, Boeing workers hi Seattle would be worse off; they would have 
to pay more for their Toyotas (if they were still available) and would 
earn lower wages (if they still had them).
A third group of workers is employed in the "nontradable" goods 
sector (e.g., service and insurance); their interest is ostensibly in lower 
consumer prices and they are thus hostile to trade restrictions. This is 
a little tricky, for, as Deardorff and Stern (1979) point out, every worker 
is also a member of a community. The demand for "nontradables" in 
an area that is dominated by either an import or an export industry
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will be accordingly affected by trade developments. For example, a pro 
ducer of nontradables in Michigan would probably be helped by the 
imposition of domestic content legislation; a similar person in Seattle 
would probably be hurt.
If the potential gains and losses associated with any trade policy are 
added up for all three groups, aggregate welfare is clearly greatest when 
trade restrictions are minimized. For example, the value of cheap shoes 
from Korea outweighs the losses incurred by American shoeworkers. 
However, this conclusion, a sacred paradigm in economics that goes 
back to Adam Smith, is based on the explicit assumption that everyone 
counts the same. In the language of modern benefit-cost analysis, there 
exists a set of distributional weights that will yield the opposite conclu 
sion, i.e., that free trade is a bad thing. If, for example, one were a 
45-year-old shoeworker without skills that were transferable to any other 
industry, the argument that the sum of the welfare of the rest of the 
citizenry is increased due to the availability of imported shoes (for $10 
when you can make them for $40) by more than you lose (the difference 
between $18,000 in the shoe factory and $7500 at the Burger King) 
is irrelevant. The standard economic argument is also obviously irrele 
vant to the union that represents the shoeworker (and to those unions 
that represent workers in the steel, auto, textile and like industries).
Not all unions benefit from protectionism, and, accordingly, not all 
unions advocate it. A study by Steven Magee (adapted by Deardorff 
and Stern 1979) examined the testimony of both labor and management 
organizations in congressional hearings on trade policy in 1972. There 
was a tendency for both labor and management groups that represented 
industries with large positive trade balances in 1967 (e.g., machinery, 
soybeans, and trucks) to favor freer trade and for those that represented 
industries with large negative trade balances (e.g., textiles, steel, and 
cars) to favor a more protectionist policy. If the merchandise trade deficit 
were approximately zero, the antis and pros would more or less balance 
out, and representatives of "the public" would tilt the scales toward 
freer trade. The problem is that in recent years the trade deficit has 
been very large, and the antis far outweigh the pros. The reason for 
the increase in the trade deficit is the huge federal government deficits 
that followed the large tax cuts in 1982, a topic to be discussed in the
Organized Labor's Political Agenda 79
following subsection. This had the effect of driving up the dollar and 
rendering U.S. manufatunng largely noncompetitive in world markets. 
Whatever its cause, however, the symptom, a flood of inexpensive 
foreign merchandise, has raised the hackles of American labor.
As an example of how trade unions have been affected by the events 
of the past 15 years, I calculated the percentage of nonsupervisory 
workers that were represented by unions in the private nonagricultural 
sector in 1970 (using two-digit industry categories for manufacturing 
and one-digit categories for other industries and the Freeman-Medoff 
collective bargaining coverage numbers). This proportion was .41 in 
1970. If the extent of collective bargaining had remained the same in 
each industry to 1986, this ratio would have fallen to .34. In other words, 
organized labor would have lost about a sixth of its relative influence 
in the private, nonagricultural sector due to the shifts in the industrial 
composition of employment, much of it associated with import penetra 
tion. That this has happened does not mean that the U.S. should adopt 
a more protectionist set of policies, but it does help to understand why 
the AFL-CIO has become so vehemently opposed to free trade.
In principle, since there are more gainers than losers as a result of 
free trade, the gamers should be able to buy off the losers from trade 
so that the whole society is better off. In practice, however, it has pro 
ved very difficult to do this. The various programs for trade adjust 
ment assistance have not been very effective, and this has magnified 
labor's opposition to free trade. The administrative problem stems from 
an economic problem. If, for example, several GM plants go out of 
business because of a combination of high wages and incompetent 
management, surely much of their output would be replaced by the im 
portation of Toyotas and the like. A case could be made that the af 
fected workers are victims of import penetration, but, obviously, that 
position is arguable. Do we want to put the government in the role of 
bailing out all companies that fail? What kind of automatic mechanism 
would provide an efficient and equitable determination of who should 
or should not receive trade assistance? What do we do about the 45-year- 
old displaced shoeworker?
These are tough questions, and the AFL-CIO has provided answers 
to all of them. There are, of course, other points of view. However, it
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is clear that the problem is not going to go away in the near future. 
The U.S. is still a very high wage nation, and the exodus of physical 
capital and the adoption of much of our technology by other economies 
will continue. It would, in my opinion, be a serious mistake to follow 
the route of increased protectionism as have many countries; this would 
cause a further significant decline in our living standard. The solution 
lies in (i) solving the problem of the provision of trade adjustment 
assistance, and (ii) coming to grips with our internal fiscal problem that 
is the root cause of the trade crisis.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
During the 1970s, the AFL-CIO, like most professional economists, 
turned from unabashed Keynesianism to a much more eclectic stance 
concerning monetary and fiscal policy. Gone are the days when sensi 
ble people feel that the government can "control" the economy through 
the use of fiscal policy, and the statements of organized labor, in their 
reports to Congress, their issue papers, and in the AFL-CIO News, reflect 
this change of opinion.
A clear statement of their view about monetary policy is contained 
in the June 1983 Report on the 97th Congress. Here (pp. 25-27), they 
complain about the shift in monetary policy from the control of interest 
rates toward an "automaticity" in the rate of growth of the money sup 
ply. Their solution to the problem of high interest rates (yields on AAA 
bonds had been in the double-digit range since 1980) was the imposi 
tion of credit controls so that the money market would yield a lower 
interest rate. The problem with this proposal is that, with the increas 
ing mobility of financial capital across international borders, the U.S. 
has little capacity to control the nominal interest rate in the economy, 
which tends to equal the world real interest rate plus the rate of infla 
tion in the U.S. If we run huge government deficits, we will also run 
large trade deficits, and this requires a large influx of foreign capital 
into the country in order to finance these deficits. If the government 
attempts to set the nominal interest rate such that our real interest rate 
is below the world level, wealth-holders in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and 
elsewhere will turn to other investments and refuse to purchase the U.S. 
government bonds that are necessary to finance the federal government
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deficit. Without severe controls on the export of U.S. financial capital 
(i.e.,making it illegal to ship dollars out of the country, buy foreign 
financial instruments, etc.), capital markets in the U.S. would break 
down in the sense that there would be little "money" for mortgages, 
consumer credit, farm crop loans, etc. Short of nationalizing the bank 
ing system and running it at a huge loss, the country would be in a real 
mess. Thus, the AFL-CIO proposal for artificially driving down the 
rate of interest is either ill-informed or irresponsible.
The preceding paragraph also brings out the root of the trade prob 
lem facing American labor. The Reagan administration decided in 1983 
to cut tax rates very significantly without corresponding cuts in govern 
ment expenditures. These tax cuts were supposed to induce individuals 
to work longer and harder and consumers to save more (thus adding 
to the capital stock) so that the tax base would increase sufficiently for 
tax revenues to fall by very little or, perhaps, increase. This was, of 
course, nonsense, for the question of the incentive effects of after-tax 
wages and rates of return on labor supply and investment had been very 
thoroughly researched and we knew that the tax cuts would reduce 
revenues more or less proportionately. Thus, the government deficit 
increased to the $150-200 billion range on a permanent (or "structural") 
basis. In an economy with open trading of financial assets, this had to 
be accompanied by a decline in net exports on roughly a one-to-one 
basis. Our government deficits were financed by selling assets (govern 
ment bonds, common stocks, Waikiki Beach, and so on) to foreigners. 
Further, the fall in net exports means that exports decline and imports 
increase with the subsequent strengthening of the dollar relative to foreign 
currencies. This is the background to the foreign trade problem that 
was discussed in detail in the preceding subsection.
So what are we going to do about it? Clearly a restrictive trade policy 
(like the Gephardt bill discussed above) only attacks a symptom of the 
problem, not the cause. (It would ultimately strengthen the dollar more 
and reduce both exports and imports by roughly equal amounts.) To 
solve the trade problem we must bring about a significant reduction 
in the government deficit through some combination of increases in taxes 
or decreases in government spending. The Democrats and the AFL- 
CIO favor the former; the Reagan administration favors the latter. The
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reasons for labor's support of higher taxes rather than cuts in govern 
ment spending are spelled out in their report "Infrastructure: Backbone 
of the Economy" (November 1986). Here they take a very long-sighted 
and, in my view, reasonable approach. Investment in infrastructure (air 
ports, highways, bridges, urban transit, railroads, water resources, 
recreational facilities, wastewater treatment, and the like) has serious 
ly declined as a fraction of GNP (from 3.1 percent in 1968 to 2.4 in 
1985). To a large extent, this is a federal responsibility, for the benefits 
of many of these facilities cross the boundaries of state and municipal 
governments so that without federal direction there will be consistent 
underinvestment in them. Thus, a policy of cutting taxes significantly 
and of removing the federal government from the nondefense sphere 
of the economy (the Reagan administration policy of the 1980s) is, to 
say the least, suboptimal. In the AFL-CIO's words, "Skimping on in 
frastructure to cut the federal deficit is a short-run expediency that will 
constrain growth and living standards in the future. The far wiser course 
is to raise the necessary revenue and develop appropriate spending 
priorities that will assure sufficient resources for public investment and 
help overcome the economic stagnation and high unemployment that 
have plagued the United States for many years." (If one put a period 
after "public investment," no reasonable person could argue with this 
statement. The probable implications of the rest of that sentence [Davis- 
Bacon wages, targeting to areas of high unemployment, etc.] are sub 
ject to controversy.)
At present, the federal tax system for individual income is characteriz 
ed by a 15 percent rate up to about $40,000 of taxable income and a 
marginal rate of 28 percent thereafter. Eight years ago the maximum 
marginal tax rate was 50 percent, and at some times during the postwar 
period it was as high as 70 percent. The corporate profits tax rate is 
now 34 percent, as contrasted to the pre-1982 rate of 50 percent. It 
is unlikely that there will be a drastic overhaul of the tax system during 
the next decade, for Congress just completed that (painful) process in 
1986. Thus, additional revenues probably must be raised by adjusting 
the parameters of the present system. One way would be to raise the 
existing rates by a constant proportion (for example, the lower rate by 
a third to 20 percent and the higher rate to 40 percent, the profits rate 
to 45 percent). A second way would be to raise the lower rate and leave
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the upper rate and the profits rate unchanged, which would mean that 
all new tax revenues are generated from the less well-off segment of 
the population. The AFL-CIO, somewhat predictably, favors the third 
possibility (leaving the 15 percent rate constant but increasing both the 
higher rate on personal income and the profits rate to 38.5 percent).
On an issue like this there is no right way or no wrong way to raise 
tax rates. Resolution of this issue rests on a value judgment (i.e., it 
is a political decision). Where one comes out generally depends on where 
one is in the income distribution, although factors such as altruism also 
come to play. It is interesting to note that the typical union member 
is above the middle of the income distribution and, under the current 
tax system, would be in the higher marginal bracket. It is not entirely 
self interest, therefore, that motivates labor with respect to tax policy. 
The notion of "equity" obviously plays a significant role. This is in 
contrast to the tax policy of the Reagan administration, which was design 
ed mainly to cut the taxes of the upper third of the income distribution 
on the (obviously bogus) grounds that this would so increase incentives 
that tax collections would rise.
A final aspect of monetary and fiscal policy that was very important 
to the AFL-CIO in the 1970s is compliance with the Humphrey-Hawkins 
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. This legislation, 
which was enacted largely because of the strong support of the AFL- 
CIO, made achievement of the goal of a 4 percent unemployment rate 
(by 1985) the law of the land. This goal is (the present tense is used 
because the Humphrey-Hawkins Act is still the law) to be achieved 
without increasing inflation or upsetting the U.S. trade balance, and 
this is to be accomplished by certain "structural measures" such as 
the government provision of job training and public service jobs. The 
original legislation called for expansion of public employment (at 
"prevailing wages") until the unemployment rate reached 4 percent, 
but in the final version the only mandated activity was for the Presi 
dent to reveal how the goals of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act were go 
ing to be achieved. (The last time I saw compliance with the law was 
in the 1983 Economic Report of the President, which called for the 
establishment of a youth subminimum wage and for reductions in 
unemployment insurance so as to reduce the "natural rate" of 
unemployment.)
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This law was passed by Congress and signed by President Carter as 
a symbolic act to appeal to labor (and to blacks, who suffer most from 
unemployment); there is no way that any set of structural policies could 
achieve its objectives. It is interesting, however, because it indicates 
the underlying view of the AFL-CIO toward macroeconomic issues. 
Further, if the conditions for a renaissance of labor political influence 
emerge in 1989, more will be heard of the provisions of the Humphrey- 
Hawkins Act.
Women in the Labor Market
An interesting aspect of organized labor's political agenda is its stance 
toward issues that affect women's role in the labor market. A thorough 
discussion of this is set out in the AFL-CIO pamphlet "Work and Family: 
Essentials of a Decent Life (What is Really 'Pro-Family'?)," which 
was published in February 1986. This statement, which covers a wide 
range of topics, might be considered labor's reply to the right wing "pro- 
family" point of view, although it does not address the standard items 
of the right wing agenda (prohibition of abortion, prayer in public 
schools, etc.). Instead, it argues for a series of measures that would, 
in labor's view, make the U.S. a better place for families in general 
and women workers in particular.
The first set of policies advocated by the AFL-CIO to promote the 
quality of family life are the standard ones, some of which have been 
discussed above in other contexts. These include the achievement of 
full employment under Humphrey-Hawkins, an increase in the minimum 
wage, a mandatory reduction in the standard workweek (by requiring 
employers to begin paying overtime wages at 35 rather than 40 hours), 
increasing the federal government role in guaranteeing safety on the 
job (by increasing funding of the Occupational Health and Safety Ad 
ministration), and increases in payments to the unemployed.
Recognizing the ever-increasing importance of women in the U.S. 
labor force (and in unions), they also advocate a number of other policies 
designed to be beneficial to women in the labor market. One major policy 
proposal is increased government funding of child care centers. Noting 
that the cost of caring for children during working hours makes par 
ticipation in the labor market an unprofitable option for many women,
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it is taken as obvious that society would benefit from subsidization of 
child care. From an economic point of view, however, it is not obvious 
that the social benefits of such a subsidy would outweigh the costs. The 
outcome of a formal analysis of this question would rest on the ques 
tion of the degree to which there are "increasing returns to scale" in 
the child care process. That we should allocate x billions of dollars of 
public resources to the provision of child care, however, is certainly 
a clearly stated point of view.
Another interesting proposal discussed in this position paper concerns 
the earnings of women relative to men. One of the more severe social 
problems facing the U.S. is the fact that, on average, the hourly wage 
rate of employed women is 35 percent less than that of men. (Average 
earnings per year are about 40 percent lower, but this is because women, 
on average, work fewer hours.) To some extent this is explained by 
the fact that the average woman in the labor force has less work ex 
perience and job tenure than the average man, a phenomenon attributable 
in large part to career interruptions associated with child birth and rear 
ing. To some other extent, however, the gap between men's and women's 
wages is explained by the fact that the wage rates associated with 
"women's jobs" (secretaries, nurses, librarians, etc.) are lower than 
the wage rates associated with "men's jobs" (truckdrivers, doctors, 
engineers, etc.) even after adjusting for other attributes. Under current 
federal law, it is illegal for most employers to pay different wages to 
men and women with similar productivity on the same job (under the 
Equal Pay Act of 1962). It is also illegal, under Title VH of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, to discriminate against women in hiring and pro 
motion. It is not illegal to compensate workers in different jobs at dif 
ferent schedules; it is, for example, O.K. for X Incorporated to start 
its secretaries at $12,000 moving up to $16,000 per year while paying 
wages of $20,000 to $26,000 to its truckdrivers, so long as women 
truckdrivers are compensated according to the same schedule as are 
men in that job and women applicants for the truckdriving jobs are given 
an equal opportunity to receive them.
A legislative proposal that will probably receive serious considera 
tion in the early 1990s is designed to eliminate sexual wage disparities 
arising from differences in wage scales between jobs held predominantly
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by men and women. This thrust, alternatively termed "pay equity" or 
"comparable worth," which has already received support from the AFL- 
CIO, would require X Incorporated in the above example to justify its 
wage structure across occupations by the use of job evaluation pro 
cedures. By this technique, each of the jobs in the company would be 
assigned points for various characteristics: intellectual requirements, 
responsibility, physical demands, and working conditions. The points 
in the evaluation for each job would be summed (using some set of 
weights for each characteristic) and the wage structure of the firm read 
justed so that average wages were proportional to each job's score. The 
presumption of proponents of comparable worth is that the resultant 
wage structure would be purged of sexist biases that yield much higher 
pay for men's than for women's jobs. (Interestingly, men in predominant 
ly women's jobs do worse relative to men in predominantly men's jobs 
than do women; see Johnson and Solon 1986.) Accordingly, a signifi 
cant portion of the male/female wage differential would be eliminated. 
Thus far comparable worth legislation has been introduced into a few 
states and local governments (e.g., Minnesota and San Jose, Califor 
nia), but it has not been found (in the courts) to apply to the private 
sector, and no X Incorporates have come forward to offer their com 
panies as laboratories to see how it would work. Its biggest proponent 
in the labor movement has been AFSCME, a union that has much to 
gain from it. Without going so far as to label the concept as "looney 
tunes" or "cockamamie" (the latter applied to it by President Reagan), 
there are some serious flaws in comparable worth. Ignoring the litiga 
tion costs (which would be enormous), its most serious flaw is that it 
would in practice apply only to a fraction of employers (at most only 
about 40 percent) in the economy, all levels of government and the large 
private corporations. Many or most of these employers would find it 
profitable to contract out for the services of their now "overpriced" 
women employees, for the temporary employment companies (e.g., Kel 
ly Girl) would be effectively immune to comparable worth because they 
would make sure they did not have any high-wage male jobs by which 
women's jobs could be evaluated. This would mean employment ef 
fects in which some of the previous holders of women's jobs in the
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covered sector would be forced to take wages in the now depressed 
uncovered sector.
Thus, some holders of women's jobs would gain from the imposi 
tion of comparable worth, but others would lose. As with the analysis 
of the effect of unionism on the average wage rate in the economy, it 
is not clear whether comparable worth would on balance be a good or 
a bad thing for the group it is supposed to help.
Conclusions
I have examined the political positions of organized labor in the U.S. 
on a number of current issues concerning the economy. Two principal 
themes appear to emerge.
First, a large number of the AFL-CIO's positions can be explained 
in terms of the obvious self-interest of blocks of its member unions. 
The Davis-Bacon Act is designed to help construction unions at the ex 
pense of virtually everyone else; minimum wage legislation is (arguably) 
a device to lower competition to relatively low-wage unions; the turn 
about of the union movement with respect to international trade coin 
cided with the shift of the U.S. from a merchandise exporter to im 
porter; and so on. However, this hardly distinguishes labor unions from 
other special interest groups such as the American Medical Associa 
tion, the National Turkey Federation (of Reston, VA), or even the 
American Association of University Professors. The AFL-CIO and its 
member unions are a fairly small slice of the total forces lobbying for 
particular treatment in Washington. It is also not unusual that their posi 
tions would be stated rather strongly. People fiercely engaged in a bat 
tle for some cause or other tend over time to believe their rhetoric. (For 
example, I suspect that, when arguing against all evidence for the 1982 
tax cuts, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan actually believed that 
what they were doing was good for the long-term interests of the coun 
try as well as for "the typical guy who earns $100,000 a year.")
On the other hand, many of the positions of the AFL-CIO do not
arise from pure self-interest. I have mentioned their strong stand in favor
nof a relatively progressive tax hike. Further, they have been very strong
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on civil rights issues, even before it was not too unpopular to do so. 
Passage of comparable worth, although of obvious potential benefit to 
a few member unions like AFSCME, would harm many other unions 
representing predominantly male blue-collar workers. I am not privy 
to the decision process that accompanied support of the proposal, but 
it is at least possible that their support of the idea is motivated by a 
sincere concern for the plight of low-paid women workers.
A second theme that has emerged in this investigation of organized 
labor's political agenda is a growing preference for government interven 
tion in the economy at a micro level. This is most clearly reflected in 
their position on international trade, but it is also apparent in their posi 
tions concerning the federal government role in union-management rela 
tions, employer notification concerning plant closings and exposure to 
toxic substances, immigration, and many other issues. This may reflect 
a reaction during the 1980s to the Reagan administration's policy of 
attempting to get the federal government out of virtually every 
nondefense function of government. It may be a reaction to the buf 
feting that the majority of unions have taken from the economy since 
the early 1970s but especially in the 1980s. Whatever the cause, there 
appears to be a diminished desire by the AFL-CIO to trust the dictates 
and desires of the market place as opposed to more equitable and secure 
government solutions. The problem with this approach, in my view, 
is that their concept of equity often means using the government to get 
something for their members at the expense of others who are not as 
well off.
But that is what politics is all about. We have no universally accepted 
standard of what is fair. The AFL-CIO continues to articulate a consis 
tent set of policies very clearly. I suspect that their positions will soon 
gain in importance.
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5 
The Promise of Profit Sharing
Martin L. Weitzman 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I want to talk about the nature and significance of some recent trends 
toward making part of the pay of a firm's workers more automatically 
responsive to the economic well-being of the firm. These trends have 
received some attention for a variety of reasons, not least because they 
may perhaps help to reduce unemployment or improve productivity.
Lately there has been a significant interest throughout many coun 
tries of the world in gain sharing labor payment arrangements, which 
tie some part of a worker's pay to a measure of how well his or her 
company is doing. Profit sharing is perhaps the most familiar form. 
Profit sharing itself is an old idea with, I think, a venerable history. 
There are surely a number of reasons for the rekindled interest of late 
in profit sharing. A major direct spur is undoubtedly coming from the 
fierce pressure for containing costs, or at least making them somewhat 
more responsive to performance, that many industries, which were 
previously quasi protected, are now subjected to in a deregulated, in 
ternationally competitive environment. Another rationale stems from the 
more general idea that a properly instituted gain sharing plan can motivate 
workers to cooperate more fully with management in raising produc 
tivity and increasing profitability by giving them a direct stake in the 
outcome. And there is the idea that if society as a whole were to move 
toward profit sharing, it would help to soften the wicked unemployment- 
inflation tradeoff, which, especially in some European countries, bedevils 
current attempts of traditional macroeconomic policy to reconcile 
reasonably low unemployment with reasonably low inflation. It is this 
macroeconomic promise of profit sharing on which I will concentrate 
here by attempting to set forth the general case briefly and informally. 
I will present the case for profit sharing as an open advocate, not as 
a dispassionate observer. In that sense, this is an "essay in persuasion.''
I want to begin by emphasizing one centrally important fact. Even 
leaving aside the important moral and social consequences, unemploy-
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ment is extraordinarily expensive. Every percentage point of extra 
employment translates into about a 2 percent increase in national in 
come. Any scheme that would result in a meaningful reduction of 
unemployment would translate into very large increases in the value 
of goods and services being produced.
Let me digress for a few moments to talk about the Japanese ex 
perience. By any reckoning, Japan possesses a singularly outstanding 
employment record. Even after correcting for the inevitable interna 
tional differences in official reporting methods, Japanese unemployment 
rates are regularly the lowest among the major capitalist economies. 
This achievement is all the more remarkable considering that the Japanese 
have suffered as much as any other nation, and probably more so, from 
the effects of economic shocks beyond their control, including the two 
oil crises of the 1970s and the current depressed demand for exports 
caused by the rapid appreciation of the yen. While the debilitated Euro 
pean economies allowed serious long-term unemployment to develop 
and have remained mired in rates that would have been considered 
astronomical by standards of little more than a decade ago, Japan's 
unemployment rate has never exceeded 3 percent.
How do the Japanese keep unemployment so low? Are there lessons 
here for other countries?
To find answers, it is instructive to examine how Japan is now cop 
ing with its latest economic crisis. During the past couple of years, the 
yen has soared 50 percent above the trade-weighted value of the cur 
rencies of Japan's major partners. That represents a catastrophe for 
Japan's vaunted export industries, including such mighty pillars of na 
tional pride as steel, electronics, and automobiles. For these manufac 
turing industries, it is as if their products were subjected to a 50 per 
cent export tariff. In any other country that would be a sure recipe for 
mass layoffs and the beginning of a wicked snowball effect on the rest 
of the economy as the loss of purchasing power from unemployed 
workers feeds back into further layoffs. A key ingredient in the Japanese 
success story is that they seem able to contain the unemployment damage 
initially, when it first threatens, before it explodes and then becomes 
entrenched. The European experience teaches a clear alternative lesson 
about how much more difficult it is to eradicate unemployment after
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it settles in. Japan has the will, backed by an appropriate microeconomic 
structure, to deal vigorously, pragmatically, and automatically with the 
unemployment problems on the level of the firm, right from the begin 
ning. An ounce of microeconomic prevention is worth a pound of 
macroeconomic cure.
Japan's first line of defense against layoffs is the world's most flexi 
ble labor payment system. Fully one-fourth of an average Japanese 
worker's total pay comes in the form of a semiannual bonus with strong 
profit-sharing overtones. Studies show that bonus payments are 
significantly correlated with profits. The bonus represents an automatic 
shock absorbing cushion that helps save jobs during times of severe 
economic stress. Last year's reaction has been especially notable. For 
the first time since the 1950s, bonuses were cut from the previous year's 
level by all major auto makers. The total of summer and winter bonuses 
at Nissan, for example, was down by 2.6 percent from the previous 
year's amount and further reductions are probably coming. Manufac 
turing as a whole endured the only absolute decline of bonus payments 
in the postwar period. The automatic ability of Japanese companies to 
cut labor costs rapidly in the face of severe economic adversity comes 
across very clearly during times of stress like now and during the oil 
crises of the 1970s. Its job-saving potential is the envy of policymakers 
throughout the rigid European economies, whose unresponsive pay 
systems have ultimately proved their undoing in the face of contrac 
tionary shocks that have left a nasty residue of enduring European 
unemployment.
If the bonus system facilitates a Japanese company's retaining workers 
when times are bad, what does the company do with the extra workers 
when there is weak demand for its products? Herein lies Japan's sec 
ond, and complementary, line of defense against layoffs: a strong ac 
ceptance of intrafirm work mobility based on the principle of flexible 
job assignments. Instead of being laid off outright, automobile produc 
tion workers have been shifted to the sales arm of their company, or 
to a dealership to help clear inventories, or to repair jobs within the 
plant such as painting and renovation.
Although about 40 percent of factories in Japan are reportedly plan 
ning "labor force adjustments," this is not merely a euphemism for
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layoffs, as it would be in most other countries. Japanese "adjustments" 
mostly take the form of a reduction in bonuses and overtime, the en 
couragement of early retirements, and the shifting of workers to alter 
native tasks. Companies feel obligated to find other jobs for their idle 
workers, if not within the firm then among subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies. Although workers sometimes have to accept a different job, 
and only after considerable retraining, this is viewed as a welcome 
tradeoff during a time of economy wide contraction. Indeed, the famed 
Japanese "lifetime employment system" is contingent upon a high degree 
of pay flexibility and a discretionary right by the firm to alter job 
assignments. Some outright layoffs do occur, but only as a last resort, 
and principally among "temporary" workers not covered by the lifetime 
employment commitment. Even during very hard economic times, the 
total number of layoffs is sufficiently limited to keep the national 
unemployment rate from rising above 3 percent.
Are there lessons here for the rest of the world? I think so. The bat 
tle for full employment can be won. But success will likely require a 
more flexible labor payment system and a less rigid attitude toward work 
rules than are present in most Western countries today. I do not think 
it is just a coincidence that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all have signifi 
cant bonus systems with strong profit-sharing overtones.
Let me restate that last comment about lack of coincidence somewhat 
more carefully. As was noted, Japan has an unusual labor payment 
system, where about one-fourth of an average worker's total compen 
sation comes in the form of a twice-yearly bonus supplement added onto 
base wages. It has by now been pretty firmly established that the Japanese 
bonus system can be viewed as a form of profit sharing, even though 
only about 15 percent of Japanese firms explicitly link the bonus to pro 
fitability via a prescribed formula. What I mean by saying that Japanese 
bonuses can be viewed as a form of profit sharing is simply the statistical 
statement that the ratio of bonus payments to base wages varies positively 
with business condition indicators, including profitability per employee.
Japan has enjoyed the lowest average unemployment rate among the 
major industrialized capitalist economies over the last quarter century 
or so. This comparatively outstanding employment record survives cor 
rections for discouraged workers, relatively flexible hours, definitional
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differences, and so forth. Does the existence of a profit-sharing com 
ponent of pay help in any way to account for the comparatively low, 
stable unemployment rate in Japan?
This is an easy question to ask but a very hard one to answer. The 
whole Japanese system seems to be employment promoting, so it is not 
possible to isolate cleanly the pure role of the bonus system. I think 
it is a fair statement to say that it would be more difficult for Japanese 
firms to maintain the full employment commitment without the automatic 
cushion that the bonus system provides. The Japanese experience is 
definitely suggestive or supportive of the proposition that a profit-sharing 
system can be used to help promote full employment, although it would 
be naive to try to go far beyond such a statement at this stage.
Turning now to other countries, I want to inquire briefly why 
unemployment has moved up so persistently to such stubbornly high 
levels, especially in Europe. This is a subject of dispute. Some say real 
wages are too high, others that there is insufficient aggregate demand. 
Some blame what they see as an overly generous welfare and unemploy 
ment system. And some focus on European wage rigidities and malfunc 
tioning labor markets, especially the high costs of hiring and firing 
workers. Perhaps there is some truth in all of these views.
Let me start my own analysis by asking a general question. General 
ly speaking, what causes unemployment or slack labor markets? There 
is really only one basic answer, but, like a coin, the answer has two 
sides. Side one is that unemployment is caused when firms face insuf 
ficient demand for their products relative to their marginal costs of pro 
duction. Side two is that unemployment is caused when firms have too- 
high marginal costs of production relative to the demand for their prod 
ucts. Sometimes it is useful to stress one side of the coin; sometimes 
the other. But it is always the same coin.
In either case, the key to noninflationary full employment is an 
economic expansion that holds down the marginal cost to the firm of 
acquiring more labor. Macroeconomic policy alone, the purposeful 
manipulation of financial aggregates, can be very powerful in achiev 
ing full employment or price stability, but cannot be depended upon 
to reconcile both simultaneously. Why? Because of the two-headed 
monster stagflation. Illusions of being able to fine tune aside, we know
96 The Promise of Profit Sharing
how to get unemployment down and output up by the usual expansionary 
monetary and fiscal measures. We also know how to break inflation 
by policy-induced recessions. What we do not know and this is the 
central economic dilemma of our time is how simultaneously to recon 
cile reasonably full employment with reasonable price stability. Expan 
sionary policies dissipate themselves, to an excessive degree, in too- 
large wage and price increases rather than expanded employment and 
output.
I think it is important to realize the following point. There is a sense 
in which the major macroeconomic problems of our day trace back, 
ultimately, to the wage system of paying labor. We try to award every 
employed worker a predetermined piece of the income pie before it is 
out of the oven, before the size of the pie is even known. Our "social 
contract" promises workers a fixed wage independent of the health of 
their company, while the company chooses the employment level. This 
stabilizes the money income of whomever is hired, but only at the con 
siderable cost of loading unemployment on low-seniority workers and 
inflation on everybody, a socially inferior risk-sharing arrangement that 
both diminishes and makes more variable the real income of workers 
as a whole. An inflexible money wage system throws the entire burden 
of economic adjustment on employment and the price level. Then 
macroeconomic policy is called upon to do the impossible reconcile 
full employment with low inflation.
A profit-sharing system, where some part of a worker's pay is tied 
to the firm's profitability per employee, puts in place exactly the right 
incentives to resist unemployment and inflation. If workers were to allow 
some part of their pay to be more flexible by sharing profits with their 
company, that would improve macroeconomic performance by direct 
ly attacking the economy's central structural rigidity. The superiority 
of a profit-sharing system is that it has enough built-in flexibility to main 
tain full employment even when the economy is out of balance from 
some shock to the system. When part of a worker's pay is a share of 
profits, the company has an automatic inducement to take on more 
employees in good times and, what is probably more significant, to lay 
off fewer workers during bad times. A profit-sharing system is not an- 
tilabor and does not rely for its beneficial effects on lowering workers'
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pay. The key thing is not to get total worker pay down it could even 
go up within reason but to lower the base wage component relative 
to the profit-sharing component. The marginal cost of labor is approx 
imately the base wage, more or less independent of the profit-sharing 
component.
Here is how the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson 
stated the case for profit sharing in his 1986 annual budget speech before 
the House of Commons:
The problem we face in this country is not just the level of 
pay in relation to productivity, but also the rigidity of the 
pay system. . . . This constitutes the Achilles heel of the 
British economy. . . . If the only element of flexibility is in 
the numbers of people employed, then redundancies are in 
evitably more likely to occur. One way out of this might be 
to move to a system in which a significant proportion of an 
employee's remuneration depends directly on the company's 
profitability per person employed. This would not only give 
the workforce a more direct personal interest in their com 
pany's success, as existing employee share schemes do. It 
would also mean that, when business is slack, companies 
would be under less pressure to lay men off; and by the same 
token they would in general be keener to take them on. 
Chancellor Lawson in his 1987 budget speech proposed granting fairly 
substantial tax concessions to profit-related pay, and challenged British 
business to take up the offer in the hopes that this might help to im 
prove national economic performance on the employment and output 
side. These proposals were enacted into law in August of 1987. Fully 
one-half of a British worker's profit-related pay is now tax exempt up 
to three thousand pounds or 20 percent of total pay, whichever is smaller. 
It will be interesting to follow the British experience for the empirical 
insights it should give us.
The case for widespread profit sharing is like the case for widespread 
free trade. It is not true that free trade benefits every individual. It is 
not even true, in a realistic world of increasing returns to scale and im 
perfect competition, that free trade must benefit the community as a 
whole. Yet, when all is said and done, when the possible costs and
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benefits of alternative trade policies have been calculated, weighted by 
the relevant probabilities, and added up, most economists agree that 
free trade is the best policy. The argument for profit sharing is of this 
same form. It is possible to dream up unlikely counterexamples and 
to interpret the existing evidence perversely. But the bulk of economic 
theory, empirical evidence, and common sense argue that widespread 
profit sharing will help to improve macroeconomic performance. The 
bottom line is that it is easy to envision situations where profit sharing 
helps economic performance while it is difficult to imgine scenarios 
where profit sharing damages an economy, which is as much as can 
be claimed for any economic idea.
It is no mystery why profit sharing makes the employer view things 
fundamentally differently. In a profit-sharing system, the young school 
graduate looking for work comes with an implicit message to the 
employer saying: "Hire me. I am reasonable. Your only absolute com 
mitment is to pay me the base wage. That is my marginal cost to you. 
The profit-sharing bonus is like a variable cost, depending to some ex 
tent on how well the company is doing. So you have a built-in cushion 
or shock absorber if something should go wrong. You won't be under 
such pressure to lay off me or other workers during downswings." By 
contrast, the young British or French school-leaver looking for work 
hi a wage system now comes to a potential employer with the implicit 
message: "Think very carefully before you hire me. I am expensive 
and inflexible. You will have to pay me a fixed wage independent of 
whether your company is doing well or poorly." Is it difficult to deduce 
in which situation companies might be expected to more eagerly recruit 
new hires and to retain them, and in which situation new hiring com 
mitments are likely to be avoided when possible? What is killing Euro 
pean employment is the extreme wage rigidity compared with the U.S. 
or Japan, the extreme independence of workers' pay from how well 
or poorly their company is doing.
The essence of the case for profit sharing is the basic idea that on 
the margin the profit-sharing firm is more willing than the wage firm 
to hire new workers during good times and, more importantly, to lay 
off fewer workers during bad times. From a social point of view, a 
wage system is poorly designed because it is inherently so rigid. There
The Promise of Profit Sharing 99
has to be a precise relation between the wage level and the level of ag 
gregate demand to just exactly hit the full employment target without 
causing inflation. By contrast, a profit-sharing system is inherently much 
more forgiving. Full employment will be maintained even if base wages 
and profit-sharing parameters are somewhat "too high" relative to ag 
gregate demand or, equivalently, aggregate demand is "too low" relative 
to pay parameters.
Let me state the basic idea why a profit-sharing economy is likely 
to have a better employment record than a wage economy as a kind 
of parable. Suppose there are two kingdoms, Old Lakeland and New 
Lakeland, which are physically identical in every way. The economies 
of both identical twin kingdoms consist exclusively of fishing from the 
numerous privately-owned lakes and exporting all of the fish at given 
world prices.
In Old Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that the money wages to 
be paid throughout the year at each lake are to be posted on January 
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year. 
In New Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that payment at each lake 
shall consist of a share of the value of the fish caught per worker; the 
share fraction applying throughout the year is to be posted on January 
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year. 
In both economies, once the pay parameters (wages or share fractions) 
are posted, workers are free to migrate to that highest-paying lake which 
will employ them.
Suppose that the world price of fish has been steady for as long as 
anyone cares to remember. Then Old Lakeland and New Lakeland will 
settle into a (long-run) competitive equilibrium that is exactly identical 
in every respect except that pay is called "wages" in Old Lakeland 
and "shares" in New Lakeland.
Suppose next that, suddenly and without warning, in the middle of 
one year the world price offish drops. By royal decree, pay parameters 
cannot be changed to reflect the new situation until January 1. What 
happens in this (short-run) disequilibrium? Lake owners in Old Lakeland 
will choose to lay off workers, but New Lakeland will remain at full 
employment. Lake owners in New Lakeland will have no desire to lay
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off workers because it would diminish the total size of their fixed share 
of the fish catch.
This basic parable can be amended in various ways, including alter 
native labor supply assumptions, without destroying its essential message. 
A share economy will have a tendency to remain at full employment 
after contractionary shocks, because employers want to retain workers, 
while a wage economy will likely exhibit unemployment, because firms 
wish to shed labor.
Let me turn to the issue of how a share economy might affect the 
so-called "nonmflationary rate of unemployment," or NAIRU. In a 
highly idealized frictionless world of perfect information, long-run 
equilibrium is the same under wage and share systems. In an idealized 
long run, Old Lakeland and New Lakeland are isomorphic and both 
have zero rates of unemployment. But what about somewhat more 
realistic situations. Is the "share natural rate" of unemployment lower 
than the "wage natural rate?" The formal analysis of unemployment 
comparisons between Old Lakeland and New Lakeland in my story was 
based on short-run disequilibrium considerations, when pay parameters 
are quasi-fixed. But might widespread sharing also lower the natural 
rate under a more realistic concept of long-run equilibrium than was 
treated in the Lakeland example?
The answer is: yes, it presumably would. Furthermore, the short- 
run and long-run unemployment problems are probably related.
In order to talk meaningfully about the effects of profit sharing on 
the natural rate of unemployment, one has first to have some idea about 
what is causing a positive natural rate in the first place. There are several 
theories. Some are more persuasive than others, and they are not mutual 
ly exclusive.
A leading theory contends that long-term unemployment is largely 
inertial or hysteresis-like. Whatever initial disequilibrium caused the 
increased unemployment in the first place, once unemployment con 
tinues long enough it almost gets built into the system perhaps because 
the long-term unemployed outsiders cannot or do not act effectively as a 
disciplining force in wage setting, perhaps because working skills atrophy 
without work, perhaps because the plight of the long-term unemployed 
gets forgotten by the electorate, perhaps for other reasons. In this view
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the rate of change of unemployment typically has a more powerful ef 
fect on wage settlements than the absolute level of unemployment.
If this kind of inertial effect lies behind the too-high natural rate, then 
presumably widespread profit sharing would lower or eliminate it. The 
long-term unemployment would have difficulty developing in the first 
place out of an initial contractionary shock because profit-sharing firms 
are reluctant to let go of workers. Taking as given this kind of natural 
rate unemployment, leaving aside how it got started in the past, the in 
grained expansionary bias of a profit-sharing system should act as a 
built-in counterforce to help absorb the unemployed. The absorption 
process could of course be speeded by traditional expansionary 
macroeconomic policies which, under profit sharing, presumably pose 
less danger of causing prices to accelerate because the employment- 
inflation tradeoff has been improved. So any way you look at it, profit 
sharing looks as if it ought to help diminish long-term inertial 
unemployment.
Another theory of why the natural rate is so high is that labor has 
too much bargaining power. Whether a switch from a wage system to 
profit sharing would lower this kind of NAIRU depends on what it is 
that labor and management bargain over. If they bargain over pay 
parameters, but management contrails the employment decision, a switch 
to profit sharing would lower the NAIRU. If labor and management 
bargain over both pay parameters and employment levels, the NAIRU 
would be the same under either system. In-between bargaining would 
yield in-between results, with the NAIRU then being somewhat lower 
under profit sharing than under a wage system.
A third class of theories, based on the so-called "efficiency wage 
hypothesis," holds that long-term unemployment is caused by companies 
themselves choosing to pay above market-clearing wages because other 
wise workers would shirk too much on the job. Within this kind of model 
the natural rate would be the same under a wage or profit-sharing system.
To the extent that too-high unemployment in some economies is aid 
ed by "overly generous" unemployment and welfare benefits, which 
creates some voluntary unemployment, presumably the labor payment 
mechanism per se makes little or no difference. So "the revenge of 
the welfare state" kind of unemployment should not be affected by a 
switch to profit sharing.
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Finally, there is the longstanding identification of the "natural rate" 
with semipermanent frictional or structural unemployment, due to con 
tinuously occurring microeconomic changes. This kind of unemploy 
ment, it is usually said, cannot be reduced by pure macroeconomic 
policies except temporarily and at the cost of increasing inflation. As 
with inertial unemployment, however, the wage system is heavily im 
plicated in frictional or structural concepts of the NAIRU. After all, 
both wage and profit-sharing systems respond to shifts in relative 
demands by sending a signal that eventually transfers workers out of 
a losing firm or sector and over to a winner. With a wage system, the 
signal to workers that their firm is a loser in the game of capitalist roulette 
and that it is time to look for a new job with a winning firm is the boot  
the worker is laid off and must suffer through an unemployment spell 
of some duration while searching for the new job. Under a profit-sharing 
system, the firm does not voluntarily let go of a worker because of weak 
demand. Instead it is the worker who chooses to leave because pay is 
too low relative to what is available elsewhere at relatively more suc 
cessful firms.
Summing up, in none of the standard scenarios does a profit-sharing 
system cause a higher NAIRU than a wage system, and in most of the 
more reasonable descriptions a profit-sharing system generates a lower 
NAIRU than a wage system. In addition, of course, the profit-sharing 
system has better disequilibrium properties when pay parameters are 
sticky in the neighborhood of the NAIRU unemployment rate.
It should be noted that not all forms of share systems bring about 
equally desirable macroeconomic benefits. For example, such widely 
disparate systems as employee ownership, or piece-rate formulas, or 
Swedish style economy wide workers' fund schemes, unlike profit sharing 
do not necessarily alter the employer's attitude about hiring or laying 
off workers.
I do not have nearly enough time here to deal fully with objections 
that are traditionally raised against profit sharing. Some of these ob 
jections raise legitimate issues. But some seem to me a bit wide of the 
mark. Many of them involve a fallacy of composition a fallacious 
generalization from what is ostensibly good for the tenured high-seniority 
insider worker, who already has job security, to the level of what is good
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for the community of all would-be workers, which is quite a different 
matter. Perhaps the most egregious example of this kind of fallacious 
compositional reasoning is the argument that profit sharing allegedly 
exposes workers to unnecessary risk.
This risk argument, so widely parroted and seemingly so plausible, 
embodies, at least in its crude form, a classical fallacy of composition. 
What is a correct statement for the individual high-seniority worker who 
already has job tenure is patently false for the aggregate of all would- 
be workers. The problem of unemployment is in fact the largest in 
come risk that labor as a whole, as opposed to the median tenured 
worker, faces, and it is concentrated entirely on the marginal or out 
sider worker. If more variable pay for the individual helps to preserve 
full employment for the group, while fixed pay for the individual tends 
to contribute to unemployment, it is not the least bit clear why overall 
welfare is improved by having the median worker paid a fixed wage. 
Actually, the correct presumption runs the other way around.
What is true for the individual tenured worker is not true for labor 
as a whole. When a more complete analysis is performed, which con 
siders the situation not as seen by a tenured, high-seniority worker who 
already has job security, but by a neutral observer representing the en 
tire population, it becomes abundantly clear that the welfare advantages 
of a profit-sharing system (which tends to deliver full employment) are 
enormously greater than a wage system (which permits unemployment). 
The basic reason is not difficult to understand. A wage system allows 
huge first-order losses of output and welfare to open up when a signifi 
cant slice of the national income pie evaporates with unemployment. 
A profit-sharing system helps to stabilize aggregate output at the full 
employment level, creating the biggest possible national income pie, 
while permitting only small second-order losses to arise because of 
relatively limited random redistributions from a worker in one firm to 
a worker in another. It is extremely difficult to cook up an empirical 
real-world scenario, with reasonable numbers and specifications, where 
a profit-sharing system with a moderate amount of profit sharing (say 
20 percent of a worker's total pay) does not deliver significantly greater 
social welfare than a wage system.
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Any economy is full of uncertainty. There are no absolute guarantees, 
and if the uncertainty does not come out in one place, it will show up 
in another. I am saying that it is much better, much healthier, if everyone 
shares just a little bit of that uncertainty right at the beginning rather 
than letting it all fall on an unfortunate minority of unemployed workers 
who are drafted to serve as unpaid soldiers in the war against inflation. 
It is much fairer if people will agree that only 80 percent of their pay 
is going to be tied directly to the funny looking green pieces of paper 
(which are themselves an illusion, although a very useful illusion) and 
20 percent will be tied to company profits per employee. Then the 
economy can be much more easily controlled to have full employment 
and stable prices. Society will be producing, and hence consuming, at 
its full potential. If people will face up to the uncertainty, and if everyone 
accepts some small part of it, then society as a whole will end up with 
higher income and less uncertainty overall.
Another fallacy of composition is often involved when opponents of 
profit sharing argue that additional hired workers dilute the profits per 
worker which the previously hired workers receive, thereby possibly 
causing resentment by the already existing labor force against newly 
hired workers which, in extreme cases, might lead to restrictions against 
new hires. The fallacy of composition here lies in failing to account 
for the fact that under widespread profit sharing and relatively free hir 
ing there would also be a tight labor market, and hence an employer 
cannot so easily pick up jobless people off the streets, because they are 
just not there.
Incidentally, this kind of profit-dilution argument may be a bit of a 
red herring on other grounds as well. Even a one-sided, worst-case 
scenario where profit sharing "merely" dampens economic downturns 
by encouraging employers to lay off fewer workers during recessions 
still represents an economic benefit to the community of potentially enor 
mous magnitude. In periods of recession and other kinds of squeeze, 
the "insiders" risk becoming "outsiders" and they may well be glad 
of a system which, without painful renegotiations, will enable an 
automatic adjustment hi pay to be made to preserve jobs, which would 
be self-reversing in recovery. Remember, also, that even in periods 
of normal growth there will always be firms under pressure to reduce
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employment and anything which lessens that pressure will help overall 
employment. To ratchet an economy toward a tight labor market and 
improve the employment-inflation tradeoff so that macroeconomic 
policies can be used more effectively requires only that, on the margin, 
during downswings a few less old workers are laid off and during up 
swings no fewer new workers are hired.
So far as internal labor relations are concerned, in comparing alter 
native payment mechanisms let us not forget that the-wage system is 
hardly a bed of roses. Younger, untenured workers are pitted against 
older high-seniority workers in the jobs vs. wages decision. Featherbed- 
ding is widespread. Workers resist the introduction of new labor-saving 
technology, resist job reassignments, and, more generally, take relatively 
little interest in the fortunes of the company because they do not have 
any direct stake in its profitability. Worker alienation is widespread in 
an environment where the employer is essentially indifferent on the 
margin to whether the worker stays or goes.
Arguments about profit sharing causing underinvestment strike me 
as basically wrong, in theory and in practice. The critics have in mind 
a situation where pay parameters are more or less permanently frozen. 
In that case, profit sharing would, indeed, cause underinvestment for 
the well-publicized reason that any incremental profits would have to 
be shared with labor. (Incidentally, this should make workers proinvest- 
ment, so the critics cannot have it both ways in any case.) But over 
the longer time horizon relevant to decisions about durable capital in 
vestments, where either base wages or profit-sharing coefficients (or 
both) respond to the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand 
of collective bargaining, both wage and profit-sharing systems stimulate 
equal efforts toward output-increasing improvements to the point where 
the marginal value of capital equals the interest rate. Even if this 
theoretical isomorphism between investment in wage and share systems, 
which is well understood in modern economic theory, did not exist, 
the cost of capital is only one side of the picture, and probably the less 
important side. The more dominant consideration is the demand side. 
If profit sharing results in a macroeconomic environment where output 
is being stabilized at or near the full-employment, full-capacity level, 
while a wage economy results in erratic, fluctuation-prone output and
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capacity utilization levels, there is bound to be more investment in a 
profit-sharing economy. And, as if these two arguments were not enough, 
interest rates, investment tax credits, and the like could be used to in 
fluence investment decisions in any system. The really important distinc 
tion concerns the average level of unemployed resources.
I have concentrated mostly on the favorable macroeconomic effects 
of profit sharing. But the microeconomic properties, the effects on 
motivation and productivity, may also be significant. This is of special 
interest in a world where international competitiveness is so crucially 
important. The two biggest economic tasks of our time are to resolve 
the unemployment-inflation dilemma and to increase productivity 
growth. It is just possible that a well-designed profit-sharing economy 
has a big advantage in both of these important areas.
The few formal studies that have been done tend to show that greater 
profit sharing in firms is positively related to increased productivity. 
One of the problems in interpreting this result is that it is not clear 
whether the profit sharing is causing the higher productivity or whether 
some hidden third factor, call it superior management, tends to cause 
the more progressive firms to have both profit sharing and high 
productivity.
Most economists would say that there are no grounds for subsidizing 
profit sharing on its possible productivity-enhancing merits because these 
are strictly internal to the firm. Firms do not need to be subsidized to 
take other productivity-enhancing measures, so why should they be 
especially subsidized for profit sharing? I mostly agree with this inter 
pretation, but I am not entirely sure because in practice a labor pay 
ment mechanism may have large demonstration effects.
As for the employment stabilizing effects of profit sharing on the level 
of the individual firm, these have only just begun to be studied in a 
formal way. There are some preliminary indications that profit-sharing 
firms are more resistant to layoffs during downswings. My distinct im 
pression from talking with representatives from a fair number of profit- 
sharing firms is that the built-in profit-sharing shock absorber protects 
jobs during bad times and that both labor and management understand 
this feature quite well, to the point of regarding it as self-evident.
Let me address the following question, which economists are naturally 
fond of asking. If profit sharing represents such a good idea for operating
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a market economy, why don't we see more examples of it arising 
spontaneously?
First of all, as was previously indicated, there are some significant 
examples of profit sharing. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, it can be 
argued, steps have been taken in this direction. The performance of 
these economies hardly supports the view that widespread profit shar 
ing is likely to prove harmful to economic health. In the U.S. economy, 
about 15 percent to 20 percent of firms have what they call profit-sharing 
plans. Although the issue has not been carefully studied in a rigorous 
way, it is clear that many of these profit-sharing firms are among the 
most progressive, advanced companies in the economy. As just one in 
formal indication, in a well-known book called The 100 Best Companies 
to Work for in America, over half of the cited companies have profit- 
sharing plans of some kind.
The reason profit sharing is not more widespread despite its benefits 
involves an externality or market failure of possibly enormous 
magnitude. In choosing a particular contract form, the firm and its 
workers only calculate the effects on themselves. They take no account 
whatsoever of the possible effects on the rest of the economy. When 
a firm and its workers select a labor contract with a strong profit-sharing 
component, they are contributing to an atmosphere of full employment 
and brisk aggregate demand without inflation because the firm is then 
more willing to hire new "outsider" workers and to expand output by 
riding down its demand curve, lowering its price. But these 
macroeconomic advantages to the outsiders do not properly accrue to 
those insiders who make the decision. Like clean air, the benefits are 
spread throughout the community. The wage firm and its workers do 
not have the proper incentives to cease polluting the macroeconomic 
environment by converting to a share contract. The essence of the public 
good aspect of the problem is that, in choosing between contract forms, 
the firm and its workers do not take into account the employment ef 
fects on the labor market as a whole and the consequent spending im 
plications for aggregate demand. The macroeconomic externality of a 
tight labor market is helped by a share contract and hurt by a wage con 
tract, but the difference is uncompensated. In such situations there can 
be no presumption that the economy is optimally organized and society-
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wide reform may be needed to nudge firms and workers towards in 
creased profit sharing.
Perhaps it is appropriate to end by commenting on one important dif 
ference between how someone with an economist's perspective is like 
ly to view labor payment systems and how someone coming from a 
pure industrial relations background is likely to see things. The economist 
tends to regard narrowly defined industrial relations as essentially con 
cerned with the interests of two parties at the workplace: management, 
and the already employed, in-place, existing core labor force, or "in 
sider" workers in the economist's jargon. Relatively little attention is 
paid to third party "outsiders," the unemployed and those who, when 
they have jobs, constitute the low-seniority, untenured, last-hired and 
first-fired. Yet industrial relations generally, and pay policies in par 
ticular, have profound effects on unemployment and inflation. And 
unemployment is extraordinarily expensive, not to mention immoral. 
Surely it is possible to craft an industrial relations system that preserves 
most of the traditional desiderata which insiders value but builds in 
stronger incentives to employ more outsiders and to keep them employed 
through thick and thin.
The industrial relations side of what I am proposing is far from trivial. 
There are genuine, legitimate, tough issues involved in reconciling the 
many, already inherently conflictual, goals of traditional industrial rela 
tions with the additional burden of creating incentives to retain more 
workers during bad times and to take on more of them during good 
times. Any industrial relations system is a complicated package, of which 
pay is only one element. Trust between management and labor is an 
important part of most successful profit-sharing schemes. I do not pre 
tend to know exactly how to design a socially optimal industrial rela 
tions pay system under the real world constraints that are out there. 
What I am saying is that we should be placing much more emphasis 
on the employment consequences of industrial relations than we are now 
doing, and that it seems to me that anything resembling a socially op 
timal solution is very likely to involve some form of profit related pay 
to help stabilize employment at higher levels.
Let me conclude with a final message in this attempted persuasion. 
Government encouragement of widespread profit sharing, through moral
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suasion and tax incentives for profit-sharing income, represents a decen 
tralized, market-oriented way of improving national economic perfor 
mance which is well worth pursuing.
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Around the world? The whole world? The title obviously promises 
more than I will deliver, particularly for the 1980s when unionism is 
changing differently across countries: losing ground in the United States, 
Japan, and some European countries; seeking to revamp industrial rela 
tions practices in Australia; maintaining high levels of representation 
in Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark after substantial growth in the 1970s; 
achieving free and independent status in Spain and Korea and briefly 
in Communist Poland as part of demoralization; organizing mass pro 
tests in South Africa and Namibia; and showing glimmers of playing 
a greater role in Communist countries. As I have neither the space nor 
competence to cover the world in its entirety, I will concentrate on 
emerging patterns in countries about which I have firsthand knowledge 
and limit myself to brief speculative comments on changes elsewhere. 
Three questions guide my investigation.
Is the deunionization that characterizes the United States a "necessary" 
feature of advanced postindustrial capitalism?
What forms of unionism have fared best in the postoil shock economic 
environment?
Where are the most significant changes in unionism likely to occur 
in the next decade or so?
My answers to these questions are based on the following findings 
of fact and observations.
(1) There is a growing divergence in the rates of unionization among 
developed OECD economies, with union density falling sharply in some
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places while reaching unprecedented peaks in others. If the trends of 
the 1980s continue, the Western world will be divided between coun 
tries with strong trade union movements that participate in national 
economic policymaking, as in Scandinavia, and countries with "ghet 
to unionism," where organization is limited to a small segment of 
workers, as in the United States.
(2) The divergence results in large part from the degree to which coun 
try differences in the legal and institutional features of industrial rela 
tions give employers the incentive and opportunity to oppose unioniza 
tion of their workers, not to "inexorable" economic changes.
(3) Increased competition due to foreign trade, capital mobility, and 
deregulation of markets has reduced the ability of unions to raise wages 
in manufacturing, shifting the locus of unionism in some countries to 
public sector or white-collar workers, and creating a situation in which 
unions do best in neo-corporatist settings where they participate with 
management and government in determining national economic policy.
(4) A major barrier to reforming communist economies are old-line 
managers and party functionaries, whose skills and experience make 
them more adept at dealing with a command economy than with market 
institutions, and whose stake in the command system impels them to 
throttle efforts to free markets. As workers are the only group with the 
potential to challenge these bureaucrats at the enterprise level, unions, 
either reformed official unions or new independent unions, have a poten 
tially important role to play in "perestroika."
On the basis of these facts and observations I conclude that:
  there is nothing about advanced capitalism that necessitates United 
States-style declines in unionism;
  unions do better where they take a macroeconomic national 
perspective in neo-corporatist-type settings;
  unions will become increasingly important in the Communist
world.
The remainder of this paper presents the evidence and arguments for 
these claims and lays out the major lesson I draw for understanding 
industrial relations around the world.
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Divergence of Union Density
The first and seemingly simplest claim to document is the differen 
tial change in union representation of workers among developed coun 
tries. Unionism means something different in different settings. It in 
volves collective bargaining with written contracts in the United States; 
national wage-setting in Scandinavia; representation at the company level 
and the Shunto offensive in Japan; many unions at the same workplace 
in France, Belgium, and Italy; and so on. It includes the unemployed 
in some countries (Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, where unions ad 
minister unemployment insurance benefits) but not in others; and 
membership estimates come from diverse sources (labor force surveys, 
reports by unions, employer surveys, union financial records). The seem 
ingly simple is fraught with problems, however. Even the most careful 
estimates of density provide only crude indicators of union strength and 
must be informed by direct knowledge of institutions so as not to be 
misleading.
This said, Exhibit I records readily available figures from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and other sources on the union proportion of 
nonagricultural wage and salary workers in OECD countries. As ex 
amples of the problems in cross-country comparisons, note the follow 
ing: in Australia, unions enlist half of the workforce but represent vir 
tually all workers before the industrial tribunals that formally set wages; 
in France and Germany, legal extension of agreements between represen 
tative employers and unions gives unions a larger role in wage-setting 
than density figures indicate in France, for example, in the 1980s, 80 
percent of wage workers were covered by legally extended industry 
agreements while only 24 percent had plant-level agreements; 1 in Italy 
and France, membership is vaguer than in many countries and a bit 
of a trade secret among competing organizations, leading me to put ques 
tion marks next to their data. The available measures of density are 
better suited to analyze trends over time, but still are hardly problem- 
free. The United Kingdom figures understate the decline in density in 
the 1980s as some unions exaggerated membership to maintain high 
representation in the Trade Union Congress and Labor Party. The 
American data mix two conflicting trends: the disastrous drop in private
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sector unionism and the relatively late development of public sector 
unionism. The Italian data may exaggerate the downward trend due to 
omission of members of establishment-level unions outside the stan 
dard organizations.
Measurement issues notwithstanding, Exhibit I shows a wide range 
of variation in unionization levels and trends that are unlikely to change 
with better data. From 1970 to 1979, density increased in most coun 
tries, rising 10 or so points in several, but fell in the United States, 
Japan, and Austria. From 1979 to 1985/86, density stabilized in most 
countries but fell in the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. Two decades of decline make the United States 
and Japan the centers of deunionization.
The differential trends produced the substantial divergence in unionism 
noted at the outset. Formally, the coefficient of variation of density in 
Exhibit I increased from .31 in 1970 to .39 in 1985/86; the difference 
in the average density between countries in the top and bottom thirds 
of the density distribution rose from 34 percentage points to 49 points 
over the same period; and the share of union members of the countries 
exhibited in the United States and Japan fell from 42 percent in 1970 
to 34 percent in 1985/86 at the same time that the share of wage and 
salary workers in the two countries rose from 50 percent to 54 percent. 2
Note, finally, the differential changes in density between pairs of coun 
tries with similar industrial relations: the United States and Canada; 
the Netherlands and Belgium; the United Kingdom and Ireland. These 
patterns show that diverging trends represent more than disparate 
development of different forms of unionism.
Strike Days Lost
It is important to recognize that cross-country differences in union 
density do not imply similar patterns of differences in labor-management 
conflict, as reflected, say, in strike days lost per year. To the contrary, 
the degree of labor-management conflict is essentially unrelated to union 
density across countries (see Exhibit n). High-density Sweden, for in 
stance, has one of the lowest strike rates in the OECD while moderate- 
density Italy has a high rate and low-density United States has a moderate 
strike rate. Spearman rank order correlations of countries by density
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and strike days lost are effectively zero. 3 As for trends, in contrast to 
the divergence in densities shown in Exhibit I, Exhibit n reveals a modest 
convergence in strike days lost among countries in the 1980s. The reason 
for the differing patterns is simple: strikes reflect the state of labor- 
management relations in a country, not the degree of unionization, and 
countries with high or low levels of unionization can have adversarial 
or cooperative relations.
Accounting for the Divergence
To determine the causes of the divergence of union density across 
developed countries, I analyze next the leading case of deunionization, 
the United States; I consider the relevance of my explanation to the 
United Kingdom and Japan; and I explore some of the causes of union 
growth in Western Europe, particularly Scandinavia and Belgium.
Two types of explanations have been advanced to account for the fall 
in density in the United States: "nonconflictual" explanations that at 
tribute the fall to structural changes in advanced capitalist economies; 
and "conflictual" explanations that stress management antiunion cam 
paigns in an institutional setting where employers influence decisively 
the outcome of organizing drives.
My reading of the cross-country and within-country evidence leads 
me to reject the nonconflictual explanation of the decline in unioniza 
tion in the United States and elsewhere in favor of the conflictual 
explanation.
Nonconflictual Explanations
The principal factors suggested here are shifts in the composition of 
employment toward traditionally nonunion jobs and types of workers, 
a worsened public image of unions, increased government protective 
labor regulations that provide an alternative to unionism, and declining 
worker desire for unions as a result of high wages and good working 
conditions, i.e., "positive industrial relations" in many companies.
The hypothesis that shifts in the composition of employment toward 
white-collar and service-sector jobs and female and more educated
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workers is the prime reason for the decline in density in the United States 
runs counter to the basic fact that workforces throughout the 
developed world have experienced similar compositional changes without 
deunionizing. 4 As a case in point take Canada, where many of the same 
firms and unions operate in a similar industrial relations system as in 
the United States and which had comparable changes in the composi 
tion of employment as the United States but where union density has 
grown rather than fallen. As can be seen in Exhibit in, the difference 
between the United States and Canada lies within sectors: density in 
creased in most one-digit industries in Canada while dropping in one- 
digit industries in the United States. Measures of density by industry 
for Japan also show substantial changes within sectors. Finally, collec 
tive bargaining coverage figures for the United Kingdom show falls in 
coverage for almost all sectors from 1973 to 1985 (Pelletier and Freeman 
1988). In these countries and in the United States the fundamental reason 
for falling density appears to be union failure to organize new plants 
and industries. 5
Two pieces of international comparative data contravene Lipset's 
public image explanation of changes in union density: opinion polls of 
attitudes toward unions in some Western European countries that reveal 
as poor a public image of unions as in the United States without any 
decline in density; and 1980s opinion polls for the United Kingdom that 
show attitudes toward unionism becoming more favorable during the 
1980s drop in density! Time series data for the United States also gain 
say the public image argument, showing no drop in public approval 
of unions between 1972 and 1985, when density fell sharply. 6
The argument that unionism is declining because governmental regula 
tions substitute for union protection of workers at workplaces (Neumann 
and Rissman 1984) is inconsistent with cross-country evidence that 
unionism has remained strong in Scandinavia and other European coun 
tries with highly regulated markets. It also runs counter to: the ac 
celerated decline in density in the United States during the Reagan ad 
ministration, which eased labor regulations; the turnaround in density 
in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher government; the great desire 
for unions by black Americans, who receive special legal protection 
against discrimination; and the success of unions in states with the
The Changing Status of Unionism 117
greatest legal protection of workers (Freeman 1987; Block, Mahoney, 
and Corbit 1987. The argument that unionism and government regula 
tion are substitutes is flawed because it fails to recognize that "enact 
ing a law and securing the realization of the purpose the law is aimed 
to secure are two vastly different matters" (Gompers 1965, p. 54). To 
benefit from legal regulation, workers need a union or union-like agency 
to monitor compliance at the shop floor.
The claim that increasing numbers of workers in the United States 
reject unions because they enjoy improved wages and working condi 
tions is inconsistent with survey data showing that the proportion of 
nonunion workers wanting to be represented by a union remained roughly 
constant at one-third between 1973 (Quality of Employment Survey) 
and 1985 (Harris Survey). 7 Over the same period that density fell in 
the private sector, moreover, it increased in the public sector, highly 
unlikely if workers in general had freely decided that unionism was not 
in their interest. And the 1970s and 1980s were hardly a bellwether 
period of rapid growth of real wages and living standards.
In sum, the nonconflictual explanations for the decline in unionism 
in the United States and other countries is inconsistent with interna 
tional comparisons and detailed within-country evidence.
Conflictual Explanations
My analysis and that of others (Farber 1987; Dickens and Leonard 
1985; Goldfield 1987) suggests that the major single cause for the de- 
unionization of the private sector of the United States is to be found 
on the other side of the ledger: in the behavior of management operating 
in an institutional setting that allows virulent campaigns against union 
organizing drives. In the 1980s, the vast majority of firms that faced 
a National Labor Relations Board representation election (the 
government-run secret ballot process by which American workers can 
chose to unionize) sought to forestall unionization in various ways; by 
aggressive lawful efforts to persuade /pressure workers to reject unions; 
by committing unfair labor practices that include firing union activists; 
and by adopting "positive labor relations" that use the carrot of 
company-created union work conditions, such as seniority and grievance 
procedures, to deter unionization of their employees. Indicative of the 
pervasiveness of the corporate antiunion campaign, 45 percent of the
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relatively progressive companies in the Conference Board's Personnel 
Forum declared in 1983 that their main labor goal was to operate ' 'union- 
free" (Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986), a far cry from the 1950s 
and 1960s when most large firms accepted unions at the workplace. 
With the exception of one study whose results were reversed in a 
reanalysis, every investigation with which I am familiar shows manage 
ment opposition to be a decisive factor in NLRB election outcomes 
(Freeman 1988). My analyses suggest, moreover, that management op 
position is the single most important factor in the downward trend in 
unionization (Freeman 1986, 1988).
Why has American management declared war on unions? One reason 
is the increased cost of unionization to firms due to the growth of the 
union wage premium in the 1970s and greater product market com 
petition due to trade, deregulation and other factors. A second reason 
is the growth of a market-oriented ideology in which managers view 
unions solely as an impediment to flexibility and believe that "anything 
goes" in stopping them. A third reason is that labor laws allow exten 
sive management campaigning against unionization and impose only 
minimal penalties for illegal antiunion practices. In Canada, where labor 
law severely limits the opportunity for management to fight unions, in 
some provinces by certifying unions after card checks rather than after 
adversarial elections (Weiler 1983), union density has gone from below 
the levels in the United States to nearly twice the American levels.
Legal and institutional factors also appear to be important in changes 
in density in the United Kingdom. In the 1970s, density rose with the 
favorable legislation of the Labor party. In the 1980s, it fell with the 
unfavorable legislation of the Thatcher government. By contrast, in the 
closest comparison country, Ireland, laws governing industrial relations 
did not change and union density trended modestly upward in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Pelletier 1988).
Countries with Increasing Density
What about countries where union density reached unprecedented 
peaks in the period under study? Why did unions in Scandinavia and 
Belgium, in particular, grow so much in the 1970s and maintain high 
representation in the 1980s?
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The conflictual analysis suggests that hi those settings management 
opposition to unionism must be significantly muted and/or that labor 
laws and institutions limit management's role in determining union status.
The prime factor that mutes management opposition is centralization 
of wage negotiations. Countries in which unions and management engage 
in centralized bargaining, so-called neo-corporatist systems, had the 
greatest increases in density even though they were already highly 
organized in 1970 (Exhibit IV). In these settings, managements form 
employers' federations that not only accept unions but often pressure 
nonunion firms to recognize them also, presumably to assure comparable 
wages in the labor market. Indicative of management's stance in these 
countries, none of the Danish businessmen and representatives of the 
employer federations whom I interviewed in summer 1987, including 
spokesmen for small businesses, expressed opposition to unions and 
collective bargaining. The notion that business should engage in a jihad 
for a union-free environment as in the United States was anathema to 
the Danes, as it is to management in Sweden, Belgium, and most of 
Western Europe.
In addition to factors that take management out of the organizing pro 
cess other institutional forces contributed to the increased union densi 
ty in the countries at the top of Exhibit I. For historical reasons, Belgian, 
Swedish, and Danish unions distribute government-funded unemploy 
ment benefits. In the high unemployment 1980s workers who lost jobs 
maintained union membership, stabilizing the numerator but not the 
denominator in the density statistic. The role of unions in delivering 
unemployment insurance is a key factor in the differing trend in unioniza 
tion between Belgium and neighboring Netherlands, where unions do 
not play such a role.
Regression Analysis
To evaluate the quantitative impact of the above factors on changes 
in union density, I estimated a cross-country time series regression model 
linking compound annual changes in density to corporatist industrial 
relations, to union delivery of unemployment benefits interacted with
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the unemployment rate, and to three macro variables that are often view 
ed as affecting unionization: the unemployment rate, inflation, and the 
growth of gross national product. Because density is bounded between 
0 and 1 the calculations use a log odds ratio form as well as a simple 
linear form:
Dp or Dln(p/l-p)=a+b INF+c DUNE+d UI*DUNE+e CORP+d 
Z+u, where
D = change in variable
p = union density
INF =ln change in prices
UNE =rate of unemployment
UI = dummy variable if unions deliver unemployment benefits
CORP=dummy variable if country has "corporatist" industrial 
relations
Z = set of control variables that includes growth of employment 
and growth of GNP per capita, and the time period covered.
The analysis treats annual changes from 1973 to 1985 in a single pooled 
sample, with dummy variables for individual years to allow for time 
effects.
The basic regression estimates, summarized in Exhibit V, show that 
with other factors held fixed, density grew more in countries with cor 
poratist industrial relations; in countries with rising unemployment when 
unions deliver unemployment benefits; and where inflation was rapid. 
By contrast, neither unemployment nor growth of GNP had any discer 
nible impact on density.
The results of Exhibits I-V provide support for the claim that the 
institutions that govern labor relations rather than broad-based economic 
forces determine the changing cross-country pattern of unionism. Where 
management has a profit incentive to oppose unions and plays a key 
role in organizing, as in the United States, density fell. Where manage 
ment has less incentive to oppose unions, as in corporatist-style 
economies, or where management is restricted in its ability to influence 
organizing, as in Canada, density increased or stabilized.
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Unions and Union Leadership
"But where is Hamlet? Aren't unions and their leaders at 
least partially responsible for declining union densities?"
At first sight there is much to criticize in the 1970s and 1980s per 
formance of unions in the rapidly deunionizing United States. Organizing 
activity did not keep pace with the growth of the workforce; unions 
contested fewer NLRB elections annually than in the 1960s; most drives 
were in existing areas of union strength rather than in growing sectors 
of the economy (Voos 1983); and the major AFL-CIO effort to enroll 
new workers, the 1980s Houston Project bombed abysmally. Looked 
at from the perspective of standard marginal analysis, however, union 
failure to invest in organizing looks very much like rational optimizing 
behavior in response to increases in the cost of winning new members. 
In an environment where management opposition can readily defeat 
organizing drives, it simply does not pay unions to risk members' dues 
on expensive representation campaigns, save for close competitors to 
currently organized firms. And once density starts dropping, the cost 
to existing members of unionizing an additional percent of the workforce 
rises. Finally, while some might blame American unions for the 1970s 
wage increases that put competitive pressure on employers and stimulated 
management opposition, American unions were among the first to give 
wage concessions and stress job security once the employment conse 
quences of the 1970s wage gains became clear.
Still, one aspect of the behavior of unions and their leaders in the 
period cannot be defended: this is the slow, even sluggish, recognition 
of the reality and importance of declining density and consequent delayed 
search for remedies to the problem. In the 1970s many top leaders 
downplayed falling density on the grounds that absolute membership 
was stable and that all would be well if only the economy started to 
boom. Not until the 1985 report, "The Changing Situation of Workers 
and their Unions" did the top AFL-CIO leadership address seriously 
the moribund state of the union movement in the private sector. Since 
then, national unions have been slow to adopt the "evolutionary 
blueprint" laid out in the Report. While many have signed for union 
Mastercards with their attractively low rates of interest (McDonald
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1987), none has actively pursued the key recommendation to create new 
forms of membership outside the collective bargaining structure.
The contrast with unions in other countries is striking. In Australia, 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) sought to transform 
Australian industrial relations from its historic confrontational British- 
style system to a Scandinavian corporatist system, in part to preempt 
growing antiunion management sentiment that might fuel United States 
or United Kingdom type problems. The secretary-treasurer of the AC 
TU was doing his best in the mid-1980s to convince constituent unions 
to accept a national wages accord that required lower settlements than 
some unions could get. The difference between the American and 
Australian union responses was forcefully brought home to me at a 1988 
Harvard Trade Union Program seminar where Australian unionists 
mocked as ridiculously inadequate the changes proposed, though often 
not implemented, by American unions. "Never work, mate." "It's like 
your beer, piss-poor." were representative comments.
While not as striking as the Australian union effort, the 1987 
reorganization of Japanese trade union federations also goes beyond 
what American unions have initiated at this writing. In Japan, the private 
sector unions formed a new federation to take the lead in the union move 
ment from the more politicized public sector unions.
Even in the United Kingdom, where the past seems to restrict union 
thinking and behavior to a greater extent than elsewhere, there have 
been substantially greater changes than in the United States: the split 
of the Miners Union; the development of cooperative single plant/single 
union bargaining strategies by the Electricians and Engineering unions; 
new efforts to enlist part-time workers by the Boilermakers, among 
others. And, at this writing, there is talk of the potential break-up of 
the Trade Union Congress.
Finally, in Scandinavia and Belgium unions have been in the forefront 
of economic debate on broad macroeconomic issues that unions in the 
United States rarely address, such as the exchange rate of national cur 
rency. American unions lacked the expertise and credibility to be an 
effective voice against the 1980s overvalued dollar that was a more im 
portant determinant of the well-being of members in many industries 
than any collective bargaining agreement.
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What explains the slow and inadequate American union response to 
the crisis of declining density?
A major factor in my view is the otherwise admirable decentralized 
structure of the American union movement. In the United States, organiz 
ed labor consists of some 90 or so independent national unions in the 
AFL-CIO and others outside the federation. Each national has its own 
problems and agenda. Each contains hundreds of independent locals 
with their own concerns. Such a structure concentrates union efforts 
on local or sectoral rather than national issues, guaranteeing slow reaction 
to problems that affect unionism in its entirety, and making implemen 
tation of reforms suggested by the AFL-CIO leadership problematic 
at best. Without the career option of moving into government, as in 
countries with labor parties, American union leadership may turn over 
too slowly and appears to be more risk averse than suits a crisis period.
New Behavior in a New Environment
The cross-country evidence that economic changes are compatible 
with high or increasing union density does not mean that unions can 
operate in the economic environment of the 1980s as they have in the 
past. To the contrary, the shifts in employment to traditionally less 
unionized groups, intense product market competition, and continued 
high unemployment in much of Europe require unions to alter tradi 
tional modes of operating in various ways.
The shifts of the workforce requires adjustment in bargaining goals. 
White-collar workers are often more interested in having a say at the 
workplace, in job flexibility, fairness in promotions, and the like (the 
* 'collective voice'' aspects of unionism of What Do Unions Do ?), than 
in establishing contractual rules that limit management arbitrariness and 
abuse of power. Part-time workers want different fringe benefits from 
full-time workers. Women workers are concerned with pay equity, day 
care facilities, maternity leave, and obtaining compensation packages 
that complement those their husbands receive. All this means that unions 
have to modify traditional demands, as they are doing throughout the 
West, with varying degrees of success.
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Increases in product market competition due to world trade, deregula 
tion, privatization, and international mobility of capital require more 
significant changes in union behavior. Increased competition raises the 
elasticity of demand for labor, weakening the ability of unions to bargain 
for high wages and improved working conditions without loss of jobs. 
In manufacturing, the growth of world competition means that even 
100 percent organization of domestic employers no longer "takes wages 
out of competition" as it once did in many countries. To improve wages, 
unions must help create margins for gains either by raising productivi 
ty and competitiveness through, say, improved effort at workplaces, 
bargaining over investment decisions, or innovative wage payments such 
as profit sharing, or by coordinated bargaining across national lines. 
In the service sector, by contrast, union strength still depends on organiz 
ing domestic workers, so that unions can pursue traditional forms of 
bargaining and behavior. As a result, the locus of strength within the 
union movement has begun to shift toward unions in the public sector 
and services in several countries including the United States, Canada, 
and United Kingdom while in Sweden and Denmark the white-collar 
service sector unions have shown an increasing willingness to develop 
their own economic agenda rather than to follow the lead of blue-collar 
manufacturing unions.
The persistently high unemployment rates that developed in much 
of Europe hi the 1980s present unions with a different challenge. As 
expansionary policies risk unsustainable trade imbalances/capital flows 
when initiated by single countries, and as the central bankers and finan 
ciers who dominate economic summits and international policymaking 
are more concerned with inflation than unemployment, the coordinated 
expansion needed to attain full employment will require unions in several 
countries to pressure governments to expand in concert. The develop 
ment of the Common Market and the American-Canadian free trade 
agreement increases the necessity for union coordination across national 
lines.
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Unions in Perestroika
"Transmission belt from the Communist Party to the masses 
or ... ?"
Unions have long created conceptual and practical problems for com 
munist societies. In 1921 when the Tenth Soviet Communist Party Con 
gress debated the status of unions, the Worker's Opposition faction 
argued that unions should be independent of the Community Party and 
should manage parts of the economy while Trotsky and Bukharin argued 
that unions should be subordinate to the Party and state. During the 
New Economic Policy of the 1920s, unions had considerable in 
dependence. But after 1929, Stalin purged the leadership and destroyed 
any semblance of autonomy. The accession of Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe suppressed free unionism in those countries as well, 
though to differing degress depending on national contexts. In all cases 
the authorities selected union leaders, guaranteeing loyalty to the state 
rather than to workers, used unions to deliver social services such as 
low-cost vacations, restricted the ability of unions to protect workers 
on the job by forbidding strikes de facto if not de jure, and treated unions 
largely as aids to management in spurring production and controlling 
labor. Only during rare periods, such as the Prague Spring of 1968 or 
the Polish protests of 1980, did unions develop that represented workers 
first and foremost.
Will unions in Communist economies remain subordinate institutions 
in an era of political and economic reforms or will "glasnost" and 
"perestroika" lead to a new union role? Was the free and independent 
operation of Solidarity in 1980/81 an aberration or a harbinger of future 
labor relations under communism?
My speculative answer to these questions, based in part on limited 
firsthand knowledge of the Polish situation from a 1987 World Bank 
mission, is that unions or related worker organizations will achieve in 
creasing independence and play a major role in reforming Communist 
economies. Solidarity may not be a realistic model for the future of 
unionism under most Communist regimes, but neither is the "transmis 
sion belt" union of the command economy.
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I expect increasingly independent unionism to go hand-in-hand with 
economic reform of Communist economies for three reasons. First, 
because implementation of reforms requires an enterprise level counter- 
force to the command economy managers and party functionaries who 
dominate Communist economies that only autonomous unions can pro 
vide. As beneficiaries of a command economy, these managers and of 
ficials, Milovan Djilas' "New Class," have much to lose and little to 
gain from market reforms and will accordingly do all they can to stifle 
reforms. Even the highest level leaders such as Gorbachev will need 
allies at the enterprise level to force these officials to change behavior 
or to change jobs pressure that can only come from organized workers, 
either through revitalized official unions or through newly formed in 
dependent unions like Solidarnosc that favor economic reform as the 
only way to improve living standards. Suppressing free unionism, as 
the Jaruzelski regime did in Poland, will turn even nominally signifi 
cant market reforms into dead letters, give the bureaucrats and managers 
a free hand to demand limitations on labor mobility, as they have in 
Poland and Hungary, and lead the rest of society to dismiss the reforms 
as sham. Strange as it may seem to conservative economists who regard 
unions as the archtypical antimarket force, free and independent unions 
are a prerequisite for more market-oriented behavior in command 
economies.
The second reason for expecting greater independent activity by 
workers and unions is that reform communism legitimizes unions car 
rying out their classical defensive function of protecting workers from 
increasingly independent management (including management in private 
enterprises) and creates a new role for them to lobby for workers' in 
terests in a more pluralistic society. Here, the historical record shows 
that reformist communist regimes accept such worker and union ac 
tivity, at least within some bounds; in 1987 thousands of Yugoslav 
workers struck to protest national wages policy without producing police 
repression (New York Times, March 21, 1987); in Poland the official 
unions have denounced government plans to increase the price of food 
and fuel and carried out protest strikes, while the outlawed Solidarnosc 
continues to defend workers at local workplaces and speak up in na 
tional debate; in Hungary unions have at times lobbied the central
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government for economic policies more favorable to workers, including 
wage increases and a greater allocation of national product to consump 
tion (Noti, Pravda and Ruble); in the Soviet Union, as noted earlier, 
unions acted as relatively autonomous organizations during the NEP 
years. In part, reform communist governments permit official unions 
some autonomy to give them legitimacy among workers and to forestall 
truly free and independent unions; in part the governments permit worker 
protests because they recognize the failure of their command economies 
and the consequent need to allow some outlet for worker frustrations 
and anger. Still, whatever the cause, the movement of unions from the 
transmission belt institutuion is clear.
The third reason for expecting freer unionism to develop under reform 
communism is the possibility that such organizations can help spark 
the individual work effort that is necessary for these economies to ad 
vance. My argument here is based on Hirschman's exit-voice analysis, 
which contrasts two mechanisms for dealing with social problems: the 
voice mechanism, by which individuals express their desires through 
political channels; and the exit mechanism, by which they express their 
desires through market mobility. In the labor market, unions are the 
institution of voice and quitting is the normal form of exit (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984). From the perspective of the dichotomy, traditional 
command economies deprive workers of voice by suppressing free unions 
and deprive them of exit by restricting employment to state-run enter 
prises and often by limiting and penalizing mobility among those enter 
prises. The result is that workers have only one way to express discon 
tent with wages and work relations by "exiting" the workplace through 
reductions of effort. While neither the "socialism with a human face" 
experiment in Czechoslovakia nor free and independent Solidarnosc 
unionism in Poland lasted long enough to test whether autonomous unions 
and freer markets can break the "they pretend to pay us, we pretend 
to work" ethos of labor markets under communism, those experiences 
seem to offer the greatest promise for creating a productive workforce.
In sum, my speculative analysis is that reform of Communist 
economies, */it is to proceed successfully, will advance hand-in-hand 
with growing union activity. How independent and free unions will 
become and with what feedback effects on the societies is likely to dif-
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fer among countries. In some cases, Communist leaders may backtrack 
and suppress unions as a threat to their power, effectively killing reforms, 
as in Poland. In other cases, the dynamics of reform may be cumulative, 
as appeared to be occurring in Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 inva 
sion. At any rate, expect to see increasingly interesting developments 
on the union front in Communist states in the next decade or so.
Concluding Comments
In their 1964 analysis of labor relations in industrial society, In 
dustrialism and Industrial Man, Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick 
Harbison, and Charles Meyers argued that the logic of industrialism 
was producing a convergence in labor relations among countries, while 
allowing for pluralistic industrialism along some dimensions: "the more 
we look . . . the more impressed we become with the power of the forces 
for uniformity." If there is a broad generalization that emerges from 
the review of the changing patterns of unionism in the world in this 
essay, it is the opposite: that at the level of labor market institutions 
examined here labor relations is not converging toward a single institu 
tional mode across countries, nor necessarily toward a stable pattern 
within countries. In a world of economic and social flux, structuring 
labor relations should not be viewed as a once-and-for-all process of 
setting up procedures and institutions. Rather, it is more properly viewed 
as a process that must be undertaken time and again as changes occur 
in the balance of power between workers and management and in their 
conflicting and coinciding interests. There is no rest in the practice or 
study of industrial relations.
NOTES
1. These figures are from Ministere du Travail, De L'Emploi et de la Formation 
Professionelle, Tableaux Statistiques (Paris: 1986). The data further show that only 9.9 
percent of establishments had plant level agreements while 76.9 percent were covered 
by branch/industry level agreements.
2. I calculated the coefficient of variation for 1985/86 using 1979 densities for 
Belgium, France, and New Zealand. The average density for the top six countries was
The Changing Status of Unionism 129
65 percent in 1970 and 79 percent in 1985/86 while the average density for the bottom 
six countries was 31 percent in 1970 and 30 percent in 1985/86.1 calculated the United 
States and Japanese shares of wage and salary employees using the data from the Center 
for Labour Economics, OECD Data Set, updated, and with union figures based as much 
as possible on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data. The calculation is crude, using 
figures for the year closest to 1985 for countries with missing data.
3. For example, the rank correlation between working days lost in 1971-82 and density 
in 1979 is a bare 0.10.
4. OECD data show that the shift of employment out of manufacturing, which 
adherents to the structural view cite as a key to the decline in United States unionism, 
was actually larger in OECD Europe than in the United States. See OECD Historical 
Statistics (Paris: 1986).
5. In the United States this shows up hi the precipitous fall hi the number of workers 
organized through NLRB elections. For the United Kingdom, data from the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey show no change hi union representation among the same 
establishments between 1980 and 1984, which is consistent with the claim in the text 
but there are too few new establishments to provide a clear test (Millward and Stevens 
1986). For Japan, the 88.4 percent of new enterprises in 1985 were nonunion, accord 
ing to the Japan Institute of Labor.
6. Polls reported by Heckscher (1988, p. 258) show a 33 percent rate of confidence 
hi unions in the U.S. compared to 26 percent in the UK, 32 percent in Italy, and 36 
percent in France and Germany. The rise in favorable ratings of unions in the UK is 
documented in Financial Times. Data on approval of unions in the United States are 
given by Lipset (1986).
7. Because these figures are from two separate surveys, they are not strictly 
comparable.
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EXHIBIT I
Levels and Changes in Union Membership as a Percent 
of Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Employees Across Countries
1970-1986
1970 1979
For the years
1985/86 1970-79 1979-86
Countries with sharp
rises hi density
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Belgium
Countries w/moderate
rises hi density
Italy
Germany
France
Switzerland
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Ireland
Countries w/stability
or decline in density
Norway
United Kingdom
Austria
Japan
Netherlands
United States
66
56
79
66
39
37
22
31
32
52
43
44
59
51
64
35
39
31
86
84
89
77
51
42
28
34
36
58
46
49
60
58
59
32
43
25
95
85
96
-
45
43
~
33
36
56
 
51
61
51
61
28
35
17
+20
+28
+ 10
+ 11
+ 12
+5
+6
+3
+4
+6
+3
+5
+ 1
+7
-5
-3
+4
-6
+9
+ 1
+7
-
-6
+ 1
~
-1
0
-1
 
+2
+ 1
_-i
+2
-4
-8
-8
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and 
Technology, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics and Trade, July 1986; Center for Labour 
Economics, OECD Data Set; and respective country statistical abstracts.
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Exhibit II 
Working Days Lost Per 1000 Employees
Country
Australia
Austria*
Belgium*
Canada
Denmark*
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands*
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland*
United Kingdom
United States
1964-70
286
47
172
704
31
110
140
6
893
1273
112
15
150
12
29
4
207
583
1971-82
638
10
206
869
294
605
191
45
639
1379
98
35
314
55
134
2
514
18
1983-85
262
 
-
390
~
399
70
88
453
592
10
~
486
34
9
 
584
119
SOURCE: Beggs and Chapman; Table 2, countries with * from Creigh (1986), Table 2.3 1962-71 
for 1964-70 and 1972-81 for 1971-82 for countries with *.
Exhibit m 
Changes hi Union Density by Sector: U.S., Canada and Japan
u> to
United States
Total
Manufacturing 
Construction
1973/5 1986
29 18
37 24 
38 22
Transportation, communication 
and utilities 50 35
Trade
Service
Mining 
Finance, insurance and
real estate
Government
SOURCES:: U.S.-1973/5:
1986:
Canada  1971: 
1985:
Japan  1970: 
1986:
11 7
7 6
35 18
4 3
24 36
-11
-13 
-16
-15
-4
-1
-17
1
12
Richard Freeman and James Medoff, "New
and Labor Relations Review, 32:2, January 
from Current Population Survey Tapes.
Canada
1971
32
42 
51
56
8
15
56
1
62
1985
35
38 
48
53
10
36
26
3
71
3
-4 
-3
-3
2
21
-30
2
9
1970
35
39
25
66
9
24
72
68
71
Japan
1986
28
34 
18
58
9
18
53
50
75
Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States"
1979.
W.D. Wood and Pradeep Kumar, "The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada: 1977 
Canada). 
Calura Report, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Canada.
" (Queens University,
-7
-5 
-7
-8
0
-6
-19
-18
4
Industrial
Kingston,
Basic Survey on Trade Unions, Japan Ministry of Labor. 
Foreign Labor Trends, Japan.
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Exhibit IV 
Percentage Point Changes hi Union Density, 1970-85/86
11 -
10 -
9 -
8 -
7 -
6 -
5 -
4 -
3 -
1 -
10.8
2.0
"Corporatist" 'Noncorporatist"
SOURCE: Corporatist countries taken from Crouch (1985). (They include: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany.)
134
Exhibit V
Impact of Corporatism, Inflation, and Changing Employment
on Annual Growth of Percent Unionized
1973-85
Dependent variables
Explanatory variables 
(mean in parenthesis)
Change hi Change in log odds 
% union ratio of % union 
(/-statistics in parenthesis)
Corporatism (.48) .005 (2.68) .038 (3.80) 
Inflation (.079) .065 (2.60) .409 (2.93) 
Change in
unemployment (.003) -.027 (0.20) -.129 (0.17) 
Change in unemployment
if unions give benefits
(.0008) .750 (3.58) 6.09 (5.23) 
Growth of GNP (.028) -.054 (1.17) -.20 (.76) 
Time -.001 (5.29) -.004 (3.27) 
R-squared .22 .24 
Number of observations 259 259
SOURCE: Calculated from London School of Economics, Center for Labour Economics OECD 
Data Set. Countries where unions give benefits: Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. Corporate coun 
tries, as in Exhibit IV.
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7 
Evidence on U.S. Experiences
with 
Dispute Resolution Systems
Orley Ashenfelter 
Princeton University
My purpose in this paper is to report the results of recent quantitative 
analyses of interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. Arbitra 
tion systems for settling wage disputes ("interest arbitration") in the 
public sector have operated in some states since the 1960s. Although 
similar, in that they provide binding resolution of wage (and other 
employment-related) disputes, the various states have tended to experi 
ment by adopting somewhat different systems. This opens up the 
possibility of exploring and comparing how the various systems work, 
and that is the major purpose of the research on which I report below.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first set out the broader 
context in which interest arbitration has become a feature of public sector 
wage determination in the U.S. The purpose of this discussion is to 
show how these dispute resolution institutions arose in a U.S. context 
which differs, as we shall see, from the Canadian and British settings. 
The following two sections of the paper describe analyses of arbitra 
tion systems for New Jersey police officers and for Iowa state and local 
employees. The purpose of these two sections of the paper is to present 
in a nontechnical manner the statistical operating characteristics of two 
functioning arbitration systems. I believe even a casual reader will be 
struck by the statistical regularities the operating characteristics of these 
systems display. I also believe that even a passing understanding of these 
operating characteristics will make it clearer just what we can and can 
not expect these arbitration systems to accomplish.
In a final section of the paper, I try to extract the general conclusions 
that are emerging from the new research on interest arbitration systems.
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Some of these conclusions are virtually conjectures at this point, while 
others have a considerable grounding in hard research results.
The Context of Interest Arbitration in the U.S.
I do not intend to survey the detailed evolution of interest arbitration 
systems in the U.S., as that has been ably accomplished by my col 
league Richard Lester in his recently published Labor Arbitration in 
State and Local Government. l My goal is instead to give the general 
context for the arbitration legislation that has been established, and to 
explain how it tends to operate.
The Right to Strike
For a variety of reasons local and state public sector workers in the 
U.S. do not have the right to strike (or even to bargain collectively) 
unless they are specifically given these rights by the state governments 
in the states in which they negotiate. This situation contrasts sharply 
with the rights of private sector workers in the U.S. and the rights of 
private and public sector workers in other countries. In Great Britain, 
for example, it is taken for granted that both private and public sectors 
workers will collectively bargain and, when a dispute is unresolved, 
strike their employers. Private sector workers in the U.S. face a varie 
ty of labor law regulations, but ultimately these workers may also 
organize and strike their employers. As in so many other matters of 
public policy, the Canadian situation seems to fall between the U.S. 
and British cases. Although private sector workers and many public 
sector workers have the right to strike in Canada, arbitration is sometimes 
legislated to replace the strike either on an ad hoc or systematic basis 
in some of the provinces.
Today the workers in the U.S. public sector do not have the right 
to strike. In many places public sector workers do not belong to unions 
or engage in collective bargaining either. In these places, workers who 
are not willing to accept employer-determined pay scales or working 
conditions are expected to quit and look for another position. In many 
places, however, public sector workers have been given the right to
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form unions and have formed unions that bargain collectively, although 
they do not have the option to strike. In this situation, one may natural 
ly ask, whey are public sector employers willing to submit disputes to 
arbitration at all?2
Although the varying politics of the various states no doubt plays a 
role, it seems likely that public employers have grudgingly acquiesced 
in the establishment of arbitration laws in some states largely to reduce 
the number of illegal strikes that would otherwise have occurred. In 
effect, the state legislators have often cooperated with public sector 
unions to design a statute that will settle disputes, rather than allow 
disputes to drag on indefinitely hi the face of employer resistance and 
the illegality of strikes. Subsequently, employer resistance has often 
diminished.
As a general rule, therefore, U.S. public sector trade unions obtain 
some leverage in colletive bargaining negotiations when the possibility 
of an arbitrated contract lurks in the background. This may be the reason 
why interest arbitration of public sector wage disputes is more accep 
table to union workers and their leaders in the U.S. than in other 
countries.
The Structure of Arbitration
The two most common forms of interest arbitration hi use in the U.S. 
are conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration. Each of these 
operates much like an informal judicial system. The parties are often 
represented by attorneys and they present their cases to a neutral ar 
bitrator. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator may fashion any award 
deemed suitable, while in final-offer arbitration each party must pre 
sent an offer and the arbitrator must select one or the other without 
compromise.
The ' 'Chilling'' Effect. In the casual discussion of arbitration systems, 
it is often claimed that the final-offer arbitration system is more likely 
than the conventional arbitration system to lead the parties to present 
reasonable offers for the arbitrator's decision. This conclusion is usually 
based on a very specific idea of how arbitrators are likely to function 
in the conventional arbitration systems. The idea seems to be that
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arbitrators will, for the most part, attempt to fashion awards that fall 
precisely in the center of the employer and union offers. 3 If we assume 
parties know this will be the the arbitrator's behavior, they will surely 
wish to present extreme demands, for the more extreme a party's de 
mand, the more the party gains in the compromise. At the extreme, 
the parties will present no useful information to the arbitrator on what 
concessions they might be willing to make. This is sometimes known 
as the "chilling effect" of arbitration.
It is sometimes said that final-offer arbitration is not so likely to pro 
duce a chilling effect on bargaining because the parties would be unlikely 
to take an extreme position for fear that the arbitrator might select a 
more reasonable offer made by the other party. It is easy to see that 
this conclusion is also arrived at by assuming that arbitrators behave 
in a specific way. In particular, how are we to suppose an arbitrator 
determines that one offer is more reasonable than another? The natural 
equivalent to assuming that the arbitrator splits the difference in con 
ventional arbitration is to assume that the arbitrator flips a fair coin to 
choose a final offer. If this were the arbitrator's behavior, however, 
it is obvious that, instead of rewarding moderate behavior, the arbitrator 
would be rewarding the party making the more extreme demand with 
a 50 percent chance of success! Apparently, the alleged superiority of 
final-offer arbitration depends on the assumption that arbitrators will 
change their behavior when confronted by the final-offer arbitration 
procedure.
The Effect of Arbitral Uncertainty. Of course, this discussion of con 
ventional and final-offer arbitration depends entirely on the characteriza 
tion of arbitrators as simply "splitting the difference" in one way or 
another between the parties' offers in determining awards. Many ar 
bitrators, and some scholars, have begun to assert that this is not the 
way that arbitrators behave in any actual ongoing arbitration system. 
Instead, it is argued that arbitrators appear to behave in a similar way 
regardless of the type of systems under which they are asked to operate. 
In this view the arbitrator first arrives independently at some notion 
of a "reasonable" award based on the facts of the individual case. 
Although precisely how a reasonable award is fashioned is not com 
pletely specified, it seems very likely that, whatever the procedure,
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it will produce awards that differ from place to place and from arbitrator 
to arbitrator. It also seems likely that some of these differences in ar 
bitrators' preferred awards will remain unpredictable both to the par 
ties and to outside observers.
In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator then proceeds to fashion 
an award that may, to some extent, take into account both the positions 
of the parties and the arbitrator's own determination of a reasonable 
award. Under final-offer arbitration, on the other hand, an arbitrator 
will choose whichever final offer is the closer to the arbitrator's own 
determination of a reasonable award. Given the uncertainty associated 
with an arbitrated award, according to this analysis, we can expect a 
considerable incentive for the parties to negotiate their own settlement, 
regardless of whether the arbitration system is conventional or final- 
offer. There is, therefore, no "chilling effect" caused by the existence 
of either arbitration system. The chilling effect disappears so long as 
arbitrators introduce exogenous information into their decisions in a 
way that is to some extent unpredictable by the parties. It is this uncer 
tainty about their prospects that gives the parties an incentive to negotiate 
their own settlement in order to avoid the gamble an arbitrator's deci 
sion represents.
This discussion is a far cry from the simple analysis of the "chilling 
effect" of conventional arbitration with which I started. If it is a cor 
rect description of the way the arbitration process actually works, then 
it is clear that the simpler comparison of conventional and final-offer 
arbitration with which I started may be quite misleading. Moreover, 
the correct comparison between what may be expected under these two 
arbitration institutions will be considerably more complicated, and 
perhaps less conclusive. Which of these two analyses of the way ar 
bitrators behave are we to accept?
Ad Hoc versus Systematic Arbitration. In my view, both of these 
analyses have merit in the situations they were designed to describe. 
The confusion arises from failing to specify whether the analysis is to 
be applied to (a) an ongoing arbitration system where the parties will 
bargain repeatedly in the face of the same fixed, systemwide rules, or 
to (b) an ad hoc, one-time arbitration of a single dispute where the
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parties had no prior reason to suspect the dispute would be submitted 
to arbitration. It is, of course, very unlikely that situation (b) will oc 
cur more than once!
To see how the confusion may arise, consider a situation where the 
parties bargain with offer and counteroffer to a stalemate. Suppose that, 
contrary to the expectation of the parties, arbitration of the dispute is 
imposed by a third party, and that the arbitrator is made aware of the 
positions of the parties at the point of stalemate. Since the parties had 
no reason to suppose an arbitrator would be brought to the scene, there 
is no reason for the arbitrator to suppose that the positions of the par 
ties represent a mere bargaining posture. Instead, the arbitrator will 
assume that the parties' positions reflect reasonable concessions from 
both sides. Under these circumstances, it will be natural for the arbitrator 
to propose a settlement that "splits-the-difference" or lies midway bet 
ween the positions advanced by the parties at the point of stalemate. 4 
It is also clear, however, that this procedure will only work once. In 
future bargaining, the parties will expect the arbitrator to proceed the 
same way and "split-the-difference" in fashioning an award. This will, 
of course, give the parties the incentive to make extreme offers purely 
for the sake of impressing the arbitrator at the point of compromise. 
This is, of course, the "chilling effect" alleged to result from conven 
tional arbitration. Final-offer arbitration is a natural proposal to remedy 
this situation, but its effectiveness depends on the assumption that the 
arbitrator does not merely flip a fair coin to make a decision. Thus the 
advantage of final-offer arbitration is entirely a result of the assump 
tion that the arbitrator changes behavior under one system as opposed 
to another.
In practice, the arbitration systems used in the U.S. public sector are 
not of the ad hoc variety. They are, instead, fully specified systems 
within which the parties engage in repeated bargaining. It is natural 
in such systems to carry out private negotiations away from any poten 
tial arbitrator's presence so that offers and counteroffers will not be 
used by one party against the other during any subsequent arbitration 
hearing. (Indeed, it might be argued that arbitration statutes should be 
designed to further this purpose, so as to avoid any "chilling effect" 
of the statute.) 5 The result is that arbitrators are aware from the outset 
in these systems that the parties' offers, when presented in an arbitra-
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tion proceeding, are designed as bargaining positions. Since arbitrators 
cannot determine with certainty that the offers presented by the parties 
are realistic attempts at compromise, it follows that the arbitrator will 
necessarily be compelled to use external criteria, at least in part, in 
fashioning an award. This will be the case, of course, regardless of 
whether the arbitrator is operating under a conventional or final-offer 
arbitration system. Thus, a continuing arbitration system seems likely 
to implicitly require arbitrators to introduce external criteria in fashioning 
an arbitration award, regardless of whether there is a conventional or 
final-offer arbitration system.
Simulation Evidence on Arbitral Uncertainty. These are, or course, 
abstract arguments. As it turns out, there is considerable evidence emerg 
ing to support the view that arbitral uncertainty and arbitrator reference 
to external criteria are important aspects of the operating characteristics 
of U.S. arbitration systems. Moreover, arbitrators do not appear to 
change their decisionmaking when operating under different systems. 
There is also some evidence that the parties behave as if they unders 
tand this to be the case as well. Much of this evidence will emerge below, 
and here I only wish to give some indications of this evidence by showing 
its consistency with a recent questionnaire study of practicing arbitrators. 
This simulation study, by Henry Farber and Max Bazerman,6 reports 
the results of presenting 25 different economic scenarios to 64 actual 
arbitrators who then fashioned a wage increase award. Arbitrators were 
asked to fashion (or select) two awards, one on the assumption they 
were operating under a conventional arbitration system and the other 
as if they were operating under a final-offer arbitration system. Although 
there are important limitations to this approach, the results are quite 
revealing in that they are consistent with, but add considerable detail 
to, the data available from arbitration systems operating in the field.
A key finding is that when operating under a conventional arbitra 
tion system, arbitrators are far more heavily swayed by the facts of the 
case (as represented by wage rates of comparable workers, the infla 
tion rates and the financial health of the company) than by the last of 
fers presented by the parties. When the difference between the last of 
fers of the parties is small, Farber and Bazerman find that the facts
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receive about 75 percent of the weight in the arbitrator's decision, but 
that this fraction increases the further apart the last offers of the par 
ties. A simple interpretation of this result is that arbitrators view the 
parties' offers as typically carrying some information about where the 
parties might truly be willing to settle, but not much. As noted in the 
discussion of one-shot versus continuous arbitration systems, it seems 
likely that the weight placed on the parties' offers will be the greater, 
the greater the likelihood is that the arbitrator may consider the offers 
as having been made without the presumption they were merely a 
bargaining ploy. Unfortunately, the setup in Farber and Bazerman's 
study does not permit this hypothesis to be tested, and the design of 
such a test, while important, may be difficult.
Farber and Bazerman's results are obtained by experimentally vary 
ing the economic environments and the final offers that the arbitrators 
are instructed to consider. By comparing the arbitrators' awards when 
they face different offers in similar environments, Farber and Bazer- 
man can determine the extent to which differences in the offers arbitrators 
face influence their awards. Using similar methods, Farber and Bazer- 
man also can determine which parts of the economic environment in 
fluence arbitrator decisions. Here they find, as has been reported by 
others, that recent wage increases in "comparable settings" receive the 
largest weight in arbitrator decisions, although other factors are also 
important.
A second important conclusion of Farber and Bazerman's study is 
that the arbitrators, in their simulations, behaved as if they had selected 
essentially the same external criteria for an award regardless of whether 
they were operating under a conventional or final-offer arbitration 
system. In the case of conventional arbitration, the arbitrator simply 
imposed a reasonable award after due consideration of the facts and 
the parties' offers. In the case of final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator 
selected the parties' offer that was closest to the award the arbitrator 
would otherwise have imposed under conventional arbitration where 
the parties' offers were far apart. It follows that the arbitrators were 
behaving in a fashion that is consistent across institutional structures. 
Finally, Farber and Bazerman find that there is considerable 
variability in the awards that different arbitrators fashion in identical
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factual simulations. This suggests, but does not prove, that there may 
be considerable arbitral uncertainty facing the bargainers in interest ar 
bitration systems. If the bargainers are risk averse, such uncertainty 
should naturally produce an incentive for negotiated settlements. To 
determine whether such uncertainty exists, however, would require that 
two arbitrators be observed to fashion different awards in an actual ar 
bitration case, a situation that we will encounter shortly.
How Arbitrators are Selected and Paid
Unlike the U.K. and Canada, U.S. arbitrators' fees are generally borne 
by the parties. The fee schedule may be regulated by a state agency 
establishing a maximum fee, but its payment is generally split equally 
by the parties.
An important feature of U.S. arbitration systems is that the parties 
generally play an important role in selecting who shall be the arbitrator 
in a particular case. I have come to believe that this procedure has an 
important effect on the stability of the operating characteristics of in 
terest arbitration systems.
The selection of arbitrators usually proceeds in two stages. In the first 
stage, a third (governmental) organization produces a list of potential 
arbitrator names that is circulated to the parties. (In the private sector, 
this function is often served, for a fee, by the nonprofit American Ar 
bitration Association.) In the second step, the parties express their 
preferences for the arbitrators whose names are on the proposed list. 
Sometimes the proposed list of arbitrators is simply passed back and 
forth between the parties, with each party striking one name each time 
the list is passed, until one name remains. Alternatively, the parties may 
be asked to veto one or more names from the proposed list, and to rank 
order the remainder. Subject to an arbitrator's availability, the lowest 
sum of ranks then determines the arbitrator selected.
At first blush, it may seem surprising that the parties are asked to 
participate in the selection of the arbitrator. After all, if the parties are 
in a dispute which they cannot settle, it may seem odd that they are 
asked to select the arbitrator who will settle it for them. In fact, it is 
this aspect of the process that underscores the ultimately cooperative 
nature of arbitration systems.
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It seems clear that so long as the parties play so central a role in ar 
bitrator selection, it is likely that arbitrator behavior will contain an 
essentially unpredictable component. After all, if the arbitrator's posi 
tion is known, then it is likely that one or the other of the parties will 
have reason to strike the arbitrator from the proposed list. Apart from 
this unpredictable component, it is unclear what other factors are like 
ly to determine arbitrator popularity.
In a remarkable study, Bloom and Cavanagh have recently examin 
ed the determinants of arbitrator selection using the actual ranking by 
disputants of arbitrators selected in disputes involving police officers 
in New Jersey. 7 The evidence from their study indicates that both par 
ties view the characteristics of individual arbitrators in roughly the same 
way. This suggests that the parties may be acting in a moderately 
cooperative way in the selection of arbitrators.
Bloom and Cavanagh ask, and answer, two questions. First, do the 
parties tend to rank (and hence state their preferences for) the arbitrators 
on a given panel in a way that is positively or negatively correlated? 
They find that the parties' rankings are weakly positively correlated. 
This implies that there is such a thing as "arbitrator popularity." The 
question then remains, what determines arbitrator popularity? Bloom 
and Cavanagh find, first, that prior win-loss tallies under final-offer 
arbitration are uncorrelated with the parties preferences. This suggests 
that the parties are not "punishing" arbitrators for previous performance. 
Bloom and Cavanagh also find that the main determinant of arbitrator 
popularity is the amount of the arbitrator's prior experience. This sug 
gests that the arbitrator's "reputation" is a key determinant of the par 
ties' preferences.
Although it remains conjecture at this point, it seems likely that there 
is a connection between (a) the fact that the parties' preferences are 
a key determinant of arbitrator selection, and (b) the statistical regularity 
in the operating characteristics of the two arbitration systems describ 
ed below. In any event, the cooperative nature of arbitrator selection 
may well be an important factor in the acceptability of arbitrator awards 
by the parties. At a minimum, it seems clear that this method of ar 
bitrator selection is likely to enhance the feelings of the parties that they 
will receive a "fair shake" in any arbitration award. It is no doubt such
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"feelings" that determine the acceptability of the entire arbitration 
system.
Final-Offer Arbitration in New Jersey8
Unsettled disputes betweenNew Jersey police unions and municipalities 
have been subject to binding arbitration since 1977. The arbitration law 
is designed to give the parties considerable leeway in designing their 
own arbitration mechanisms. When the parties can agree on nothing 
else, however, their dispute is resolved by final-offer arbitration on the 
package of economic issues. As table 1 indicates, in 1978 about 35 per 
cent of bargaining cases in New Jersey were settled by recourse to final- 
offer arbitration, although this percentage has dropped each year since.
Table 1
The Results of Final-Offer Arbitration 
of New Jersey Police Disputes
Proportion of employer victories
Mean of employer compensation offers
Mean of union compensation offers
Mean of final-offer compensation
awards
Standard deviation of final offer awards
Proportion of bargaining cases going
to final-offer arbitration
1980
.266
5.70%
8.54%
8.10%
1.41%
.23
1979
.348
6.51%
8.29%
7.57%
1.48%
.28
1978
.317
5.01%
7.14%
6.63%
1.19%
.35
The only alternative arbitration mechanism of which the parties have 
made much use in New Jersey is conventional arbitration. As table 2 
indicates, in 1978 about 14 percent of bargaining cases in New Jersey 
were settled by recourse to conventional arbitration, although this per 
centage has subsequently stabilized at about 6 to 7 percent.
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It is natural for both employers and unions to inquire as to how they 
typically fare under a final-offer statute. The tabulation of "box scores" 
or "win-loss" records is inevitable. Even when these tabulations are 
not publicly available, it appears that they are the subject of considerable 
informed discussion and folklore.
The first row of table 1 contains the box score for the New Jersey 
experience. In 1978, arbitrators selected the union offer on total com 
pensation in 68 percent of final-offer arbitration cases. In 1979 and 1980 
arbitrators selected the union offer on total compensation in 65 and 73 
percent of final-offer cases, respectively. In sum, under the New Jersey 
statute, union offers have been selected most of the time in final-offer 
arbitration cases. There is no sign that this is a transitory phenomenon. 
This raises a question for the evaluation of this arbitration statute. Why 
have arbitrators most often selected the union offers in the New Jersey 
final-offer arbitration cases?
A Simple Model
Presumably, most of us expected to see approximately 50 percent 
of the union offers selected under final-offer arbitration. This is why 
the considerably higher percentages listed in table 1 seem surprising. 
To understand why this might not be a reasonable presumption, it is 
necessary to spell out what underlying model of arbitrator behavior and 
union and employer behavior we presumed would produce this 50-50 
result.
First, it seems reasonable to suppose that a fair arbitrator would be 
one who considered the objective considerations in a particular case 
and then settled on what, in the arbitrator's mind, seemed a preferred 
settlement. As I have observed, little is known about precisely how ar 
bitrators determine their preferred awards other than the consensus that 
they represent a sort of * 'going rate.'' Given that the arbitrator has deter 
mined a preferred award, however, it seems clear that a fair arbitrator 
must select whichever offer is closest to it.
We may suppose that the union and employer also understand this 
process. Using their best estimates of the arbitrator's preference they 
will then shape their own offers. They will understand that a higher 
offer by either party will increase the probability that the employer's
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offer will be selected. Similarly, a lower offer by either party may be 
assumed to increase the probability that the union's offer will be selected. 
As a result, most of us would expect that the union and employer of 
fers would tend to fall equally distant from, but on opposite sides of, 
the parties' best estimate of the arbitrator's preferred award. If this hap 
pens, then, we should naturally expect the union's offer to be selected, 
on average, in one-half of the cases.
It follows from this discussion that there are two different types of 
reasons why the union offer may not be selected in one-half of the cases. 
First, the arbitrators may not follow the decision process set out above. 
In particular, arbitrators may systematically give less weight to a 
generous employer offer than to a conservative union offer. If this is 
the case, then the integrity of the arbitration system is being seriously 
undermined. One may even wonder how long it is likely to last.
Second, it may be that, for one reason or another, the parties do not 
typically position themselves equally distant from, but on opposite sides 
of, the arbitrator's expected award. This could happen for one of two 
reasons. On the one hand, unions may have a more conservative view 
of what arbitrators will allow than do employers. On the other hand, 
unions may be more fearful of taking the risk of losing the arbitrator's 
decision than are employers. In either case we may expect that the union 
offers will be conservative relative to the award that arbitrators will 
typically prefer. Hence, the union offers will be disproportionately 
selected by the arbitrators.
It is important to inquire as to whether it is possible to distinguish 
empirically between these two alternative explanations for the dispropor 
tionate selection of union offers. If final-offer arbitration is operating 
alone, it should be obvious that there is no simple way to untangle which 
of these explanations is correct. After all, to determine whether the union 
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers we must be able 
to uncover the central tendency of the arbitrators' preferred awards for 
comparison. Since these preferred awards are unobservable when final- 
offer arbitration operates by itself, however, there would be no simple 
way to do this.
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Data Analysis
In New Jersey, the same pool of arbitrators is used in both final-offer 
arbitration and conventional arbitration cases simultaneously. If we may 
assume that arbitrators simply assign their preferred awards in the con 
ventional arbitration cases, then the numerical central tendency of these 
awards can serve as a benchmark for determining whether the union 
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers. A comparison 
of tables 1 and 2 reveals that this is indeed the case.
In 1980, for example, the mean employer offer was an annual wage 
increase of 5.7 percent, while the mean union offer was an annual wage 
increase of 8.5 percent. According to table 2, however, the mean con 
ventional arbitration award was 8.3 percent. Hence, if we may take 
the conventional arbitration awards as broadly indicative of arbitrators' 
preferred awards, it is clear that the union and employer offers were 
not centered at equal distances from, and on opposite sides of, the ar 
bitrators' preferred awards. Instead, the union offers were very con 
servative relative to the arbitrators' preferred awards. A comparison 
of the mean of the union and employer offers with the mean of the con 
ventional arbitration awards in 1978 and 1979 exhibits precisely the 
same phenomenon.
Table 2
The Results of Conventional Arbitration 
of New Jersey Police Disputes
1980 1979 1978
Mean of conventional compensation awards 8.26% 8.59% 6.55%
Predicted mean of conventional awards using 
data on final offer arbitration cases only and 
assuming "fair" arbitrators 8.27% 8.51% 7.41%
Standard deviation of conventional awards 2.10% 2.27% 2.21%
Predicted standard deviation of conventional 
awards using data on final offer arbitration 
cases only and assuming "fair" arbitrators 1.48% 2.54% 2.70%
Proportion of bargaining cases going to 
conventional arbitration .07 .06 .14
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It is possible to test statistically whether it is reasonable to suppose 
that the final-offer arbitration decisions in New Jersey were generated 
by a set of fair arbitrators who were systematically applying the con 
ventional arbitration standards. To do this, assume that arbitrators 
selected whichever offer was closest to their preferred award. Examining 
the final-offer arbitration data alone, it is then possible to estimate what 
central tendency (mean) and measure of variability (standard deviation) 
of arbitrator preferences is most likely to have generated the actual final- 
offer arbitration decisions observed.9 This part of our analysis could 
be constructed even if final-offer arbitration were the only arbitration 
mechanism operating.
It is then necessary to compare these estimates from the final-offer 
arbitration data against the actual central tendency and measure of 
variability for arbitrator preferences revealed by conventional arbitra 
tion data. This part of the analysis is only possible under a statute like 
New Jersey's. Lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 of table 2 contain the results with 
which to make the comparisons.
In 1980, for example, the actual mean of conventional arbitration 
awards was 8.26 percent, while the mean predicted as generating the 
final-offer arbitration awards if arbitrators were applying the conven 
tional arbitration standards was a remarkably close 8.27 percent. The 
comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are nearly as close, as can be seen from 
table 2. For 1980, the actual standard deviation of conventional arbitra 
tion awards was 2.1 percent, while the standard deviation predicted as 
generating the final-offer arbitration awards was a very similar 1.5 per 
cent. The comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are even closer.
In sum, the comparison of the pattern of the final-offer arbitration 
and conventional arbitration awards explains why the union offers were 
most often selected by arbitrators. The union offers were very conser 
vative relative to the pool of arbitrators' preferred awards. There is no 
evidence that arbitrators treat generous employer offers any different 
ly than they treat conservative union offers. Instead, the union offers 
are most often selected because the frequency of conservative union 
offers is considerably greater than the frequency of generous employer 
offers.
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This finding does not imply that the New Jersey arbitrators, taken 
as a group, may not be more (or less) generous than some outside 
observer of the arbitration process in New Jersey would approve. For 
example, the analysis implies that the central tendency of arbitrators' 
preferred awards in 1980 was around 8.3 percent, regardless of whether 
an arbitrator was working in the final-offer arbitration or conventional 
arbitration framework. Does this imply that the arbitrators were too 
generous in their general outlook?
The framework used here provides no answer to this question, and 
no doubt different answers would be given from different perspectives. 
The basic point, however, is that this issue cannot be settled by an ap 
peal to win-loss tallies under final-offer arbitration either. Only an 
analysis of actual awards and an appeal to some external criterion of 
fairness can answer the question of whether the arbitrators have behaved 
in a more (or less) generous fashion than is desirable.
Final-Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration Compared
The conservative union behavior revealed in tables 1 and 2 results 
in a paradox. Unions actually received lower average wage increases 
under the final-offer arbitration provisions than under the conventional 
arbitration provisions of the New Jersey statute. For example, in 1980 
the mean of the actual final-offer arbitration awards was 8.1 percent, 
but the mean of the conventional arbitration awards was higher at 8.3 
percent. The union offers are accepted in a vast majority of the final- 
offer arbitration cases, but average union wage increases are lower under 
final-offer arbitration than under conventional arbitration. Although con 
servative union offers increase the likelihood of acceptance, this is not 
enough to offset the lower wage increase that is won. Appearances are 
indeed deceiving!
The result is that the union bargainers have taken a small loss in their 
mean wage increases under final-offer arbitration relative to what would 
have prevailed under conventional arbitration. It is also clear from a 
comparison of tables 1 and 2, however, that the union bargainers have 
gained something in return under final-offer arbitration.
In 1980, for example, the standard deviation of conventional arbitra 
tion awards was 2.1 percent, but the standard deviation of final-offer
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arbitration actual awards was only 1.4 percent, and the same discrepancy 
exists in 1979 and 1978. Thus, what the union bargainers gave up by 
way of a decrease in the mean award under final-offer arbitration they 
made up by a reduction in its variability. The union bargainers have 
bought "insurance" with their conservative offers, albeit at a cost in 
their wage settlements. This suggests that union bargainers may be more 
risk averse than employer bargainers in New Jersey.
Tri-Offer Arbitration in Iowa10
The data describing the operating characteristics of the New Jersey 
arbitration statute are an early indication that arbitration systems are 
especially amenable to convincing statistical analyses. Precisely why 
this should be the case is not yet known. Nevertheless, it is important 
to establish that this is a general characteristic of such systems by ex 
amining data from other operating systems to the extent this is possi 
ble. Some preliminary work has been done in the analysis of a quite 
remarkable statute for interest arbitration that has existed in Iowa since 
1976.
The structure of the Iowa statute provides the opportunity to examine 
three important questions about the way arbitration systems work. In 
the Iowa system, the parties have the option of negotiating a system 
of their own choosing, and in some cases this has led to the adoption 
of final-offer arbitration. Hence, it is possible to compare the results 
of the preceding analysis in New Jersey with some additional data from 
Iowa. Second, the system used in Iowa in most cases is designed (sure 
ly not intentionally) so that it is possible to observe two independent 
neutral arbitrators' observations on the same dispute. This provides an 
opportunity to assess the existence and extent of genuine arbitral uncer 
tainty that exists in the arbitration system. Finally, the Iowa system has 
operated long enough that it is possible to generate several years of time- 
series data for the purpose of assessing the way in which arbitration 
awards respond to changes in economic circumstances.
156 Dispute Resolution Systems
Structure of the Tri-Offer Arbitration System
As noted, the Iowa statute allows the parties considerable leeway in 
the design of a system for settling a dispute. If the parties do not agree 
to an alternative procedure, however, they are compelled to resolve 
their dispute by a two-step, tri-offer system. Under this system, the par 
ties are first provided a fact-finder to propose the terms on which the 
dispute might be settled. After the parties have seen the fact-finder's 
proposal, they may negotiate their own settlement. If they do not agree 
on a settlement, the parties are compelled to submit their best offers 
to a second arbitrator. The second arbitrator must select the employer's 
offer, the union's offer, or, in a novel twist, the arbitrator may select 
the earlier fact-finder's proposal. Obviously, the extent to which the 
second arbitrator does not concur in the fact-finder's proposal is a 
measure of the degree of arbitral uncertainty that exists in the system.
Undoubtedly, the rationale of the two-step procedure is the recogni 
tion that disputes may arise because one or the other of the parties is 
poorly informed about the likely results of an arbitrated outcome. The 
fact-finder's proposal should serve to inform the parties of the likely 
outcomes. If this does not resolve the dispute, however, it is ultimately 
arbitrated.
The Fact-Finder Proposals
Over the period 1976-83, some 302 cases were submitted to the Iowa 
fact-finders. Of these, 181 (or 60 percent) were settled after the fact- 
finder's recommendation was submitted. This suggests that the infor 
mation produced for the parties by the fact-finders may be an impor 
tant ingredient bringing the parties to a settlement.
Table 3 contains the time-series of data on the average compensation 
increase proposed by the fact-finders in Iowa over the period 1976-83. 
There is one important conclusion suggested by these data: The typical 
fact-finder's proposal does move systematically over this period, rang 
ing from a high of 9.4 percent in 1980 to a low of 3.5 percent in 1983. 
A casual analysis suggests that fact-finder proposals move in a way quite 
similar to wage settlements in the rest of the economy, but perhaps with 
a lag. Further analysis of this issue is clearly required. The important 
point is that the fact-finders are not suggesting awards that are con-
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tinuously at extremes relative to those generated in other parts of the 
economy. It is natural to inquire, therefore, as to the relationship be 
tween these fact-finder proposals and the awards that appear under 
arbitration.
Table 3
Fact-Finders Recommendation (Percent Wage Increase) 
in Iowa Public Sector Wage Disputes
Year
All years
1976a
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Mean
5.96
6.18
5.22
5.08
6.19
9.44
7.65
5.64
3.51
Standard 
deviation
2.51
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
Number 
of cases
302
22
29
18
49
37
40
41
66
SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For 
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is 
the same for each year.
Final-Offer Arbitration
In some circumstances, the parties in Iowa negotiate an arrangement 
where, by mutual consent, the fact-finding step is eliminated from the 
arbitration statute. The system is effectively final-offer arbitration when 
this occurs.
Data on the mean union and employer offers in these cases is con 
tained in table 4. Also contained in the table are the win-loss records 
under final-offer arbitration in these cases. Having observed that the 
majority of arbitration decisions in New Jersey are for the union offer, 
it may come as some surprise that just the reverse is the case in Iowa. 
As the table indicates, over the period 1976-83, employer offers have 
been accepted in two-thirds of the final-offer arbitration cases. Does
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this mean that the arbitrators in Iowa had a pro-employer bias? Or was 
it the case that, in contrast to New Jersey, the employer offers were 
the more reasonable?
Table 4
Cases of Arbitration without Fact-Finding 
in Iowa (Percent Wage Increase)
Offers proposed by 
unions
Offers proposed by 
employer
Standard Percent Standard Percent Number 
Mean deviation wins Mean deviation wins of cases
All years 7.54 2.91 34.5 4.89 2.57 65.5 58
1976a
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
10.61
8.26
13.89
9.01
10.89
6.91
4.84
2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21
0
27.3
100
0
33.3
25
57.1
5.67
5.52
5.57
6.68
8.95
5.14
1.50
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37
100
72.7
0
100
66.7
75
42.9
5
11
3
3
6
0
16
14
SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For 
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is 
the same for each year.
If we may assume that the fact-finders' proposals are a reasonable 
benchmark for arbitrator preferences, then this question may be analyzed 
in much the same way as it was analyzed in New Jersey. To see how 
this is done, consider the mean of the union and employer offers for 
1976. As indicated in table 4, the union offers averaged 10.6 percent 
and the employer offers averaged 5.7 percent. To see which of these 
was the more reasonable we may contrast them against the mean of 
the fact-finders' proposals in 1976, which was 6.2 percent. Using the 
fact-finders' proposals as a benchmark, therefore, the employer offers 
appear considerably more "reasonable" than the union offers. Consis 
tent with this comparison, table 4 indicates that the employer offers were
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accepted in all the 1976 cases. Although not so extreme, this same 
analysis is consistent with the data in each year until 1983. (The excep 
tion is 1978, but this involves only three cases.) Thus, in each of the 
years from 1976 through 1982, the mean of the employer offers was 
nearer the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was the mean of the 
union offers. During this period, the employer offers were accepted 
in 73 percent of the cases.
The exception is 1983, when the union and employer bargainers ap 
pear to have changed their offers so that the mean of the union offers 
was slightly closer to the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was 
the mean of the employer offers. Remarkably enough, in 1983 the union 
offers were accepted in 57 percent of the cases. Recall, too, that the 
fact-finder proposals used to benchmark these results are from entirely 
independent cases.
Like the data for New Jersey, these results for Iowa strongly con 
firm the hypothesis that the arbitrators, as a group, are behaving in a 
manner that is consistent across institutional structures. Thus, the reason 
why union offers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than 
are employer offers in New Jersey, and the reason why employer of 
fers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than are union of 
fers in Iowa, is not because the arbitrators in these two states are behaving 
differently. Instead, the win-loss awards under final-offer arbitration 
in New Jersey and Iowa are different because the union and employer 
bargainers are behaving differently in these two states. The union 
bargainers appear to put forward the more reasonable offers in New 
Jersey, while the employer bargainers appear to put forward the more 
reasonable offers in Iowa. Just why this should be the case is an impor 
tant question for further research.
Tri-Offer Arbitration
The data giving win-loss records for the cases ending in tri-offer ar 
bitration are contained in table 5. Surprisingly, in nearly one-half of 
these cases the union or the employer final offer coincides with the earlier 
fact-finder's recommendation. As the table indicates, it was slightly more 
often the case that the union's offer, rather than the employer's offer, 
coincided with the fact-finder's recommendations.
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TableS 
Tri-Offer Arbitration Results in Iowa
Employer's Fact-finder's
offer recommendation Union offer
Number Arrangement accepted accepted accepted 
of cases of offers (% of cases) (% of cases) (% of cases)
63 Three distinct offers 23.8 63.5 12.7
32 Union offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation 34.4 65.6 65.6
26 Employer offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation 61.5 61.5 38.4
The data in table 5 provide a very strong test of the hypothesis that 
arbitration decisions contain an element of behavior that is truly un 
predictable by the parties. After all, in each of the cases contained in 
table 5, two independent neutrals examined an identical factual situa 
tion. If the arbitrator does not select the fact-finder's recommendation, 
it appears that two qualified neutrals have disagreed on the appropriate 
award in the idential case. If this is a fairly common situation, it seems 
very unlikely that the parties will be able to predict arbitral outcomes 
with any precision.
The first row of table 5 indicates that where there were three distinct 
offers available for selection, the arbitrator and fact-finder agreed in 
about two-thirds of the cases. Remarkably enough, the second and third 
rows of table 5 indicate that, even when union or employer offers coin 
cide with the fact-finder's recommendation, the arbitrator still selects 
the fact-finder's position in only about two-thirds of the cases. In view 
of the possibility that arbitrators may be naturally inclined to defer to 
the fact-finder's proposal, this seems like strong evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the parties face some true arbitral uncertainty.
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Conclusions
It should be apparent from this brief survey that a great deal has been 
learned from the interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. in 
the public sector. For reasons that still remain unclear, simple statistical 
analyses continue to confirm a very stable set of operating characteristics 
for these systems. The data suggest that the arbitrators base decisions 
partly on the facts of the situation and partly on a unique assessment 
of what is an appropriate award in a given factual situation. The data 
also suggest that the determination of an appropriate award is largely 
independent of the type of arbitration system in which the arbitrator 
operates. As a result, the variability in the outcomes that exists across 
arbitration systems is a product either of constraints placed on arbitrator 
decisions by the institutional setup (for example, the selection of one 
of two offers under final-offer arbitration) or of differences in the 
behavior of the parties in response to different institutional setups. 
Precisely why arbitrator decisions may be characterized in this way is 
not yet known, but I suspect it is related to the importance of the role 
assigned to the parties own preferences in determining which arbitrator 
will have their case. In this sense private arbitration systems have a 
clear advantage of quasi-judicial or "legal" systems. Although the parties 
cannot agree on how to settle their dispute, they apparently do often 
share some common views regarding which neutral party should resolve 
it for them. It seems very likely that an arbitration system that exploits 
this fact will enhance its own acceptability.
In my view, the purpose of arbitration systems is to produce the set 
tlement of disputes in a way that is less costly than the alternatives. 
Whether interest arbitration will grow in popularity depends on whether 
it is a less costly system than the alternatives and on whether the par 
ties are able to obtain the information and experience necessary for deter 
mining whether it is less costly. This suggests that any experimenta 
tion with arbitration systems should be studied with care so that its costs 
and benefits can be examined and compared against the alternatives. 
If successful, the rewards to such study may be of considerable prac 
tical importance in reducing the overall cost of disputes in our society.
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NOTES
1. See Richard A. Lester, Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government, Industrial 
Relations Section, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, a book to which 
much of what follows is deeply indebted. For a survey of Canadian systems see Morley 
Gunderson, Economic Aspects of Interest Arbitration, Ontario Economic Council, Toron 
to, 1983.
2. This is an important issue, because interest arbitration is an option open to private 
sector disputants that is rarely used. Just as we may question why interest arbitration 
is so infrequently used in the private sector, so may we wonder why it is used in the 
public sector.
3. I have in mind here, and in what follows, the case where a dispute arises over 
compensation or some other quantitative issue. Obviously, where the issue involves 
a truly "yes or no decision," such as the granting of dues checkoff rights, final-offer 
arbitration is the conventional arbitration procedure.
4. In private correspondence J.E. Treble, of the University of Hull, has suggested 
that the situation I have just described bares some similarity to the state of affairs in 
late 19th century British coal mining.
5. It is sometimes observed that this is much the same as the principle in the civil 
law that proposals in settlement negotiations may not be used as evidence in a subse 
quent trial. This is presumably designed to encourage negotiated settlements of civil suits!
6. H.S. Farber and M.H. Bazerman, "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: 
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, October 1984.
7. See David Bloom and Christopher Cavanagh, "An Analysis of the Selection of 
Arbitrators," Harvard University, June 1984.
8. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with David 
Bloom of Harvard University. See Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of 
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984, 
and Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impar 
tiality by Win-Loss Tallies under Final-Offer Arbitration,'' Labor Law Journal, August 
1983.
9. Greater variability of arbitrator preferences will lead to a flatter slope of the rela 
tionship between the probability that an employer's offer is selected and the (average 
of) the union and employer final offers. Thus, the slope of this relationship in the final- 
offer arbitration cases is a measure of the (inverse of) the variability of arbitrator 
preferences. The method of estimation we use is called maximum likelihood, because 
it assigns values to the mean and standard deviation of arbitrator preferences that are 
most likely to have generated observed final-offer arbitration data under our assump 
tion about arbitrator behavior. The details of the method we use and some additional 
empirical material are contained in Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of 
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984.
10. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with James 
Dow of Princeton University and Daniel Gallagher of the University of Pittsburgh.
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